(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I dissent from the judgment of my colleagues in holding unconstitutional the compulsory insurance section, 3101(1), of 1972 PA 294, known hereafter as the Act or the No-Fault Act. At this juncture I would uphold the constitutionality of the above provision as well as the other challenged provisions of the Act.
For succinctness and ease of analysis, my opin*639ion is divided into sections to correspond with the respective sections of the majority opinion.
Part I. Introduction
I concur with the majority opinion.
Part II. Standing
One month prior to the date 1972 PA 294 became effective,1 the initial plaintiffs brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the Act, while asking for declaratory and injunctive relief. Subsequently, the pleadings were amended and parties were added in an effort to better arrange a more exhaustive constitutional challenge. Plaintiffs claimed standing pursuant to GCR 1963, 201.2(3) or, alternatively, GCR 1963, 521.1.
GCR 1963, 201.2(3) is designed to permit five or more residents of this state who own property assessed for direct taxation by the county where they reside to bring an action to prevent the illegal expenditure of state funds or to test the constitutionality of a statute relating thereto. I agree with the majority conclusion that GCR 1963, 201.2(3) does not contemplate the expenditure of state funds incidental to the operation of a regulatory scheme. Because the state funds required to be expended under the No-Fault Act are merely those costs incidental to the implementation and enforcement of the Act, the plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the Act’s constitutionality under that rule.
In the alternative, plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 521.1 which provides:
*640"In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, any circuit court of this state may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking a declaratory judgment, whether or not other relief is or could be sought or granted.” (Emphasis added.)
Before relief can be granted under this rule, plaintiffs must allege and prove an "actual justiciable controversy”. "Actual controversy” encompasses something more than simply the plaintiffs’ "need to know” in order to guide their future conduct.
In addition, "actual controversy” connotes the pursuance of an honest and actual antagonistic assertion of right by one party against another. A noncollusive adversary proceeding, as distinguished from a contrived friendly lawsuit, is critical, both pragmatically and constitutionally, to the proper performance of the judicial function. Outside of the constitutional provision for advisory opinions, Const 1963, art 3, § 8, this Court limits its resolution of controversies to instances where the stakes of the disputants are committed and the issues developed in adversary proceedings upon trial. Request for Advisory Opinion on the Constitutionality of 1977 PA 108, 402 Mich 83; 260 NW2d 436 (1977).
Despite the manifestly contrived nature of the instant action, I would allow plaintiffs standing under GCR 1963, 521.1 because of the compulsory nature of the no-fault scheme. Resident plaintiffs who own and operate automobiles are compelled under threat of civil and criminal sanctions to purchase the no-fault insurance. The pleadings allege that various parties are financially unable to buy no-fault insurance coverage and are therefore subject to those sanctions. We need not hypothecate future events in determining that some *641of the plaintiffs in this very limited respect are factually in a position antagonistic or adverse to the named state officials whose duty it is to implement the compulsory coverage provisions.
Although "actual controversy” arises solely out of the compulsory coverage provisions, plaintiffs also have standing to challenge other provisions in the Act because of their specific interest in those provisions and because of the allegedly integrated nature of the scheme. Accordingly, in an effort to prove 1972 PA 294 constitutionally infirm, the plaintiffs have the requisite standing to raise the issues addressed in the majority opinion.
Part III. Compulsory Insurance
The first substantive issue addressed in the majority opinion is whether § 3101 of the No-Fault Act, which requires owners or registrants of motor vehicles to maintain compulsory personal injury protection insurance, property damage insurance and residual liability insurance, is constitutional.2
Presumably there are a number of theories upon which a challenger might fashion an attack upon the constitutionality of § 3101. It might be claimed that the statute as applied violates equal protection guarantees of the state and Federal Constitutions, denies due process as applied, or simply is an arbitrary or unreasonable statutory mandate. *642There may be other bases for challenge as well. Whatever the theory of attack, however, and no matter what specific claims a party might make in a judicial challenge to the constitutionality of the provision, one fundamental principle of orderly appellate review should govern: A party wishing to make a claim of unconstitutionality must raise it on appeal before the court of appellate review. There are a number of reasons for such a rule including, of course, the fundamental proposition that an appellate court of final and discretionary review does not, in the proper performance of its function, conjure up issues of interest or even of great importance which the litigants have not raised or asked the court to decide.
The majority ignores this elemental precept of the appellate function and, acknowledging that the plaintiffs did not expressly raise the issue on appeal, "feel compelled to address it because of its basic, threshold importance to any decision we might render as to the No-Fault Act’s constitutionality”.3 I cannot acquiesce in legitimatizing such an approach to the appellate function. It is just that sort of "this ticket for this train for this day only” ad hoc rule for appellate review which has invited the criticism that this Court is often long on policy and short on judicial restraint.
It is manifest that the No-Fault Act, currently in its experimental stages, is novel, and some say revolutionary, legislation affecting literally millions of people and a billion dollar industry in *643ways utterly beyond our ability to foresee. It is imperative therefore that this Court proceed in a carefully informed manner before declaring upon the constitutionality of the compulsory no-fault insurance scheme. By disregarding the proper scope and conditions of appellate review, the majority has deliberately precluded the possibility of a better informed decision. Because the trial court heard no evidence whatever supporting any claim of inadequate casualty insurance regulation, and since none of the parties nor any of the amici either briefed or argued the "compulsory insurance” issue, the majority was able to raise and resolve the issue unburdened by any factual record and upon freewheeling speculation. In the absence of a factual basis to illuminate and give meaning to § 3101 and the manner in which it is applied, the majority has fashioned a strictly facial attack upon its constitutionality. In so doing the majority has assumed the role of the advocate rather than that of the impartially reviewing court. In assuming that posture, the majority has jeopardized, indeed abandoned, the objective and neutral stance so necessary to the proper performance of the judicial function. The inevitable result, of course, is that the Court has forsaken its ability to reach a sound decision as evidenced by its dogged determination to raise and resolve an issue which was neither contentious nor preserved, and its adoption of a most anomalous resolution of that issue.
My brothers discuss the issue of the constitutionality of the "compulsory insurance requirement” of § 3101 in the framework of two questions:
(a) Can the Legislature constitutionally, as a condition precedent to registration and operation of a motor vehicle, require the purchase of no-fault personal protection insurance and no-fault property protection in*644surance or, in the alternative, require security approved by the Secretary of State?
(b) Does the present regulatory scheme for compulsory no-fault insurance sufficiently protect the interests of registrants and operators of motor vehicles in accord with the due process clause of the Michigan and United States Constitutions as to (1) the fairness of insurance rates, and (2) the proper availability of insurance?
For the reader’s benefit, I shall address the issue within the same framework.
(a) Can the Legislature constitutionally, as a condition precedent to registration and operation of a motor vehicle, require the purchase of no-fault personal protection insurance and no-fault property protection insurance or, in the alternative, require security approved by the Secretary of State?
Authorities are abundant and unanimous that under the police power the state may regulate travel upon its public highways. Stapleton v Independent Brewing Co, 198 Mich 170; 164 NW 520 (1917); Bowerman v Sheehan, 242 Mich 95; 219 NW 69 (1928); People v Thompson, 259 Mich 109; 242 NW 857 (1932); DeVries v Secretary of State, 329 Mich 68; 44 NW2d 872 (1950). The power of the Legislature to control the operation of motor vehicles upon the highways of this state includes the power to enact legislation affecting the reciprocal rights and duties of all owners, operators, or occupants arising out of such operation. This sphere of control is the outgrowth of the state’s interest in mitigating the detrimental consequences of highway motor vehicle accidents and is expressed through the enactment of legislation designed to insure a party’s financial responsibility to others4 as well as to himself.5 The legislative *645decision to accomplish those legitimate goals by mandating the purchase of no-fault insurance by Michigan motor vehicle owners and registrants is clearly within the state’s police power. The constitutional validity of the no-fault scheme is properly assessed not only as a police power regulation, but also as an integral part of the authority and interest of the state in licensing motor vehicle operators and the vehicles they own and operate.
Obviously the imposition of this "compulsory insurance” requirement upon all owners or registrants of motor vehicles required to be registered in this state may well work something of a burden upon certain persons under certain conditions. However, the imposition of such a burden is not, per se, unconstitutional. The Legislature is vested with wide discretion not only to determine what is inimical to the public welfare, but also to determine what is fairly designed to protect the public against the evils which might otherwise occur. The expediency, the wisdom, the desirability, or even the fairness, in the abstract sense, of the specific means selected by the Legislature to advance legitimate public interests is strictly within the discretion of the lawmaking body and not subject to judicial veto, providing the means chosen do not offend constitutional safeguards. In pursuance of its determination to accomplish the goals stated heretofore, the Legislature may validly condition the operation of a motor vehicle upon the procurement of no-fault personal injury protection and property damage protection insurance.
(b) Does the present regulatory scheme for compulsory no-fault insurance sufficiently protect the interests of owners or registrants of motor vehicles in accord with the due process clause of the Michigan and United States Constitutions as to (1) the fairness of insurance rates, and (2) the proper availability of insurance?
*646It is with regard to this question that I believe my brothers’ reasoning is most seriously erroneous and in consequence of which today’s action is taken. I shall attempt, first, to identify and explain the reasoning which must have fathered the majority opinion and then to demonstrate how the well-known constitutional principle upon which the majority depends has been misapplied.
