concurring:
I agree with the majority that the present action by Mary C. Brandt, appellant, against Dr. Perry A. Eagle, M.D., appellee, is barred and that the trial court, therefore, properly entered summary judgment in favor of the defendantappellee. My reasoning differs only slightly from that of the majority.
Brandt was injured in a two car accident and filed suit against the driver of the other vehicle. In that action she was entitled to recover for all injuries sustained, including any which may have been caused or aggravated by professional negligence in treating such injuries. See: Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162, 165, 542 A.2d 516, 517 (1988); Nathan v. McGinley, 342 Pa. 12, 16, 19 A.2d 917, 918 (1941); Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 212, 192 A. 107 (1937), citing Wallace v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 222 Pa. 556, 564, 71 A. 1086 (1909) and Wyatt v. Russell, 308 Pa. 366, 162 A. 256 (1932); Embrey v. Borough of West Mifflin, 257 Pa.Super. 168, 175, 390 A.2d 765, 771 (1978); Lebesco v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 251 Pa.Super. 415, 422, 380 A.2d 848, 852 (1977). See also: Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 457. Following trial of the action against the other driver, Brandt recovered a judgment in the amount of $148,251.00. This judgment was fully, not partially, satisfied on the prothonotary’s record. Brandt then attempted to pursue an action against Dr. Eagle in which she claimed *183that he had negligently treated her for injuries sustained in the two car collision.1
The parties are agreed that the satisfaction of a judgment recovered against one tortfeasor bars a later suit against a second tortfeasor for the same injury. See: Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959). This rule also prevents a second action against a physician for negligent treatment of injuries sustained in the accident and recoverable in the first action. See: Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A. 107 (1937). The principles of law announced in these cases, in my judgment, are controlling.
Appellant argues that an exception to these general principles should be created where the first judgment is satisfied for less than the full amount of the judgment. The cases do not recognize such an exception, and, in my opinion, none should be recognized. The record in the instant case discloses to anyone who examines it that appellant’s judgment compensating her for injuries sustained in the accident was satisfied in full. That satisfaction is conclusive. “When the plaintiff has [the judgment] marked satisfied of record the common law assumption that [s]he is satisfied may reasonably be permitted to operate.” Hilbert v. Roth, supra 395 Pa. at 275, 149 A.2d at 652. The presumption of full satisfaction cannot be rebutted by parol evidence that the judgment holder accepted something less than the full amount of the judgment before satisfying it. Hazelwood Lumber Co., Inc. v. Smallhoover, 500 Pa. 180, 455 A.2d 108 (1982). See also: Frank v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 522 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.1975);2 Neustein v. Insurance *184Placement Facility, 271 Pa.Super. 126, 412 A.2d 608 (1979). In this regard, I agree fully with the majority and join its review of the decided cases.
TAMILIA, J., joins.. The second action had been commenced after the verdict in the prior action but before satisfaction of the judgment entered on such verdict.
. In arguing that the presumption can be rebutted by parol evidence that the plaintiff failed to receive payment of her judgment in full, the dissent relies upon the decision of the Court of Appeals in Frank v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 522 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.1975). This reliance is misplaced. In that case there had been no prior adversary action which had resulted in a judgment on the merits. In the instant case, the judgment which the plaintiff satisfied had followed an adversary proceeding on the merits. Under these circumstances the Frank *184court’s decision would have been different, for even that court acknowledged that in Pennsylvania, ‘‘[w]here the prior satisfaction was based on a judgment following an adversary action on the merits, the presumption of full satisfaction would appear to be conclusive.” Id. at 326.