Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Robbbts:Solely on the basis of testimony given by two alleged co-felons, appellant stands convicted of first degree murder. Both co-felons have now recanted their testimony. The majority holds that appellant’s right to a new trial depends on whether the hearing court believed the recanting testimony, and that since it did not, its decision to deny a new trial must be affirmed. I believe, however, that we must examine this case somewhat more closely and that, given the nature of the original testimony and the facts surrounding the recanting testimony, the hearing court erred when it denied appellant a new trial. Hence, I must dissent.
Appellant was tried as a participant in the robbery-murder of a grocery store owner. The issue in dispute at appellant’s trial was whether, when he drove his co-felons to the grocery store, he knew that they were going there to commit a robbery. Both Frank McCoy, the murderer, and James Allen, the other robber, testified that appellant was informed of the robbery beforehand; appellant testified that he thought he was driving McCoy and Allen to a numbers writer to borrow money. McCoy testified that appellant knew McCoy had a gun; appellant denied this. The jury evidently believed the Commonwealth’s witnesses and convicted appellant.
Prior to appellant’s trial, McCoy had been found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. We granted him a new trial, see 401 Pa. 100, 162 A. 2d 636 (1960); but he was again found guilty and sentenced to death. On July 18, 1961, this Court affirmed the judgment, see 405 Pa. 23, 172 A. 2d 795 (1961). On January 25, 1962, shortly before he was to be exe*379cuted, McCoy recanted the testimony he had given at appellant’s trial. He testified under oath that appellant “didn’t know about this crime” and that appellant had not seen the gun.
It was not until nearly one year later that the Commonwealth’s second witness, Allen, likewise recanted his testimony. On January 9, 1963, Allen, admitting under oath that he had committed perjury at appellant’s trial, testified that appellant was completely innocent. This was now in conformity with the testimony Allen gave at his own trial, where he stated that appellant was unaware that a crime was to be committed. Further, Allen indicated why he had lied at appellant’s trial. While Allen was in jail and appellant out on bail, appellant had refused Allen’s request for money to hire a lawyer, and had attempted to date Allen’s girl friend. Allen is presently in jail serving a life sentence for his participation in the murder.
Thus appellant stands convicted solely on testimony which originally emanated from a corrupt source, alleged co-felons, and has now been fully and explicitly recanted. One witness, Allen, has returned to his former story exculpating appellant, giving a highly credible reason for his deceitful deviation. The other, McCoy, had changed his testimony only after all avenues of appeal had been exhausted and he was about to die. Both men are now admitted perjurers. Appellant, on the other hand, has consistently told the same account, and his actions on the day of the crime were perfectly consistent with his testimony.
I think that under these circumstances it is how for a jury to determine where lies the truth. It is not now a question of whether the hearing court believed or disbelieved the recanting testimony. For the recantation by both Commonwealth witnesses, in the circumstances of the instant case, places the Commonwealth’s trial evidence too much in doubt. We should not for*380get our “reluctance to entrust plenary powers over tlie life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1451 (1968). Appellant deserves the right to have a jury pass on the credibility of the recanting testimony.
Accordingly, I dissent and would grant appellant a new trial.