The majority holds that the "compulsory insurance” requirement of § 3101 denies due process unless the government takes certain necessary steps to assure that all persons required to purchase no-fault insurance have an opportunity to do so on "fair” terms.
Although positing the view that some Michigan motorists are, in effect, denied the operation of their motor vehicles because of an inability to obtain insurance at justified, reasonable rates, the majority does not support such a conclusion with a factual record because none exists. There being no evidentiary basis upon which to predicate the assumption of the claim of unavailability of insurance, nor even appellate argument claiming it, the majority is forced to resort to an involved analysis by which an attempt is made to identify fair and equitable insurance rates as an "interest” warranting procedural protection under the due process provisions of the state and Federal Constitutions. Accordingly, the "interest” identified by the majority is an alleged "statutory entitlement” to no-fault insurance on a fair and equitable basis.
Although arguing that persons have a "statutory entitlement” to fair and equitable insurance rates, the majority meticulously avoids defining or delineating the scope of the term "statutory entitlement”. Concededly, the United States Supreme Court has never explicitly defined a "statutory *647entitlement”, nor does this form of property interest lend itself to easy definition. However, certain attributes of a "statutory entitlement” are sufficiently established in United States Supreme Court decisions to enable one to extrapolate a tentative definition of the concept.
A statute creates an entitlement claim to a governmental benefit if it defines the conditions under which the benefit must be granted or if it sets out the specific and sole conditions under which the benefit may be denied.6 Once the cognizable benefit is conferred or received, the individual beneficiary has a sufficient property interest in the benefit to warrant due process protection in the event the government attempts to withhold or deny the benefit.7 Underlying this concept of a property interest to which there is an entitlement is the rationale that the recipients of governmental benefits place a reliance upon the continued receipt of those benefits which must not be arbitrarily undermined.8
In attempting to identify the enjoyment of fair and equitable insurance rates as such an entitlement interest, the majority ignores certain absolutely essential attributes of entitlement interests, which will be discussed hereafter, while focusing extensively upon other attributes. In declaring that there exists an entitlement interest in fair and equitable insurance rates, the Court focuses upon two factors which it claims raise insurance rates from an important if abstract economic con*648cern to a constitutionally protected property interest, to wit: (1) a citizen’s dependency and reliance upon fair and equitable no-fault insurance rates; and (2) the action of the Legislature in fostering an expectation that no-fault insurance will be available at fair and equitable rates.
In finding the necessary citizen dependence or reliance, my brothers reason that simply because "independent mobility provided by an automobile is a crucial practical necessity * * * ” and "whether or not a person can obtain a driver’s license or register and operate his motor vehicle profoundly affects important aspects of his day-today life”, there exists therefore a constitutionally protected property interest in such registration and operation.
The next step my brothers take is to conclude that because the new found property interest one has in registering and operating a motor vehicle upon the highways is conditioned upon the procurement of no-fault insurance, constitutionally based procedural guarantees are also applicable to enable one to fulfill the condition. The result of such reasoning, of course, is that the provision established by the Legislature (compulsory purchases of no-fault insurance) as a condition to the exercise of the constitutionally protected entitlement interest (registering and operating one’s motor vehicle upon the highways) is, through bootstrapping argument, itself elevated to a constitutionally protected entitlement interest.
Apparently recognizing that the element of citizen reliance standing alone is not sufficient to create the entitlement interest to which due process protections attach, the majority finds "a separate and independent basis for invoking due proc*649ess protection for Michigan motorists required to purchase no-fault insurance”, viz., legislative enactments, independent of the compulsory no-fault insurance scheme which "fostered the expectation that no-fault insurance will be available at fair and equitable rates”.9
That somewhat convoluted route leads the Court to the conclusion that because of what it perceives to be inadequate procedural protections guaranteeing the availability of no-fault insurance at fair and equitable rates, the "compulsory insurance” requirement of § 3101 is unconstitutional.
The fundamental error in the reasoning of the majority is in the assumption that there is a property interest or entitlement, in the constitutional sense, in the availability of no-fault insurance at fair and equitable rates.
Essentially, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits”. (Emphasis added.) Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564, 576; 92 S Ct 2701; 33 L Ed 2d 548 (1972). When such benefits are terminated, the constitutional right to a hearing provides an opportunity for a person to vindicate his claim to such benefits. Board of Regents v Roth, supra, 577. Obviously, procedural due proc*650ess is not required until a benefit is abridged or otherwise threatened.
At the very outset my brothers err in concluding that the mandatory no-fault insurance scheme is an abridgment of the property interest one has in registering and operating his motor vehicle. The error is the result of an improper analysis of the essence of an entitlement interest. The analysis is deficient in two respects.
First, there is a failure to recognize that the property interest to which a citizen has an entitlement, and which is involved in this case, derives from the action of the state in registering or licensing a motor vehicle, a benefit which, once conferred, permits the use of a motor vehicle upon the public highways.
