Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:It is clear that upon the death of Abraham M. Ellis on September 1, 1961, the partnerships which existed between him and his three sons (each partner having a 25% interest) were dissolved. Paragraph eleven of each of the complaints recognizes the termination of the partnerships by reason of the death of the co-partner. Dissolution of a partnership by death of a co-partner is the undisputed mandate of Section 31 of the Uniform Partnership Act, March 26, 1915, P. L. 18, 59 P.S. §93(4), which states: “Dissolution is caused *423... by the death of any partner . . . .” The partnerships pleaded in the complaints already had been dissolved by operation of law. Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131 Atl. 276 (1925).
There was, therefore, no need for two of the decedent’s former partners (his sons and co-execntors of his estate) to request equity “to enter a decree of dissolution of the partnerships and to decree and supervise a restricted auction of all of the partnerships’ assets with bidding limited to the parties holding partnership interests.”1 Moreover, the surviving partners had the affirmative duty upon the death of the partner-father to wind up the affairs of the partnerships and to account to the estate of the deceased partner. Spivak v. Bronstein, 367 Pa. 70, 79 A. 2d 205 (1951); Froess v. Froess, supra.2
The complaints which purport to seek dissolution, in reality, do not do so. They seek, rather, equity’s decree approving acquisitions by appellees of their deceased father’s interests in the partnerships. That this is the real substance of the complaints is made obvious by the requests that the sale of assets be limited to the parties holding partnership interests. Thus, appellees seek equity’s direction, and approval to limit the participants in the proposed transaction to themselves and appellant, their brother-co-fidú'ciary. While the propriety of granting this unusual request is not before us at this time, the request itself is evidence that what is primarily , sought is the purchase of decedent’s interests rather than the dissolution of the partner? ships. If, two years after the death of their father, two of the three surviving former partners contem*424plated only a sale of partnership assets, I can see no need to petition the court for dissolution.3
While it is the general rule that the estate of a deceased partner has no right to specific partnership property, it does not follow that, in this instance, prior approval of the orphans’ court is not essential to appellees’ authority to purchase at the sale contemplated by these complaints. Section 546 of the Fiduciaries Act, April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, 20 P.S. §320.546, requires that such approval be obtained by a fiduciary who desires to bid for and purchase property of the estate.
The circuitous method by which it is sought to avoid the requirements of the Fiduciaries Act should not be approved.
I dissent.
From the opinion of the majority.
In addition, “it is apparent that the survivor must proceed with utmost caution and use'the highest degree of care in the liquidation of the partnership.” Lee v. Dahlin, 399 Pa. 50, 52, 159 A. 2d 679, 681 (1960).
Nothing has been alleged which brings this matter within Section 32 of the Uniform Partnership Act, 59 P.S. §94, entitled “Dissolution by decree of court.”