with whom MACK, Senior Judge, joins, dissenting:
On two prior occasions, the en banc court has defined plain error. See Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145 (D.C.1985) (en banc); Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706 (D.C.1976) (en banc). Thus, the government agrees that plain error occurs when “the error complained of [is] so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.” Watts, supra, 362 A.2d at 709. It further agrees that the plain error rule applies to “a trial infected with error so ‘plain’ the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it.” Appellee’s petition for rehearing en banc at 2 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). In my opinion the proper application of this test requires reversal here.
The majority concludes that the prosecutor’s “impropriety” in violating the missing witness rules was insufficient to warrant reversal. In order to reach this conclusion the majority underestimates both the gravity of the error in this case and the error’s importance to appellant’s trial and to the judicial system as a whole. In view of long-standing decisions of the court, the prosecutor’s misconduct was clear. Yet the trial judge inexplicably failed to correct the situation. Furthermore, defense counsel’s failure to object was unprofessional. This combination of circumstances virtually compels the conclusion that appellant’s trial can only be characterized as a “miscarriage of justice.” Under such circumstances, the court should find plain error both because the error had an “unfair prejudicial impact on the jury deliberations” and because the errors “seriously affected] the ... integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936). The failure to do so here leaves the plain error doctrine with little meaning. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I.
According to the majority, the prosecutor’s misconduct1 in the instant case was failing to ask the trial judge’s permission before cross-examining appellant in a manner that raised missing witness inferences. I agree that the prosecutor clearly erred in failing to seek the trial judge’s permission before cross-examihing appellant about whether he had asked missing witnesses to come to court to testify on his behalf.2 The majority concludes, however, that this error was relatively unimportant, because if the prosecutor had sought the trial judge’s permission, “it would have been within the trial court’s ‘considerable discretion’ to allow [the] cross-examination.” Majority *169opinion at 163 (quotation omitted). I cannot agree.
Before raising a missing witness inference, the party must demonstrate “(1) that the witness in question is peculiarly available to the party against whom the inference is sought, and (2) that the witness’ testimony would have elucidated the transaction at issue.” Lawson v. United States, 514 A.2d 787, 789 (D.C.1986). The purpose of this rule is to prevent the jury from being exposed to an argument that “may add a fictitious weight to one side or another of the case_” Arnold v. United States, 511 A.2d 399, 415 (D.C.1986) (quoting Burgess v. United States, 142 U.S.App. D.C. 198, 206, 440 F.2d 226, 234 (1970)).
During the cross-examination of appellant, the prosecutor asked appellant how he arrived at the scene of the arrest:
Q [by the government]: And how did you get there?
A [by appellant]: I walked.
Q: From where?
A: Walked from I say 9th to — it was over by the Florida Avenue Grill visiting a friend and I walked from there. That would be at 11th and Florida Avenue.
Q: What time were you visiting your friend?
A: I say around about 11:30, maybe quarter to 12:00.
Q: Do you still know that friend?
A: Yeah.
Q: Did you ask — did you try to see if you could get that friend to come in here and testify?
A: Yes, I did but they don’t want to be — like, okay, I even seen one of the guys that I was gambling with but they don’t want to get caught up in no cases whereas they might can get another charge for testifying or they don’t want to be able to like — like no police to see them where they could can have to be like harassing them. Because the police harass people.
Q: I’m not sure I understand. You mean that your friends wouldn’t testify because they have prior criminal records?
A: They wouldn’t testify. I’m saying I just got caught up in something, you know, and I got to deal with it. They wouldn’t testify for me.
Q: Is that because they have prior criminal records?
A: I have no knowledge of that. [Emphasis added]
This questioning clearly violated the missing witness rules because the prosecutor failed to obtain prior permission from the trial judge. See note 2, supra. More important, even if the prosecutor had asked permission, the judge would have to have denied it. The “Florida Avenue Grill friend” observed appellant hours before the drug sale and many blocks away. It is arguable whether the witness could have offered even relevant testimony; the witness surely could not have offered testimony that would “elucidate the transaction.” See Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 131 (D.C.1980) (“appellant’s testimony was that he was with ... friends earlier on the night of the incident observing a fire some one to two blocks from the warehouses. [T]heir testimony ... would have shed no light on whether appellant did or did not break into the warehouse later that evening”); Haynes v. United States, 318 A.2d 901, 902 (D.C.1974) (“[t]he absent witness here ... was present at the door of the house, where she allegedly lived, shortly before the officers first encountered appellant. ... We cannot see in what manner she could elucidate that transaction which is the subject of this prosecution”).