The concept of the present enjoyment of the benefit appears to be an essential attribute of the protected interests in property under the entitlement doctrine. The attribute of present enjoyment is consistent with the rationale of the recipient’s dependency and reliance upon the government activity.
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.” (Emphasis added.) Bell v Burson, 402 US 535, 539; 91 S Ct 1586; 29 L Ed 2d 90 (1971).
"The Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.” (Emphasis supplied.) Board of Regents v Roth, supra, at 576.
"The emerging and underlying principle is clear; once a cognizable benefit is conferred or received, governmental action must not be employed to deprive or infringe upon that right without some form of prior hearing. We are unaware, however, of any authority for *651the proposition that the full panoply of due process protections attaches every time the government takes some action which confers a new status on the individual or denies a request for a different status.” Scarpa v United States Board of Parole, 477 F2d 278, 282 (CA 5, 1973).
Second, there is a failure to appreciate that the legislative command that no-fault insurance be obtained as a condition precedent to the registering of a vehicle does not terminate or even abridge one’s entitlement to that benefit, but merely defines, in part, the perimeters or dimensions of the benefit.
An individual does not possess, in the abstract, a property interest in the operation of his vehicle upon Michigan’s highways. Rather, the property interest lies in his status as a registrant or licensee recipient of the entitled benefit. Until an individual acquires such licensure or proves his eligibility for it, he does not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Essentially, the requirement of no-fault insurance simply conditions or defines one aspect of the eligibility for the benefit. Until an individual fulfills the eligibility requirement of obtaining no-fault insurance, he does not have a valid claim of entitlement to operate his vehicle in Michigan.
The property interest at issue was created by the Legislature and, within constitutional limitations, the Legislature is free to define its dimensions. Board of Regents v Roth, supra, 577. The condition of obtaining no-fault insurance, which is applicable to all motor vehicle registrants, is no more than a partial determinant of such dimensions. So long as the condition is not palpably arbitrary or unreasonable, it does not offend due *652process.10 Michigan Canners v Agricultural Board, 397 Mich 337; 245 NW2d 1 (1976); Grocers Dairy Co v Department of Agriculture Director, 377 Mich 71; 138 NW2d 767 (1966); Carolene Products Co v Thomson, 276 Mich 172; 267 NW 608 (1936).
To so condition the issuance of such a license does not run afoul of Fourteenth Amendment procedural guarantees.
"If the statute barred the issuance of licenses to all motorists who did not carry liability insurance or did not post security, the statute would not, under our cases, violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bell v Burson, supra, 539.
The majority implies that the Legislature recognized a constitutionally protected property interest in fair and equitable rates when it enacted legislation toward that end. Moreover, because of this claimed interest in fair and equitable rates, the majority opines that procedural guarantees must be effectuated in connection with the rate making process.
The validity of the statement by the majority, implying that the Legislature has recognized an interest in fair and equitable insurance rates by "foster[ing] the expectation that no-fault insurance *653will be available at fair and equitable rates”, is necessarily dependent upon a showing that the alleged interest in fact exists. Since, as explained above, there does not exist, in the abstract, an interest in fair and equitable insurance rates, the interest in such rates, allegedly recognized by the Legislature, must exist, if at all, within the framework of this statutory scheme alone. Accordingly, we must determine whether the statutory provisions cited by the majority create an entitlement interest in such rates.
The relevant provisions of the legislative enactment upon which my brothers rely are the following:
"(1) All rates shall be made in accordance with the following provisions:
"(d) Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.” MCLA 500.2403(1); MSA 24.12403(1).
"(1) Every insurer authorized to write and writing automobile bodily injury liability and property damage liability insurance in this state shall participate in an organization for the purpose of:
"(a) Providing the guarantee that automobile insurance coverage will be available to any person who is unable to procure such insurance through ordinary methods.
"(b) Preserving to the public the benefits of price competition by encouraging maximum use of the normal private insurance system.
"(2) The organization created under this chapter shall be called the 'Michigan automobile insurance placement facility.’ ” MCLA 500.3301(1); MSA 24.13301(1).
The suggestion that, by enacting a regulatory scheme, the Legislature established a property interest in the subject matter of the regulation is *654constitutionally unsound. As explained earlier, a statute creates an entitlement to a government benefit when it declares the conditions under which the benefit must be granted or the conditions under which the benefit may be denied. Rather than creating or recognizing the existence of a property interest, the first cited provision, § 2403(1), sets the standards for the casualty insurers and the Commissioner of Insurance to follow when making casualty insurance rates.
