(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The administrative determination which the Wisconsin Environmental Decade, Inc., et al. (hereafter appellants) sought to review in the circuit court was a Public Service Commission rate increase order which had been issued after several hearings were held on the matter from April through December 1975.
The P.S.C. moved to dismiss the petition for review on the ground that appellants had not served their petition on “all parties who appeared before the agency” as required by sec. 227.16(1) (c). The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, and judgment was entered accordingly.
The majority opinion concludes that failure to serve “all parties who appeared” within the statutory time limits is a defect of subject matter jurisdictional import and that because this court cannot name “all parties who appeared,” it cannot determine whether they were all served within the time limit. Accordingly the court reverses the circuit court judgment which dismissed the action on the ground that appellants had not served “all parties who appeared.” The court also directs the circuit court to remand the case to the P.S.C. for its determination of “all parties who appeared.” The court then “fashions a remedy” which permits the appellants to avoid the jurisdictional defect of having failed to satisfy the service requirement should the P.S.C.’s list of “all parties who appeared” include persons not originally served. The court allows any person named as a “party who appeared” by the P.S.C. — which presumably will include the appellants — to petition the circuit court for review, even though the statutory thirty-day period has ended. In other words, the statutory time limitations of sec. 227.16 begin again when the P.S.C. issues the list of “all parties who appeared.”
I believe the majority opinion misinterprets the import of ch. 227. Although I would reach a result similar in *536practical effect to the majority’s, I would do so under a very different rationale. I would hold that failure to serve a “party who appeared” within the statutory time limit is not a subject matter jurisdictional defect which requires the dismissal of the review proceedings. I would reverse the circuit court judgment and remand the cause to the circuit court to permit the P.S.C. to file a list of “all parties who appeared” and the criteria it used in compiling the list.
Sec. 227.11, Stats., provides that “every decision when made, signed and filed shall be served forthwith . . . [on] each party to the proceedings . . . .” Sec. 227.16 (1) sets forth the procedure for instituting proceedings for review. Subsection (a) provides that “proceedings for review shall be instituted by serving a petition therefor . . . upon the agency . . . and by filing such petition in the office of the clerk of the circuit court . . . all within 30 days after the service of the decision of the agency upon all parties as provided in s. 227.11 . . . .” Sec. 227.16(1) (c) provides that “copies of the petition shall be served . . . not later than 30 days after the institution of the proceeding, upon all parties who appeared before the agency in the proceeding in which the order sought to be reviewed was made.”
The statute thus clearly provides that review proceedings are instituted by serving the agency and filing the petition in court within the thirty-day period. Parties are served pursuant to sec. 227.16(1) (c) after the proceedings are instituted. Service on the agency and filing in court are jurisdictional requirements necessary to institute the proceedings. Service on the parties occurs after the circuit court acquires subject-matter jurisdiction. Failure to serve the parties should not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction.
The legislature could have clearly stated that service on the parties is a jurisdictional requirement if it desired *537that result. Compare the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act which explicitly makes service on the parties jurisdictional.
“Proceedings for judicial review shall he instituted by filing a petition ... in the district court . . . . Within ten days after the filing of a petition for judicial review . . . copies of the petition shall be mailed by the petitioner to all parties .... Such mailing shall be jurisdictional . . . Sec. 17A.19(2), Iowa Code of 1977.
My analysis of sec. 227.16(1) (a) and (c), Stats., is in accord with Hamilton v. ILHR Dept., 56 Wis.2d 673, 687, 203 N.W.2d 7 (1973). In that case Mr. Hamilton filed a complaint with DILHR charging that American Motors Corporation (AMC) had discriminated against him because of his race. DILHR ruled against Hamilton and Hamilton appealed, serving DILHR and AMC. Because of defects in both services, the attorney general moved to dismiss the petition for review. The circuit court entered an order dismissing the petition. This court held that, despite the defects in the service on the agency and in the filing of the petition in court, the service would be viewed as sufficient within sec. 227.16 (1) (a). Thus, this court concluded, the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction to review the agency determination. Even if service on AMC was defective, this defect did not affect the circuit court’s acquiring subject-matter jurisdiction.
“. . • Sec. 227.16(1), Stats., does not require A.M.C. to be served in order for the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to attach. Rather, one only need serve the department and file with the court. Service on A.M.C. is required in sub. (1) of sec. 227.16 within thirty days after the ‘institution of the proceeding.’
“Service upon A.M.C. was not necessary for the court to obtain subject-matter jurisdiction — it was for the purpose of obtaining personal jurisdiction over one of *538the parties appearing in the agency proceeding.” Id. at 687.
This language from Hamilton is not limited to the peculiar facts of that case. Nor was the language withdrawn or overruled by this court in Cudahy v. Department of Revenue, 66 Wis.2d 253, 224 N.W.2d 570 (1974), a case which the majority views as controlling the case at bar. Indeed Cudahy sets forth no new law; it merely reiterates the rule set forth eleven years earlier in Monahan v. Department of Taxation, 22 Wis.2d 164, 167, 125 N.W.2d 331 (1963).
In Monahan v. Dept. of Taxation, 22 Wis.2d 164, 167, 125 N.W.2d 331 (1963) and Cudahy v. Department of Revenue, 66 Wis.2d 253, 224 N.W.2d 570 (1974), this court held that on review of a determination of the Tax Appeals Commission, failure to serve the Department of Revenue was a subject matter jurisdictional defect, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the Commission’s determination. These cases are distinguishable from the case at bar because of the special statutory provisions relating to review of the Tax Appeals Commission. Sec. 227.16(1) (b) and (d), Stats. Although the Commission is the “agency” which makes the decision subject to review within sec. 227.16(1), the Department of Revenue is to be named “respondent” in the petition of review and is required to participate in the circuit court’s review proceedings. Sec. 227.16(1) (b) (d), Stats. The statute has, in effect, substituted the Department of Revenue as the “agency” in lieu of the Tax Appeals Commission. Sec. 227.16(1) (b). Service on the Department is therefore necessary to institute the review proceeding. In a series of tax cases culminating in Cudahy the court has held that both the Tax Appeals Commission and the Department of Revenue must be served within the time limits prescribed by sec. 227.16(1), Stats., for the tax*539payer to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court.
I do not find these tax cases controlling' in the case at bar. The tax cases, unlike the instant case, are governed by special statutes relating to the Tax Appeals Commission. The Department of Revenue in the tax cases is an “agency party” which is readily known to and identified for the petitioner and which must participate in the review proceedings. The instant case involves serving non-agency “parties” who may be numerous, who may not be known to or identified for the petitioner, and who need not participate in the review proceedings if they do not wish to do so.
On the basis of the statutes and the prior cases, I would hold that if the appellants failed to serve “all parties who appeared,” dismissal of the petition is not required because service under sec. 227.16(1) (c) is not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.
The result ultimately reached by the majority is inconsistent with its conclusion that a defect in service of non-agency parties is jurisdictional. The majority opinion concludes that failure to serve the parties within the time limit is jurisdictional, that the circuit court “lacks authority to extend the time for service” and that “if the petition was not served on the proper parties . . . dismissal was required.” Nevertheless, at the close of the opinion the court comes to the rescue of the appellants, “fashioning a remedy” which gives the appellants an opportunity to proceed with judicial review of the P.S.C. decision even if they failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of serving “all parties who appeared.” The cases the majority relies upon as enabling the court to “fashion a remedy” hold that a court of equity has the power to adapt its remedies to the exigencies and needs of the case. This equitable doctrine is applicable to cases where a court has subject-matter jurisdiction; it has *540no relevance to the case at bar as viewed by the majority. If the defect is jurisdictional and the case at bar is governed by Cudahy and Monahan, as the majority holds, then, as the majority also notes, Cudahy and Monahan make clear that service of a notice of review, like service of a notice of appeal, within the time period specified, is an absolute prerequisite for jurisdiction and that the supreme court is without power to allow an appellant to serve notice after the expiration of the statutorily mandated period. In Monahan we held that this court cannot employ its discretionary power in the interest of justice (sec. 251.09, Stats.) to allow appellant to proceed with a petition to review, because the court cannot use sec. 251.09 “to confer jurisdiction where it does not already exist.” 22 Wis.2d at 171. See also Cudahy, 66 Wis.2d at 259, and Estate of Pitcher, 240 Wis. 356, 361, 362, 2 N.W.2d 729 (1942).