The prosecutor’s questions thus did exactly what the missing witness rule is designed to prevent: they suggested that the jury draw an improper adverse inference from the Florida Avenue Grill friend’s absence at trial. See Lemon, supra, 564 A.2d at 1375 (“even where no adverse inference is expressly requested, the effect of the ‘incomplete’ argument is substantially the same as that of a more explicit one”). As our decisions make clear, the fact that the Florida Avenue Grill friend did not testify at trial proves only that he had *170nothing important to add to appellant’s defense.3
The prosecutor went on, during appellant’s cross-examination, to question appellant about another missing witness:
Q [by the government]: Well, who were you playing dice with?
A [by appellant]: I was playing dice with some guys that play, you know, we play regular around the area.
Q: Well, you said you knew some of them, what were their names?
A: One was Raymond Jones.
Q: Where does Raymond Jones live?
A: I do not know his address.
Q: You don’t know his address?
A: No.
* ’ * * * * *
Q: And you — you only knew one person?
A: I only knew one person.
Q: And you tried to get him come down here and testify?
A: Uh-uh, I just seen him. I talked to him when I was out the last time on the street.
Q: When was that?
A: Back in May.
Q: And what did he say?
A: He said he couldn’t come for me. Q: Why is that?
A: Because they just won’t come to court, man. I don’t know why, they just — I mean, you know, if you get caught up, you just gotta deal with it the best way it is, the best way you can. That’s the way it is.
This questioning was equally flawed, both because the prosecutor failed to ask for prior permission, see note 2, supra, and because permission would not have been granted. In particular, the government did not show that Raymond Jones was “peculiarly available” to appellant.
The court in Carr v. United States, 531 A.2d 1010, 1012-13 (D.C.1987), made clear that a witness is “peculiarly available” to the defendant if the witness is “physically unavailable” or “practically unavailable” to the government. “We have held that a witness can be peculiarly available when ‘physically available’ to only one of the parties, for example, to a defendant, but beyond the subpoena power of the government ...” Id. at 1012 (citation omitted). In addition, a witness can be “practically unavailable” if one “party’s ability to produce the witness, or his reasons for doing so, [are] stronger than those of the party seeking an inference in his favor.... [I]f a party has a special relationship with a witness, that witness becomes unavailable in a practical sense to the opposing party because his testimony is expected to be hostile.” Id. at 1013 (quoting Thomas v. United States, 447 A.2d 52, 58 (D.C.1982); Dent v. United States, 404 A.2d 165, 170 (D.C. 1979)).
Applying these principles, it becomes clear that the government failed to demonstrate that Raymond Jones was peculiarly available to appellant. First, the government failed to demonstrate that Jones was physically available to either party. Harris gave uncontradicted testimony that he did not know where Jones lived, and that Jones would not testify voluntarily. Furthermore, to the extent that Harris could use compulsory process to bring Jones in, the government had the same option. Moreover, the fact that Jones was described as a “friend” of Harris is not enough to show that Jones was practically unavailable to the government. Carr, supra, 531 A.2d at 1014 (“Friends testify against other friends. That relationship alone cannot justify the missing witness instruction, at least without further exploration”). Thus, the government made no showing of unavailability.
The majority’s conclusion to the contrary distorts the missing witness rule by requiring a defendant — the party against whom the inference is raised — to disprove the appropriateness of the inference. As our decisions make clear, however, the party raising the inference — in this case, the *171government — is obliged to “establish the two foundation conditions to the court’s satisfaction.” Carr, supra, 531 A.2d at 1012 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 444 A.2d 962, 964 (D.C.1982)). Although the majority refers to “the government’s argument that Raymond Jones was peculiarly available to [appellant],” majority opinion at 163, the majority's focus on the inadequacy of appellant’s “response,” majority opinion at 162-163, is misplaced. The government had the burden of demonstrating that the inference was justified; because the government failed to meet its burden, appellant had no obligation to make a “bona fide reasonable effort[] to produce the witness.... ” Majority opinion at 163 (quoting Thomas v. United States, 447 A.2d 52, 57 (D.C.1982).4 Appellant did not need to respond, because the government never made a sufficient showing. Moreover, the majority ignores appellant’s testimony on redirect, which indicated that appellant had asked his attorney to subpoena the missing witnesses, but that his attorney could not locate them.5
In sum, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the prosecutor’s error in this case. The majority concludes that the prosecutor’s error was no more serious than an infraction in the children's game of “Mother, may I?” In my view, the error is far more serious. In addition to failing to ask the judge’s permission, the prosecutor engaged in cross-examination that raised an improper missing witness inference: an inference that the trial judge, had he been apprised of the prosecutor’s intentions, would have refused to permit. The jury was thereby exposed to an inference that can carry “fictitious weight” and which this court has repeatedly declared off limits. See Part II, infra.