The cases cited by the majority (footnote 23, pp 599-600, majority opinion) in support of the claim that there exists an interest in "fair and equitable insurance rates”, do not, in my view, stand for the stated proposition that there exists "a separate and independent basis for invoking due process protection for Michigan motorists required to purchase no-fault insurance”. Rather, the cases clearly narrow and limit instances in which procedural guarantees attach to situations in which there is not only a dependency or reliance upon the alleged interest, but also a legislative recognition of the interest at issue. Paul v Davis, 424 US 693; 96 S Ct 1155; 47 L Ed 2d 405 (1976); Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341; 96 S Ct 2074; 48 L Ed 2d 684 (1976); Meachum v Fano, 427 US 215; 96 S Ct 2532; 49 L Ed 2d 451 (1976); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv L Rev 86-104 (1976).
MCL 500.3301; MSA 24.13301, cited by the majority (p 599, majority opinion) as independently supporting the claim of legislative recognition of an interest in fair and equitable rates, merely provides for the creation of the "Michigan automobile insurance placement facility”. The provision compels insurers to participate in the assignment of high risks in order to make coverage available to all, while preserving to the public the benefit of *655price competition through the maximum use of the normal private insurance system. Outside of citing this provision in the context of its independent basis argument, the majority does not explain how it recognizes an interest in "fair and equitable insurance rates”.
Even if the majority was correct in concluding that there is a constitutionally protected entitlement interest in "fair and equitable insurance rates”, there has been no showing that the compulsory insurance provision of the Act either terminates or abridges the continued enjoyment of such interest. As indicated heretofore, Fourteenth Amendment procedural protection of property is a safeguard of interests a person has already acquired and procedural due process is not applicable until a state threatens to terminate or otherwise abridge the benefit. Although the majority alleges that a property interest in "fair and equitable rates” does in fact exist, their discussion is without any illustration demonstrating how no-fault’s compulsory insurance scheme abridges or terminates this interest. The majority does not discuss the essential factor of termination or abridgment of a property interest which triggers the procedural guarantees, because it is obvious that the compulsory insurance scheme in no sense abridges any interest in fair and equitable insurance rates. The action of the Court in declaring the compulsory insurance scheme unconstitutional is, to say the least, an anomalous approach to assuring procedural safeguards for the enjoyment of such benefits.
In summary, I am persuaded that the requirement of security imposed upon all motor vehicle owners by the No-Fault Act, as a condition precedent to the operation of motor vehicles, does not *656violate Fourteenth Amendment procedural guarantees. More specifically, the statutory requirement, on its face, does not even raise Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process questions.
In today’s novel declaration of unconstitutionality in futuro, for lack of procedural safeguards, the majority initiated inquiry, defined issues and objectives, and has attempted to coerce a solution.
There being no adversarial claims before the Court concerning the issue which is decided today, the compulsory insurance provision is struck down not by the adjudication of specific claims, but upon an inherently generalized approach to an abstract problem.
Perceived weaknesses, inequities, uncertainties and a concern for the potential unfairness of the compulsory insurance provision of the Act are elevated to the level of constitutional shortcomings to justify judicial veto. Impingement upon the legislative function in today’s judgment is glaring.11 Lacking the appropriate plenary power to effectuate the desired purpose, the Court’s declaration of unconstitutionality, in futuro, is used as a bludgeon to motivate, even compel, the Legislature and the Commissioner of Insurance to regulate the casualty insurance industry in conformance with the will of the Court.12 To this end my brothers *657have even proffered a "minimal” plan unburdened by any experience, expertise or understanding of the myriad factors which are implicated in the rate making process of the industry.
In its disposition of this issue, the Court has strayed from the constitutional limits of its judicial authority and usurped the legislative function. There is a difference between the Court’s power to make today’s judgment of unconstitutionality and its proper authority to do so. In the instance at hand, the latter has given way to the former and the price is further erosion of the ever weakening doctrine of judicial self-restraint.
Part IV. Due Process and Equal Protection Tests Applicable to the No-Fault Act
I concur with the majority opinion.
Part V. Constitutionality op the Personal Injury Protection Scheme Under the No-Fault Act
I concur with the majority opinion.
Part VI. Constitutionality op the Property Damage Protection Insurance Scheme Under the No-Fault Act
I concur in the result reached by the majority. *658The specific constitutional issues raised with respect to the property damage protection scheme are as follows:
(a) Whether the No-Fault Act violates the due process clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions by abolishing the common-law remedy in tort for persons whose property is damaged by negligent motor vehicle tortfeasors;
(b) Whether the No-Fault Act violates the equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions by creating the following statutory classification: (1) damage to vehicular property is not covered by any mandatory insurance under optional first-party collision insurance, while spect to this kind of property are covered solely under optional first-part collision insurance, while (2) damage to other tangible property and properly parked vehicles is covered by mandatory no-fault property damage insurance up to $1,000,000 required to be carried on the vehicle which inflicted the damage.
In accord with the so-called traditional test to determine whether the no-fault scheme comports with due process, we inquire only whether the statute bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective. The learned trial judge, rather than focusing his inquiry upon the question whether the new statutory scheme bore a reasonable relationship to permissible objectives, directed his inquiry into the efficiency of the former tort property damage idemnification system. After concluding that the traditional tort system operated with adequate efficiency, the trial court held "that there was no social objective to be served by abrogating tort rights of owners of property damaged by negligent tortfeasors”. Because of this overly restrictive analysis of the constitutional *659issue, the trial court’s legal conclusion was erroneous.
As elucidated in the majority opinion, "The Legislature is as free to experiment with other ways of dealing with a subject in the hope of making a good system better as it is to correct a perceived evil system.” When the trial court’s analysis focused only upon the latter consideration, its inquiry into possible legislative objectives was necessarily incomplete. Upon reviewing the record, the majority found several legitimate goals which would justify the enactment of the property protection scheme. Under the deferential approach inherent in the traditional due process test, I agree that there were legitimate objectives, other than those noted by the trial court, to warrant the legislative action.
With respect to the equal protection claim, plaintiffs and cross-plaintiffs argue that the Legislature has arbitrarily treated the subject of damage to moving highway vehicles differently from that inflicted upon other tangible property. As was observed in Part III (compulsory insurance), the Legislature has a legitimate interest in mitigating the detrimental consequences of motor vehicle accidents. Generally speaking, this is the fundamental objective of the No-Fault Act. A quick perusal of the Act makes evident the fact that the scheme is designed to insure one party’s financial responsibility to others as well as to himself. In accord with this objective, the no-fault scheme provides for compulsory third-party property damage protection insurance payable without regard to fault. Stated differently, the Act mandates the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in Michigan13 to procure third-party *660beneficiary insurance,14 payable without regard to fault for damage inflicted by his motor vehicle to tangible property. Out of this class of tangible property there is carved the exception of vehicular property15 designed for operation on a public highway.16 Damage to this class of property is excluded from property protection benefits. Plaintiffs and cross-plaintiffs argue that such statutory classifications are not rationally related to a valid objective of the No-Fault Act.
I do not agree.
In addition to the goal of assuring financial responsibility for motor vehicular inflicted damage to tangible property, the Legislature had other goals in mind. One of them involved cost considerations. As elucidated by the majority, the Legislature sought to make vehicle protection coverage more equitable by allocating premium expense for that protection exclusively to first-party collision coverage. Vehicle damage protection rates would thereby be calculated strictly on the basis of repair costs for one’s own vehicle, rather than including in the liability coverage a cost for the potential *661damage to a vehicle of unknown and therefore unascertainable value. Essentially, there is a resultant shift in insurance premiums from the liability coverage to the vehicle collision coverage. With this shift the Legislature intended that premiums would more closely reflect the value of the vehicle one drives while affording a more significant premium saving to one who does not purchase the optional first-party vehicle coverage. Additionally, the Legislature hoped that this shift from liability to first-party coverage might make group insurance feasible as well as create incentives for buying more crashworthy highway vehicles.
Including moving highway vehicles within the general tangible property class and affording them third-party property protection benefits would frustrate the aforementioned objectives without significantly advancing the interest of financial responsibility.17
Part VII. Whether § 3101(2) of the No-Fault Act Which Excludes Two-Wheel Motor Vehicles from Coverage Under the Act is Constitutional
I concur with the majority opinion.
*662Part VIII. Constitutionality of the No-Fault Act’s Statutory Scheme with Respect to the Work-Loss Reimbursement and Reimbursement for Replacement Services (§ 3107)
The essence of the plaintiffs’ complaint is: (1) that § 3107 violates the equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions because it invidiously discriminates between workers in the home and workers outside the home in terms of maximum benefits payable in case of injury; and (2) that § 3107(b) violates the equal protection clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitution because it creates an arbitrary classification by restricting recovery for injuries to those employed in the home to expenses "reasonably incurred” for replacement services.
Reduced to its simplest, the equal protection guarantees of both constitutions mean that the Legislature may not take what may be termed a "natural class of persons”, split that class in two, and then arbitrarily designate the severed factions of the original unit as two classes and thereupon enact different rules for the treatment of each. However, when there is a natural difference between the situation or circumstances of the two classes of persons, the Legislature may be justified in treating them differently. The state enjoys a wide range of discretion in distinguishing, selecting, and classifying, and it is sufficient if a classification is practical and not palpably arbitrary. Orient Ins Co v Daggs, 172 US 557; 19 S Ct 281; 43 L Ed 552 (1899).
