LaCrosse Queen, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE

¶ 20. (dissenting). Although the majority's conclusion that the lease payments for the use of the La Crosse Queen are taxable under the Wisconsin sales *452tax may ultimately be correct, I dissent because I conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the cause must be remanded to the tax appeals commission.

¶ 21. I would, however, state the issue on remand in a different fashion than did the court of appeals. I conclude that whether the La Crosse Queen was primarily engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 77.54(13) (1989-90)1 requires interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution. U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Because I believe that the parties should be afforded an opportunity to brief this issue, I would remand the cause to the circuit court for remand to the tax appeals commission to determine whether the Commerce Clause, and therefore § 77.54(13), require that any portion of the payments for the lease of the La Crosse Queen be exempt from the sales tax imposed.

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¶ 22. The issue presented is whether § 77.54(13) exempts from sales tax the payments made by Riverboats America to La Crosse Queen, Inc., for the lease of the La Crosse Queen. Section 77.54 provides:

77.54 General exemptions. There are exempted from the taxes imposed by this subchapter [relating to general sales and use tax]:
(13) The. gross receipts from the sales of and the storage, use or other consumption in this state of commercial vessels and barges of 50-ton burden or over primarily engaged in interstate or foreign com*453merce or commercial fishing, and the accessories, attachments, parts and fuel therefor.

(Emphasis added.) The parties' sole dispute is whether, during the tax periods in question, the La Crosse Queen was "primarily. engaged in interstate. . .commerce."2 The terms "interstate commerce" and "primarily" are not defined in the statutes.

¶ 23. The parties, the majority opinion, the circuit court, the court of appeals and the tax appeals commission construe the phrase "interstate commerce" to be consistent with the meaning of the phrase "commerce. . .among the several States" in the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution. U.S. Const, art I, §8, cl. 3. I see no reason to believe the legislature intended otherwise and I follow this approach.

¶ 24. The meaning of the term "primarily" as used in this statute was not reached below and is a question of first impression. The court of appeals remanded the cause to the circuit court for remand to the tax appeals commission for further proceedings to determine whether the La Crosse Queen was "primarily" engaged in interstate commerce.

¶ 25. I conclude that the entire statutory phrase "primarily engaged in interstate or foreign commerce" takes its meaning from the Commerce Clause. The legislature intended that § 77.54(13) exempt from taxation only those activities which the Commerce Clause prohibits the state from taxing.

¶ 26. I address three questions: whether the operation of the La Crosse Queen was an interstate activity; if so, whether that activity was commerce; *454and, if so, whether the La Crosse Queen was primarily engaged in that interstate commerce.

¶ 27. Although a determination of whether an activity is interstate commerce is not ordinarily treated as separate inquiries about what is interstate activity and what is commerce, I will follow this approach because it seems to be the approach of the parties, the tax appeals commission, the circuit court and the majority opinion.

HH HH

¶ 28. I first inquire whether the operations of the La Crosse Queen were interstate activities.

¶ 29. The La Crosse Queen was leased to provide recreational excursion voyages of varying length embarking from and returning to La Crosse, Wisconsin. It made no stops during its journeys. It did, however, travel for approximately half of each voyage in the state of Minnesota. The State does not dispute that the La Crosse Queen "crosse[d] over into Minnesota waters," brief for State at 6, and traveled on one leg of each journey on the Minnesota side of the Mississippi River. I think this fact is enough to demonstrate that the operations of the La Crosse Queen were interstate activities.

¶ 30. The majority relies on a single authority, also the sole authority offered by the State, for the proposition that boats which "might sail over soil belonging to [Minnesota] in passing between two [Wisconsin] points," are not involved in interstate commerce. Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy and Pomeroy Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179, 183 (1906); Majority op. at 447; brief for State at 6-7. In Cincinnati, the Court was called upon to determine whether rate-setting and non-interference provisions in a con*455tract were antitrust violations under the Sherman Act. The parties to the contract operated freight and passenger boats which traveled between two Ohio ports through the waters of but without landing in Kentucky. The threshold question was whether the subject of the contract involved interstate commerce such that it was within reach of the Sherman Act.

¶ 31. In the paragraph succeeding the one from which the majority draws its quotation, the Court concluded that it would be unwise to assume that the commerce at issue was not interstate commerce: "We will suppose then that the contract does not leave commerce among the States untouched." Cincinnati, 200 U.S. at 184. Cincinnati, at a minimum, left open the question whether a boat which embarks from one state and travels through the waters of another to reach a point in the original state is engaged in interstate activity.

¶ 32. In Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 634 (1944), the Court answered the question arguably left unanswered in Cincinnati. Cornell operated tugboats which moved barges from one port in New York to a different port in New York by way of New Jersey as well as New York waters. Although not stopping in New Jersey or transferring goods or people for deposit in New Jersey, the Court held that this activity was interstate commerce subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. The Court found it sufficient that "[wjhile moving on New Jersey waters, Cornell's vessels are not at that time at 'a place' in New York. Certain of its towing activities therefore actually move vessels from places in New York to places in New Jersey and thence back to places in New York." Cornell Steamboat, 321 U.S. at 638-39.

*456¶ 33. Four years later the Court held that passenger buses traveling between points in the same state through other states are engaged in interstate commerce. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948) (unapportioned state tax on bus company's gross receipts for such trips violates Commerce Clause). The Court stated: "It is too late in the day to deny that transportation which leaves a State and enters another State is 'Commerce. . .among the several States' simply because the points from and to are in the same State." Id. at 655-56 (citation omitted).

¶ 34. The State contends that the rule set forth in these cases does not apply to the La Crosse Queen's journeys. "[Tjhese cases require movement between two separate points. In the instant case, there was no such movement." Brief for State at 10. The State properly characterizes the facts of the cases but I discern no intent of the Court to limit its holding to movement from one place to another in the state.

¶ 35. Other courts have applied the rule of these cases to excursions embarking from and returning to the same port after moving across another state. Under circumstances similar to the present case, the Supreme Court of Missouri has said:

"Of course we are dealing here with 'interstate commerce'." [Central Greyhound, 334 U.S.] at 661.
The transportation of passengers in this case by boat on a boundary river in a continuous non-stop journey from and to the same point in Missouri during which the boat crosses the boundary line into and traverses waters of Illinois is interstate commerce. [citing Cornell Steamboat and Central Greyhound] To say that this transportation is confined to Missouri is to ignore a fact; to say that this *457commerce is not interstate would be to indulge in pure fiction.

City of St. Louis v. Streckfus, 505 S.W.2d 70, 73-74 (Mo. 1974).

¶ 36. While the majority opinion in the present case is arguably ambiguous, I read it as accepting what seems indisputable in light of Cornell Steamboat and Central Greyhound, that the operations of the La Crosse Queen may be considered interstate activities. Majority op. at 451.

¶ 37. Because the La Crosse Queen traveled through Minnesota waters for approximately half of each voyage, I conclude that the La Crosse Queen was engaged in an interstate activity.3

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¶ 38. I now turn to whether the interstate activity of the La Crosse Queen was commerce. The majority opinion concludes that because the purpose of the interstate trips was "recreation and entertainment" and not "transportation from one point to another" or "transfer of goods, money, or people," Majority op. at 448-49,451, the activities of the La Crosse Queen were not commerce.

¶ 39. The majority opinion states that "[i]n order for an activity to qualify as interstate commerce, there must not only be interstate movement but also interstate business." Majority op. at 451. I agree. In contrast, however, I conclude that operating an excursion boat for hire with the sole object of providing recreation or entertainment to its customers is a business and, as such, is commerce. If recreation and entertainment were not commerce, Congress might be powerless to regulate pleasure vessels which traverse interstate or international waterways.4

¶ 40. The term "commerce" for purposes of the Commerce Clause has been interpreted broadly to include recreational activities. As one court has put it: "Since pleasure and recreational activities are a vital part of the nation's commerce, the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, s 8, would reach pleasure vessels." United States v. LaBrecque, 419 F. Supp. 430, 436 n.7 (D.N.J. 1976).

*459¶ 41. The United States Supreme Court has found transportation of persons for recreational purposes to be commerce under the Commerce Clause. In Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948), the boat operator transported "patrons of the island's attractions from Detroit to Bois Blanc [in Canada] and return. The vessels engage in no other business on these trips. No freight, mail or express is carried; the only passengers are the patrons bent on pleasure. . . .No intermediate stops are made on these excursions." Id. at 29-30. The Court concluded: "There can be no doubt that appellant's transportation of its patrons is foreign commerce within the scope of Art. I, § 8." Id. at 34.

¶ 42. I therefore conclude that the activities of the La Crosse Queen were commerce.

IV.

¶ 43. I next consider the meaning of the word "primarily" in the context of the statutory language exempting a vessel "primarily engaged in interstate or foreign commerce." The word "primarily" is not defined in the statutes.

