dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority opinion affirming defendant’s conviction; however, I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion which reduces defendant’s extended-term sentence from 40 years’ to 30 years’ imprisonment.
The standard of review to be applied in determining whether a sentence is excessive is whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. (People v. Timmons (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 591, 598, 599 N.E.2d 162, 167; People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344.) The trial court is in the best position to make a reasoned judgment as to a sentence which balances the need to protect society and rehabilitate the offender, and its judgment is due great weight and deference. Timmons, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 599, 599 N.E.2d at 167-68.
The record shows that defendant was convicted of attempted murder, which is a Class X felony punishable by a term of not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 8 — 4, 1005 — 8—1(3).) The statutory extended-term provision allows a trial court to impose an extended-term sentence upon a defendant convicted of any felony where “the court finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2 (b)(2).) In evaluating the brutality and heinousness of a defendant’s conduct, the entire spectrum of facts surrounding the given incident must be analyzed. (People v. McGee (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1089, 460 N.E.2d 843.) A court need not find that a defendant inflicted “torture or unnecessary pain upon his victim” in order to find “brutal” or “heinous” behavior (La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 501); a single act which causes death or injury may be sufficient to demonstrate exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior considering the entire conduct of defendant. McGee, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 1090-91.
In the present case, the record shows that defendant’s shooting of the two victims was premeditated, in apparent retribution over an argument between Mika Gleason and Karris. The trial court considered defendant’s testimony that on the morning of March 12, 1989, defendant told his brother, Mika, not to go back to the Stay Out, that he would go to see what was happening. Defendant then retrieved a loaded .44 Magnum revolver from his closet. The trial court noted, “He has taken one of the most dangerous weapons, *** a .44 Magnum ***. If people are standing in the right position you can shoot four of them at the same time, that is how powerful this gun is.” Defendant testified that he was prepared to use his weapon. There was no evidence in the record of any immediate provocation of defendant by either victim, both of whom were unarmed.
The record further shows that defendant gave Karris a “karate chop” in the neck, which knocked him to the ground, and then shot and “brutally injured” both Karris and Officer Costa at close range, leaving Karris with “his guts hanging out” of his stomach. The trial court noted that each victim required multiple surgeries and that each would be “scarred for life.” Following the shooting, defendant did not go to the police, and initially threatened Michael Griffin at gunpoint, telling him to say nothing to the authorities.
Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that the trial court did not err in finding defendant’s conduct exceptionally brutal and heinous and sentencing him to an extended term of imprisonment.
For the above reasons, I would affirm defendant’s extended-term sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment.