ON CIVIL PETITION TO TRANSFER
GIVAN, Justice.The published opinion by the Court of Appeals appears at 579 N.E.2d 118. There, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of appel-lees and remanded the case for further proceedings. We set aside the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.
The facts are: Keith Lewis was shot by Robert Stephens in Stephens' home. Stephens was convicted of attempted murder. This Court affirmed that conviction, Stephens v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 280. Subsequently Hawkins, as Lewis's guardian, brought suit against Stephens in the Delaware Superior Court alleging that Stephens negligently shot Lewis. Auto-Owners insured Stephens but had a clause in the insurance policy that Stephens was not covered for his deliberate acts. Auto-Owners filed this cause of action in the Delaware Circuit Court asking for a declaratory judgment that they were not responsible to pay any compensation to Lewis which might result from Stephens' action.
At first, the trial court refused to grant summary judgment to Auto-Owners on the ground that a question of fact existed to be determined as to whether the shooting was deliberate or an accident. Auto-Owners then presented the transcript of Stephens' trial wherein he was convicted of attempted murder. After examining such evidence, the trial court ruled that because the action of Stephens had been adjudicated to be deliberate, Auto-Owners was not responsible under the terms of the policy.
The Court of Appeals decision in this case is well written and correctly recognizes the case law of this State to be that the judgment in a criminal action is not admissible in a subsequent civil case, citing Brooks v. State (1978), 259 Ind. 678, 291
*1359N.E.2d 559; Montgomery v. Crum (1928), 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251.
The Court of Appeals goes on to state:
"We are aware that the common law rule accepted by the Supreme Court is not in accord with the federal rules of evidence, Fed.R.Evid. 808(22), but any decision to change the rule in Indiana must be made by the Supreme Court. We obediently follow the law of this state." Hawkins, supra at 122.
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of Ind.Code § 34-3-18-1, which was passed in 1982, which allows the admission of a criminal judgment as evidence in a civil case. They also correct ly observed the rule of law to be that when a statute is in conflict with the rules of procedure established by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court rules prevail and the statute is a nullity. As observed by the Court of Appeals, this Court has not ruled on this question since the passage of the statute. We recognize that Indiana's stand on this subject has been in the minority for some time and of course is in direct conflict with the federal rule and the statute cited above.
We note that both the federal jurisdiction and our legislature have viewed the rule to cause a conflict within the judicial system and to create an intolerable situation. On the one hand, we have a criminal trial where the rules of evidence are more stringent than in a civil case and where a person has been adjudicated to have deliberately committed an act, and on the other hand, a subsequent civil trial holding that this same act is readjudicated to have been accidentally committed.
We now hold that the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, including the Federal Rules of Evidence and our own legislature, has established a more reasonable rule in this field. This Court therefore now accepts Ind.Code § 34-8-18-1 as the correct utterance of the law on this subject.
In view of the fact we are holding the trial court was correct in its decision and that no further proceeding is necessary at that level, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the question of the disqualification of Auto-Owners' attorney.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is set aside and the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, CJ., and KRAHULIK, J., concur. DeBRULER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which DICKSON, J., concurs.DICKSON, J., concurs and dissents with separate opinion in which DeBRULER, J., concurs.