II.
The question remains whether the prose-cutorial misconduct warrants reversal. Because appellant’s counsel did not object at trial, we must decide whether the errors constituted “plain error.” In my view, reversal is warranted for two reasons.
A.
First, the “error[s] complained of [were] so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.” Watts, supra, 362 A.2d at 709. In Thomas, supra, the court made clear that “where the defendant’s credibility is a key issue and the missing witness inference goes to that credibility, an improper argument or instruction will ordinarily require reversal.” 447 A.2d at 59, quoted in Lawson, supra, 514 A.2d at 790; see Simmons, supra, 444 A.2d at 965; Coombs v. United States, 399 A.2d 1313, 1318 (D.C.1979). The court has pointed out, moreover, that “repetition is an important factor in determining the gravity of such misconduct....” Parks v. United States, 451 A.2d 591, 614 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945, 103 S.Ct. 2123, 77 L.Ed.2d 1303 (1983); Dent v. United States, 404 A.2d 165, 172 (D.C.1979). If, however, there is overwhelming evidence of a defendant’s guilt or of a tactical choice by the defendant, then the alleged error does not effect a “miscarriage of justice” requiring reversal of a conviction on ap*172peal. See Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C.1985).
Appellant’s credibility was “all important to his defense.” Haynes, supra, 318 A.2d at 903; see Thomas, supra, 447 A.2d at 60. His entire defense rested on the jury believing his testimony about his innocent behavior and his explanation of how the prerecorded $20 bill came to be found in the police cruiser. Some corroborative evidence was provided in the police transport log, which indicated that there was another run between the time appellant was picked up and his arrival at the police station.6 Although three police officers testified for the government, only Officer Wallace was involved in the drug transaction; the other two relied on what Wallace told them. Wallace admitted that he never checked the alley where appellant claimed he had been playing craps and he had heard others on the street calling out “love boat” while selling drugs. He also could not produce any documentation to confirm the serial number of the prerecorded $20 bill that he had used; he claimed that it had been stolen from his car. When the prosecutor demonstrated how a handcuffed man could reach into either back pocket to discard a bill, appellant showed the jury that he had been shot in the back causing one arm to be paralyzed at the time of his arrest. The officers’ explanation of the transport log, in view of what was and was not stated in the report, was hardly compelling. Moreover, the transport log contained neither a log notation of recovery of $20 nor a notation of a vehicle check after appellant had been taken out of it.7 The record is unclear about how close appellant was seen to the brown paper bag on the sidewalk,8 and the discrepancies in appellant’s testimony, noted by the prosecutor in his closing argument, were minor.
The government emphasizes that the testimony of the three officers corroborated each other, that the chain of custody of the cruiser was well-established, and that the trial judge instructed the jury that appellant was not required to produce any evidence and that the burden of proof never shifts. The jury is presumed to follow the instructions. See Hairston v. United States, 497 A.2d 1097, 1103 (D.C.1985). These arguments, however, overlook the centrality of the credibility contest at issue and the fact that the jury was never instructed about how, if at all, it should view the so-called evidence that appellant did not call his friend or Jones as a witness or otherwise corroborate his misidentification defense. Long ago this court made clear that the trial court should not permit the prosecutor to make continued comments inviting the jury to speculate on the reason for the witnesses’ absence. Conyers v. United States, 309 A.2d 309, 313 (D.C. 1973). Here the prosecutor cross-examined appellant about two missing witnesses, once with respect to appellant’s friend and again with respect to Jones. Further, having directed the jury’s attention during cross-examination to the absence of individuals whose testimony could only have elucidated earlier events unrelated to the drug sale, the prosecutor proceeded to argue to the jury not only that appellant had failed to corroborate his misidentification defense, but that the testimony of the polite officers was worthy of more belief because they put their careers and retirement on *173the line.9 Appellant had no burden to produce any evidence, see United States v. Alston, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 551 F.2d 315 (1976), and there was no evidence to support the comments about the policemen’s careers and retirement. See Toliver v. United States, 468 A.2d 958 (D.C.1983). Coming in rebuttal closing argument made the misconduct more prejudicial to a fair trial. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 512 A.2d 253, 257 (D.C.1986); Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405, 411 (D.C.1982); see also Young v. United States, 150 U.S.App. D.C. 98, 104, 463 F.2d 934, 940 (1972) (proper argument by the prosecutor when combined with improper argument “may actually escalate the impact of the improper, just as some truth may bait the hook for the impact of a partial lie or libel”).
