I respectfully dissent.
Whether appellant’s principal duties consist of “active law enforcement” within the meaning of Government Code section 31469.3, subdivision (b) is an issue of fact reviewable pursuant to the substantial evidence standard. (Neeley v. Board of Retirement (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 815, 819 [111 Cal.Rptr. 841].) The majority avoids application of this standard of review, and purports to convert the determinative inquiry into an issue of law by concluding that there was no substantial conflict in the evidence before the trier of fact, reducing the dispositive analysis to statutory interpretation. (Id., at pp. 819-823.)
The case under review should be distinguished from those in which the trial court is authorized to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence. (See for example, Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301 [196 P.2d 20].) In such a case, the ultimate power of decision rests with the trial court and we review under the substantial evidence standard. But as Neeley makes clear, the issue before us does not call for an independent judgment review. Our scope of review is the same as that of the trial court—a review of the administrative record to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 [93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242].)
The present case differs from Neeley in a manner crucial to the analytical structure relied upon by the majority—the trier of fact herein toured the Tulare County jail facility and the correctional center branch facility. (The appellant worked at the latter.) “Whatever is viewed by a trial judge with the consent of the parties becomes independent evidence which can be considered by him in arriving at his conclusion ... in support of findings *918consonant therewith. [Citation.] Such evidence may be used alone or with other evidence to support the findings. [Citation.]” (Frustuck v. City of Fairfax (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 345, 361, 362 [28 Cal.Rptr. 357].) This rule applies with equal force to a view taken in administrative proceedings subject to review on application for mandamus. (Ethel D. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1934) 219 Cal. 699, 704-705 [28 P.2d 919].)
“ ‘It is clearly the rule in California that when the view of the trial judge is with the consent of the parties . . . what is then seen is itself evidence and may be used alone or with other evidence to support the findings. [Citations.]
“ ‘Within the compass of this rule, it is also well settled that when the trial judge views the premises and a record of what he saw has not been made a part of the transcript on appeal, an appellate court must assume that the evidence acquired by such view is sufficient to sustain the finding in question. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (City of Los Angeles v. Kossman (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 116, 120-121 [79 Cal.Rptr. 44].)
Although a tape recording was made of a portion of the tour taken by the administrative board, much of the recording was incomprehensible and no attempt was made to summarize the observations of physical features which were made. The inadequacy of the recording of the tour renders it useless to a reviewing court and does not take this case out of the general rule that an unreported view is substantial evidence alone sufficient to support the findings of the trier of fact.
Our prior decisions have recognized that classification as a safety member is largely controlled by the extent to which the job category at issue exposes its holders to hazardous activity. (Neeley v. Board of Retirement, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d at p. 822.) While a correctional officer stationed at a main jail facility may come into contact with and be required to supervise the entire gamut of pretrial and convicted detainees, including belligerent drunks and dangerous psychotics accused of violent felonies, the inmates at the facility at which appellant’s duties were performed had been screened to eliminate those considered violent or potentially violent. In fact, the only incident in which a correctional officer had been injured in the four years prior to the administrative hearing in the present case resulted in a scratch on the officer’s cheek. In making the factual determination as to the extent to which appellant’s duties exposed him to hazard, the view of the main and branch jails was invaluable in assessing the risks created by the differing inmate populations of the two facilities.
Since we have no effective record of the evidence presented to the administrative board during its tour of the various jail facilities, it can hardly be *919said that the evidence is without conflict and that this court may apply its independent notions of statutory interpretation to a “given” set of facts. (See Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 17 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839], cert. den., 365 U.S. 823 [5 L.Ed.2d 700, 81 S.Ct. 708].) “Great weight should be given to the administrative interpretation of the Board of Retirement unless clearly erroneous. (Gov. Code, § 31470.8; Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 . . . .)” (Neeley v. Board of Retirement, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d at p. 820.)
In the severely constricted fiscal environment that Tulare County and all counties operate post-Proposition 13, a special privilege or status conferred upon one class of county employees utilizes resources which might otherwise serve a more compelling societal purpose. While it may have done little harm in the past to routinely extend the most favorable retirement status to any employees who were arguably engaged in law enforcement (see Kimball v. County of Santa Clara (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 780 [101 Cal.Rptr. 353], relied upon by the majority), the majority’s disregard of the factual findings of the administrative board in the present case—findings supported by a view of appellant’s workplace not available to this court— cannot be justified in law or reason. Since the dispositive factual issue was resolved by the trier of fact against appellant, and since substantial evidence supports that resolution, the decision of the administrative board should be upheld. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 3, 1983, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 21, 1983.