There is a practical reason for the Legislature to make a distinction between benefits for work loss and the replacement of ordinary and necessary services. Reimbursement for the former lends it*663self to determination on the basis of an individual’s prior wage scale, while ordinary and necessary services performed in the home are not susceptible of valuation under the same criterion. Moreover, whereas replacement costs for ordinary and necessary services are susceptible to being incurred, one cannot ordinarily incur the cost of a substitute to perform the job of the accident victim. Additionally, the fact that the ordinary and necessary services must be incurred before reimbursement serves not only a valuation function, but also a prophylactic function which has not been shown to be unreasonable. Finally, the different maximum limits imposed by the Act appear reasonably related to their reimbursement functions.
In my view, there is no need for a remand of this matter for the taking of evidence.
Part IX. Constitutionality of the No-Fault Act’s Statutory Scheme with Respect to Transient Non-Michigan Motorists and Nonresident Occupants of Motor Vehicles Not Registered in Michigan
Essentially, plaintiffs complain that this statutory scheme violates due process and equal protection guarantees by denying no-fault benefits to the transient nonresident who has not obtained insurance from an insurer who has filed a certification in compliance with § 3163 of the Act.
I do not agree.
Rather than representing an arbitrary and capricious exercise of legislative power, this exclusion merely recognizes the realities of the situation. The Legislature, cognizant of the extent of its authority over out-of-state motor vehicles, reasonably excludes from the compulsory coverage *664scheme out-of-state motor vehicles which are not operated in Michigan for an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year. Those nonresidents who do not voluntarily procure the no-fault coverage quite reasonably do not receive the concomitant no-fault benefits. Under the traditional test, legislation is presumed to be constitutional if any state of facts reasonably may be construed to justify the legislative action and the classifications therein. From the record made below, it does not appear that the presumption is overcome.
Again, I perceive no benefit to be gained by a remand of this issue for further trial court action.
Conclusion
In finding the No-Fault Act constitutional, I am compelled to make explicit the following observation. The above holdings are dispositive of the challenges to constitutionality of the No-Fault Act as leveled in this lawsuit by the plaintiffs and raised by the majority, and no more. Upon a different factual predicate, another plaintiff, in the future, may well raise arguments and produce evidence sufficient to persuade me that the presumption of constitutional validity which weighs heavily today is overcome or that, as applied, the act is unconstitutional.
In reviewing the issues before us, I have been acutely conscious that the proper discharge of the judicial function, when evaluating new legislation for constitutional validity, is very narrow. It is to determine whether there is any rational relationship between the goals sought to be accomplished and the means chosen to do so. Our stated and restated deference to the legislative function, as embodied in the familiar doctrine of presumptive constitutional validity, is no mere verbalism. Its *665source is the doctrine of separation of powers and its life blood is judicial self-restraint. We are not free to strike down this revolutionary new concept of compensation for motor vehicle caused injury and damage because we may think it to be unwise or even at odds with our personal notions of what is fair. We test for constitutional collision. If there is none, like it or not, we ought to decline to disturb the legislative will. Stated otherwise, our review and judgment must be such as to not unduly hamper the Legislature’s freedom to experiment and innovate by superimposing our judgment as to the expediency or wisdom of the legislation over theirs. This necessary policy of deference affords the Legislature ample scope for putting its prophecies to the test of proof. The case before us is a contrived lawsuit brought one month prior to the date 1972 PA 294 became effective and is necessarily deficient in presenting evidence of the actual impact, across the board, of the no-fault scheme. Essentially, the plaintiffs produced before the trial court a body of evidence similar to that considered by the Legislature when that body was deliberating upon the propriety of adopting the scheme. That evidence included, inter alia, legislative facts, actuarial data, expert opinion, fiscal projections and professorial theorizing. Much of the evidence is imprecise, even highly speculative. Upon examining all of it, considering the findings of fact by the trial court, and applying those established principles of constitutional law which I have discussed, over all of which is superimposed the presumption of constitutional validity, I am persuaded that the Act is constitutionally sound.
Coleman, J., concurred with Ryan, J.Plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on August 28, 1973. The No-Fault Act became effective October 1, 1973.
"The owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance and residual liability insurance. Security shall be in effect continuously during the period of registration of the motor vehicle.” MCLA 500.3101(1); MSA 24.13101(1).
The majority has erroneously framed the issue in terms of registrants and operators. In actuality, the Act mandates only owners or registrants to insure their motor vehicles. Individuals are not required to provide no-fault security by virtue of being the operators of motor vehicles.
Footnote 14, p 594 of the majority opinion states:
"Although plaintiffs did not expressly raise on appeal the issue decided by the trial court, 'Can the Legislature constitutionally, as a condition precedent to [registration and] operation of a motor vehicle, require the purchase of no-fault personal protection insurance and no-fault property protection insurance * * * ’ we feel compelled to address it because of its basic, threshold importance to any decision we might render as to the No-Fault Act’s constitutionality.”