The trial judge did not indicate in any way to the jury that the cross-examination on the failure of appellant’s friend and Jones to testify was improper, that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improperly based on non-evidence, or that missing witnesses’ testimony would have been of limited relevance to the issue of appellant’s guilt. See Conyers, supra, 309 A.2d at 313; see Young, supra, 150 U.S.App.D.C. at 104, 463 F.2d 934. The general instructions to the jury that the arguments of counsel are not evidence and that the government had to prove appellant’s identification beyond a reasonable doubt were insufficient to cure the harm. See Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485, 488 (1985); Villacres v. United States, 357 A.2d 423, 428 (1976); Miller v. United States, 444 A.2d 13, 16 (D.C.1982). Rather, portions of the judge’s instructions in combination with the prosecutor’s argument had the effect of highlighting points that the prosecutor improperly made.10
Nor is there any indication that defense counsel’s failure to object was the result of a reasonable tactical decision. The government suggests that since appellant testified that there were several people on the street, defense counsel might have considered it tactically advantageous to have appellant explain on cross-examination why he was unable to present any of those people as defense witnesses. The record illustrates the fallacy of that argument here. Appellant’s responses on cross-examination hardly support the inference that a tactical defense strategy was involved. In addition, if defense counsel had asked appellant on direct examination whether any of his friends or people in the crap game would agree to testify for him, it is highly unlikely that he would have asked questions associating appellant with criminals.
Accordingly, since the missing witness inference directly related to the issue of guilt, there were no curative instructions, the evidence consisted primarily of the word of Wallace against that of appellant, and nothing in the record suggests that defense counsel’s failure to object was a tactical decision, I would hold that the errors jeopardized the fairness of appellant’s trial and reverse.
B.
Perhaps more important, reversal is also appropriate in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. While the judicial system is overburdened these days, and judges, prosecutors and defense coun*174sel may understandably be anxious to move the cases through the trial court, the system must nevertheless continue to function in a manner consistent with the fundamental right of a defendant to a fair trial. The court need not find evil motive by any participant to conclude that a trial did not live up to this standard. As the Supreme Court made clear in Atkinson, supra, 297 U.S. at 160, 56 S.Ct. at 392, a court may find plain error if the prosecutorial misconduct “seriously affect[ed] the ... integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” The prosecutorial misconduct in the instant case follows a long line of similar cases of improper missing witness arguments.
In a series of cases beginning with Arnold v. United States, 511 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1986), the court has emphasized the danger of raising improper missing witness inferences. Prosecutors were repeatedly warned that cross-examination and argument which raised such an inference required advance permission from the trial judge, Price v. United States, 531 A.2d 984, 993-94 (D.C.1987); Chappell v. United States, 519 A.2d 1257, 1259 (D.C.1987), and that permission would only be granted if the government could show the inference to be justified. See, e.g., Lemon, supra, 564 A.2d at 1375. Thus, the cross-examination raising a missing witness inference should have raised a red flag to the prosecutor. See Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368 (D.C.1989); Brown v. United States, 555 A.2d 1034 (D.C.1989); Singley v. United States, 533 A.2d 245 (D.C.1987); Carr v. United States, 531 A.2d 1010 (D.C. 1987); Price v. United States, 531 A.2d 984 (D.C.1987); Hinnant v. United States, 520 A.2d 292 (D.C.1987); Chappell v. United States, 519 A.2d 1257 (D.C.1987); Lawson v. United States, 514 A.2d 787 (D.C.1986); Arnold v. United States, 511 A.2d 399 (D.C.1986). It also should have raised a red flag to the trial judge. See Hammill v. United States, 498 A.2d 551, 557 (D.C. 1985) (“[t]he trial court sua sponte should have instructed the jury that appellant was not required to call [the missing witness] and that a negative inference could not be drawn from his failure to testify”) (citations omitted). See also Young, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 1043 (“a trial judge should deal promptly with any breach by either counsel”); Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 248, 63 S.Ct. 561, 566, 87 L.Ed. 734 (1943) (obligation to act sua sponte where remarks are highly prejudicial).
It is the combination of factors in appellant’s case — a prosecutor violating a clearly established rule, the trial judge failing to respond, and defense counsel failing to object — that created a miscarriage of justice. A criminal trial depends on each of these participants doing their job. When all fail to do so, the integrity and reputation of the judicial system can only be diminished. Therefore, I would reverse.
. Although the majority refers in this case to the prosecutor's alleged "impropriety,” I retain the court’s long-standing tradition of referring to "prosecutorial misconduct.” See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 916 (D.C.1991) (describing general approach in cases of "prosecu-torial misconduct”); Hammill v. United States, 498 A.2d 551, 554 (D.C.1985); Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 655 (D.C.1984); United States v. Harvey, 392 A.2d 1049 (D.C.1978) (en banc).
. See Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C.1989); Price v. United States, 531 A.2d 984 (D.C.1987); Chappell v. United States, 519 A.2d 1257, 1259 (D.C.1987).
. Contrary to the majority’s speculation that the jury would not attach much importance to this witness’ absence, see majority opinion at 163, the import of the prosecutor’s cross examination invited the jury to think that appellant’s friend would have something to offer at trial.
. The majority opinion quotes only part of Thomas's statement about “bona fide” efforts. Thomas actually stated that "if a party has made bona fide reasonable efforts to produce the witness without success, no adverse inference will be permitted.” 447 A.2d at 57. Contrary to the majority’s implication, Thomas did not hold that the inference will always be available against a defendant who has not shown that he made efforts to produce a witness. Indeed, nothing in Thomas undermined the general rule that the party who seeks to raise the missing witness inference has the burden of demonstrating the witness’s peculiar availability to the other party.
. The majority’s statement that a trial judge should not be required to accept a defendant’s testimony about efforts to locate witnesses, majority opinion at 163, is a little strange, given the posture of this case. Presumably the majority would be more satisfied if defense counsel had made representations to the trial judge about his efforts to locate the missing witnesses. Because the prosecutor failed to ask the trial judge’s permission before raising the missing witness inference, however, counsel for the defense had no opportunity to make any representations.
.The police transport log showed that the police cruiser had received an initial run at 1:20 p.m. to assist at 6th and O Streets, and that upon arriving at 1:24 p.m., the police were told to go to the 1800 block of 6th Street, arriving at 1:38 p.m. Appellant was picked up at 1:45 p.m., and it took between 10 to 15 minutes to get from the scene to the police station. According to the transport log, the police cruiser received a call for another run at 13 th and H Streets at 1:45 p.m. Officer Washington testified that the 1:45 p.m. run was different from that involving appellant, and, contradicting what was stated in the transport log, that the reference in the log to two defendants being transported to the First District occurred later; he also testified that no one else was in the back seat of the cruiser with appellant.
. Officer Washington testified that he checked the car after appellant was taken out of it, and that he found the $20 bill behind the cushions.
. Officer Mitchell testified that he found the brown paper bag on top of a railroad tie on a "hill” where appellant had been standing.
. The government’s contention that, unlike Price, supra, 531 A.2d 984, where the defendant raised an alibi defense, the cross-examination here had no appreciable negative effect on the verdict is unpersuasive. A claim of misidentifi-cation implies that appellant was not present at the scene of the crime or that he was not the perpetrator. Garris v. United States, 559 A.2d 323 (D.C. 1989). Here, as in Price, the missing witnesses could have confirmed appellant’s testimony that he was playing craps and that another man was selling drugs, thereby bolstering his credibility which was the linchpin of his defense.
. For example, the trial court instructed the jury that it could judge credibility on the basis of "whether the witness had been contradicted or corroborated by other credible evidence in the case.” The instructions did not tell the jury not to give greater weight to the testimony of police officers simply because they were police officers, but did tell the jury that counsel had a duty to object to any evidence which they thought was not properly admissible, thus leaving open the possibility that, in the absence of any instruction to the contrary, some jurors may have thought the missing witness inference could be used to convict appellant.