¶ 44. The language of § 77.54(13) has remained unchanged since it was first enacted in 1969 as part of the General Sales and Use Tax. Section 260, Ch. 154, Laws of 1969. The drafting record is silent as to the intent of the drafters of § 77.54(13).

¶ 45. Two doctrines guide the court's interpretation of tax statutes in this context. First, it is well established that tax exemption statutes are matters of legislative grace and are to be construed narrowly against the granting of an exemption. Ramrod, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 64 Wis. 2d 499, 504, 219 N.W.2d 604 (1974); Comet Co. v. Department of Taxa*460tion, 243 Wis. 117, 123, 9 N.W.2d 620 (1943). The legislature, therefore, drafts exemption statutes with the expectation that courts will resolve doubts against the granting of an exemption.

¶ 46. Second, in the absence of persuasive contrary indication, tax statutes may be presumed to reach as broadly as constitutionally permissible. To this end, the court has construed other tax provisions which relate to interstate commerce by reference to Commerce Clause standards. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Department of Revenue, 164 Wis. 2d 764, 772-76, 477 N.W.2d 44 (1991) (discussing cases). In Consolidated Freightways, the court determined whether the operations of an interstate motor carrier were subject to tax under Wis. Stat. § 71.07(2)(e) (1985-86) by construing the statute as coextensive with Commerce Clause limits. The court explained that it "has traditionally looked to the Commerce Clause to ascertain the limits upon Wisconsin's tax jurisdiction over interstate businesses." Id. at 773.5

¶ 47. Applying these doctrines to the language of § 77.54(13) I conclude that the legislature, by exempting vessels primarily engaged in interstate commerce, intended to tax to the full extent permitted by the Commerce Clause.

¶ 48. Having determined that the La Crosse Queen was engaged in interstate commerce and that § 77.54(13) exempts only those activities constitutionally immunized from taxation, the next step is to ascertain whether the Commerce Clause requires that *461any portion of the payments for the lease of the La Crosse Queen be exempt from the sales tax imposed.

¶ 49. The modern test for the propriety of a tax on interstate commerce was first set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). In that case the Court, focusing on the effect rather than the language of the tax, applied a four-part test. A state tax will survive a Commerce Clause challenge only if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Id. at 279.

¶ 50. The Court has recently applied the Complete Auto test to uphold a state's sales tax on the full price of a bus ticket for travel from the taxing state to another state. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995) (distinguishing Central Greyhound, 334 U.S. 653).

¶ 51. The parties have not briefed this issue and the tax appeals commission, circuit court and court of appeals have not ruled on it. Although at first blush it may appear that under Oklahoma Tax no apportionment is required, I conclude that this issue should not be decided without giving the parties an opportunity for briefing.

¶ 52. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals to hold that the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for remand to the tax appeals commission. I would have the tax appeals commission determine whether the Commerce Clause requires that any portion of the payments for the lease of the La Crosse Queen be exempt from the sales tax imposed.

¶ 53. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

*462¶ 54. I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh Bradley joins this opinion.

A11 further statutory references are to the 1989-90 volumes unless otherwise indicated.

The taxpayer does not contest the propriety of applying the sales tax to payments on the lease of the La Crosse Queen on grounds other than the § 77.54(13) exemption.

The taxpayer points to Town of La Pointe v. Madeline Island Ferry Line, Inc., 179 Wis. 2d 726, 508 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1993), and Washington Island Ferry Line, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, No. 93 CV 1442 (Circuit Court for Dane County, Dec. 4,1993) to demonstrate that its activity was interstate. These cases rely on United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). I agree with the majority opinion that Town of La Pointe and Washington Island Ferry Line are inapposite. These cases and Yellow Cab stand for the proposition that transportation of persons or goods solely within one state may be interstate commerce when the intrastate activity is an integral step in interstate movement and its relationship to interstate transit is not only casual and incidental. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 230-33. For the same reasons, however, I am perplexed by the majority opinion's proposition that Yellow Cab provides the best comparison with the facts of the present case. Majority op. at 450.

Congress would be powerless to regulate a multitude of other forms of interstate activity, such as sightseeing flights which cross the Grand Canyon, interstate balloon excursions, traveling circuses, and sport fishing boats in interstate and international waters.

See also K-S Pharmacies, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1992) ("When dealing with laws having extraterritorial potential, such as tax legislation, [the Supreme Court of Wisconsin] has endeavored to conform the legislation to limits on state power.").