The result which logically flows from the court’s holding that a defect in service is jurisdictional is that appellants have no opportunity for review if they failed to serve “all parties who appeared.” The result the majority reaches is contrary to the rationale of the majority opinion.
The majority directs the P.S.C., on remand, to decide now who were “all parties who appeared.” Because identifying “all parties who appeared” before issuance of a decision would help to avoid confusion and unnecessary litigation, the majority recommends that hereafter agencies identify “all parties who appeared” prior to the issuance of the decision in the proceedings.
In my view, the statutory scheme requires an administrative agency to determine “all parties who appeared” no later than the time it issues its decision. The agency must identify “all parties who appeared” in order to serve a copy of its decision on them. The Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act provides as follows:
*541“Every decision of an agency following a hearing shall be in writing accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. . . .” Sec. 227.10, Stats.
“Every decision when made, signed and filed, shall be served forthwith by personal delivery, or mailing of a copy to each party to the proceedings or to the party’s attorney of record.” Sec. 227.11, Stats.
The statute whose interpretation is at issue in the instant case reflects the legislature’s assumption that all the parties will be designated by the agency at least by the time a decision is made. This assumption also underlies the legislative requirement that for purposes of allowing a petitioner to serve a petition for judicial review of a decision, “. . . the agency upon request shall certify to the petitioner the names and addresses of all such parties \i.e., ‘all parties who appeared before the agency in the proceeding in which the order sought to be reviewed was made’] as disclosed by its records, which certification shall be conclusive.” Sec. 227.16(1) (c) (emphasis added). The legislature clearly did not contemplate that the agency’s determination of “all parties who appeared” would be made at a time when a review proceeding had already been instituted and a time limit on service was in effect.
The next issue requiring consideration is who are “all parties who appeared.” We start first with the statute. The word “party” is defined in sec. 227.01(6) to mean “each person or agency named or admitted as a party. Any person whose substantial interests may be adversely affected by any proposed agency action in a contested case shall be admitted as a party.” Unfortunately, this definition does not aid us in the instant case, because it appears that there was no procedure in the P.S.C. proceeding for naming persons as parties or for admitting persons as parties.
Sec. 227.16(1) (c) does not merely require service on all parties. It requires service “upon all parties who *542appeared before the agency in the proceeding.” It is unclear if the phrase “who appeared . . adds anything to the word party.
As the majority opinion points out, persons who “appear” as the P.S.C. uses the word “appear” in its rules, are not necessarily “all parties who appeared before the agency” in the proceeding upon whom service must be made pursuant to sec. 227.16(1) (c). The circuit court equated P.S.C. “appearances” with “all parties who appeared” and concluded that not “all parties who appeared” were served. I agree with the majority that it was unreasonable for the circuit court, on the record before it, to construe “all parties who appeared” as used in sec. 227.16(1) (c), Stats., as all persons who are listed by the P.S.C. as making an appearance. The flaw in the circuit court's reasoning is revealed by an examination of the P.S.C. “Findings of Fact and Order” which lists the persons who made “appearances.” Among the 43 so listed are 12 members of the P.S.C.’s staff who “appeared” according to P.S.C. terminology but are conceded not to be parties.