See DeVries v Secretary of State, supra; Larr v Secretary of State, 317 Mich 121; 26 NW2d 872 (1947).
See Helvering v Davis, 301 US 619; 57 S Ct 904; 81 L Ed 1307 (1937); Carmichael v Southern Coal & Coke Co, 301 US 495; 57 S Ct 868; 81 L Ed 1245 (1937).
See Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254; 90 S Ct 1011; 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970); Arnett v Kennedy, 416 US 134; 94 S Ct 1633; 40 L Ed 2d 15 (1974).
See Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564; 92 S Ct 2701; 33 L Ed 2d 548 (1972); Bell v Burson, 402 US 535; 91 S Ct 1586; 29 L Ed 2d 90 (1971).
See Goldberg v Kelly, supra.
"(1) All rates shall be made in accordance with the following provisions:
"(d) Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.” MCLA 500.2403(1); MSA 24.12403(1).
"(1) Every insurer authorized to write and writing automobile bodily injury liability and property damage liability insurance in this state shall participate in an organization for the purpose of:
"(a) Providing the guarantee that automobile insurance coverage will be available to any person who is unable to procure such insurance through ordinary methods.” MCLA 500.3301(1); MSA 24.13301(1).
As expressed in question (a), the condition of no-fault insurance is reasonably related to the state’s interest in mitigating the detrimental consequences of highway motor vehicle accidents. Moreover, the various underwriting guidelines currently employed by state regulated casualty insurers are not alleged to be arbitrary or discriminatory either by the majority or the plaintiffs on appeal. Although that challenge is not made in the instant case, it is made in Connecticut’s counterpart to Shavers, Gentile v Altermatt, 169 Conn 267; 363 A2d 1 (1975). The Connecticut court, relying on a regulatory scheme virtually identical to that enacted in Michigan, rejected the challenge to the underwriting guidelines under the traditional due process and equal protection tests. See Conn Gen Stat Ann 38-201c, amended since the Gentile decision. See Conn Gen Stat Ann (Supp 1978) 38-201c.
Article 3, § 2 of the 1963 Constitution provides:
"The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising the powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Judicial power is the authority to hear and decide controversies and to make binding orders and judgments respecting them. Johnson v Kramer Bros Freight Lines, Inc, 357 Mich 254, 258; 98 NW2d 586 (1959).
Constitutional duty of courts is to interpret and apply law, not to enact laws. School District of the City of Pontiac v Pontiac, 262 Mich 338, 353; 247 NW 474, 247 NW 787 (1933).
The majority characterizes their bludgeon as an attempt to soften *657the blow in holding the No-Fault Act unconstitutional at some future date if the necessary legislative action isn’t taken in the interim period. The majority cites Robinson v Cahill, 62 NJ 473; 303 A2d 273 (1973), in support of such an approach. A review of the subsequent case history evidences the impropriety of such an approach. See Robinson II, 63 NJ 196; 306 A2d 65 (1973); Robinson III, 67 NJ 35; 335 A2d 6 (1973); Robinson IV, 67 NJ 333; 339 A2d 193 (1975); Robinson V, 69 NJ 449; 335 A2d 129 (1976); Robinson VI, 70 NJ 155; 358 A2d 457 (1976); Robinson VII, 70 NJ 464; 360 A2d 400 (1976).
In addition, the Act mandates the nonresident owner or regis*660trant who operates or permits his motor vehicle to be operated in this state from an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year to continuously maintain security for the payment of benefits. § 3Í02(1).
In order to limit the absolute liability of the insurance company, the Legislature established a $1,000,000 ceiling on the mandatory third-party property damage insurance. The choice of the $1,000,000 ceiling was justified from an actuarial standpoint.
Unless the vehicle is parked in such a way as not to cause unreasonable risk of the damage which occurred. § 3123(l)(a).
In addition to the vehicle exclusion, § 3123 excludes from property protection insurance benefits "[pjroperty owned by a person named in a property protection insurance policy, his spouse or a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the person named, his spouse or the relative was the owner, registrant or operator of a vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage arose”, § 3123(l)(b), and "property damage arising from motor vehicle accidents occurring out of this state”, § 3123(2).
Because of the fact that vehicles "parked in such a way as not to cause unreasonable risk of the damage which occurred” are logically blameless, and because treating such parked vehicles similarly to other tangible property would not have a significant impact on the aforementioned premium objectives, the Legislature reasonably afforded such parked vehicles no-fault property protection benefits.
"[Ejvery line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been included. That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function.” Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1, 8; 94 S Ct 1536; 39 L Ed 2d 797 (1974); and see New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297; 96 S Ct 2513; 49 L Ed 2d 511 (1976).