The underlying premise of the majority opinion, with which I agree, is that determining who are “all parties who appeared” is an aspect of the total administrative decision-making process which the legislature has delegated to the agency. The criteria to be used in making the decision must necessarily reflect such factors as the nature of the agency proceeding, the nature and effect of the decision made, and the nature of the participation by those involved in the proceeding. The majority opinion properly concludes that it,is the responsibility of each agency, and not of this court, to develop and announce such criteria appropriate to the proceeding involved. Cf. State v. Goulette, 65 Wis.2d 207, 216, 222 N.W.2d 622 (1974).
The majority properly cautions that in establishing criteria an agency must balance the public’s interest in *543allowing broad participation in the review proceeding and the practical financial difficulties of requiring the petitioner to serve a horde of persons. But the majority goes too far when it concludes “that it is unreasonable to construe the term ‘parties’ as used in sec. 227.16(1) (c), Stats., to include all persons who sign an appearance slip or list at a P.S.C. rate proceeding.” I suggest that sometimes all such persons may very well be “parties who appeared” and other times they may not.
The majority opinion describes “parties who appeared” in a multitude of ways. The court indicates service is required upon “persons or entities which affirmatively demonstrate an active interest in the proceeding,” “active litigants,” “parties actively participating,” “principal parties,” “principal litigants,” “proper parties,” “litigants who, by their own consensus, were regarded as parties.” It is not clear if the court is suggesting multiple criteria or a single criterion to guide agencies in identifying “parties who appeared.”
Another incidental matter raised by the majority is the parties’ references in their submissions to the court of matters not of record. On appeal the parties were faced with a peculiar problem. When the P.S.C. objected that not all “parties who appeared” were served, the appellants were limited to an administrative agency record which did not deal with the issue raised in the circuit court. Nor did the circuit court take evidence, sec. 227.20, Stats, (or order the P.S.C. to take evidence, see. 227.19, Stats.) on the issue of who the P.S.C. viewed as “parties who appeared” or the P.S.C.’s criteria for designating “parties who appeared.” Accordingly, on appeal there is a very limited record which would permit this court to review the circuit court’s determination that service was not made on “all parties who appeared.”
Both appellants and the P.S.C. have attempted to overcome the deficiencies of the record by including in their briefs discussions of P.S.C. procedures relating to “par*544ties” and “appearances.” These discussions are not corroborated by evidence in the record. It is inappropriate for a court to consider matters outside the record. If the court is to consider the procedures and practice of an administrative agency not documented on the record, the parties must rely on the court’s power to take judicial notice of the procedures and practices. Whether an appellate court will take judicial notice of a matter rests largely in the discretion of the court. Currie, Appellate Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice & Independent Investigation, 1960 Wis. L. Rev. 39. This court has frequently taken judicial notice of public records in the office of a state agency. See cases cited in Currie & Heffernan, Wisconsin Appellate Practice Procedure 50 (Rev. 1975). Under the circumstances of this case, the majority’s chiding appellants for submitting P.S.C. records and summaries thereof relating to the P.S.C. practice of determining and serving “parties who appeared” is unwarranted. Appellants were not alone in going outside the record. The State also went outside the record. And the majority opinion inappropriately relies on the very material which it criticizes appellants for producing.
To summarize, I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court with directions to order the P.S.C., which is objecting to the service, to file a list of persons who are “parties who appeared before the agency in this proceeding.” If the appellants are willing to serve those persons appearing on the P.S.C. list, the trial court should grant the appellants a reasonable time to serve the persons. Sec. 801.15, Stats. When service is completed, the appellants should file an affidavit stating that they served the persons named by the P.S.C. as the “parties who appeared,” and the review proceedings would go forth. If the appellants are unwilling to serve those persons on the P.S.C.’s list, the issue arises as to *545the review available of the P.S.C.’s determination of “all parties who appeared.” We need not face that question at this time.