dissenting.
I cannot wholly agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion in affirming Jennings' conviction for driving while intoxicated as a Class D felony and his conviction for driving with a suspended license. Both convictions rest upon BMV records, which as the majority notes, were found to be ambiguous in Oller v. State (1984), Ind.App., 469 N.E.2d 1227, reh. denied, 472 N.E.2d 610, 611, and upon hearsay testimony.
Jennings' conviction for driving while intoxicated enhanced to a Class D felony is based upon the BMV record and the testimony by a probation officer, admitted over Jennings' objection, that Jennings was previously convicted of driving while intoxicated. The probation officer admitted that she was not present at Jennings' prior conviction. The majority reasons that while the BMV record alone would not sustain the conviction, the testimony of the probation officer was relevant and renders "more probable than not" the conclusion that Jennings had a previous conviction. However, the hearsay evidence coupled with the BMV abstract do not constitute evidence with probative value sufficient to demonstrate a previous conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a line of cases wherein a prior convietion was introduced for the purpose of enhancing a defendant's sentence pursuant to the habitual criminal statute, IND.CODE § 35-50-2-8, our Supreme Court has determined that introduction of properly certified court records constitutes the best method of proving prior convictions. In Morgan v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 1087, 1090-1091, the Court stated:
"Evidence, to be sufficient in a criminal cause, must have such probative value that from it a reasonable trier of fact could infer that which it is offered to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt. Glover v. State, [ (1970) 253 Ind. 536, 255 N.E.2d 657], supra. A judgment of conviction is basically a written court record of a judicial proceeding. The record's existence and content in turn is reflected in a host of other official documents. Collins v. State, (1981) [275] Ind. [86], 415 N.E.2d 46. The requirement of the law that such records be kept reflects the monumental interest of society in the maintenance of accurate and reliable evidence of such matter. To countenance proof of such an important matter as a prior conviction in a criminal trial upon parol evidence alone from witnesses who have observed the judicial proceedings, resulting in it, is counter to our entire perspective on the subject. We, therefore, hold that parol evidence standing alone is insufficient evidence of the fact *914of prior convictions in the absence of a showing of the unavailability of the proper certified records. Here, no such records were introduced, and there was no indication that the State was unable to produce them. The additional thirty year term imposed under Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8 cannot stand on the evidence submitted, and defendant's conviction on that charge must be reversed."
440 N.E.2d at 1090-1091; accord Driver v. State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 1186, 1188. But cf. Foster v. State (1985), Ind., 484 N.E.2d 965, 966 (was not fundamental error to prove habitual offender status through unobjected to testimony of admissions to probation officer and certified copies of court records identified by probation officer).
In the present case the State made no showing that court records of the conviection were unavailable. Enhancement of Jennings' driving while intoxicated convietion to a Class D felony based solely on a BMV abstract and hearsay testimony allows substantial room for error in a criminal sanction.
Jennings conviction for driving with a suspended license is also based upon a BMV abstract and hearsay testimony. I do not agree that Jones v. State (1985), Ind. App., 482 N.E2d 746 is distinguishable from the present case. The abstract introduced in the proceedings against Jennings was less informative than that in Jones. In Jennings' case the abstract was redacted to one line asserting that Jennings' license was suspended on the day after his arrest. The abstract is no more reliable because its date is in closer proximity to Jennings' arrest than were the arrest and abstract in Jones. A temporal lapse of one day or one and one-half months makes no difference when the evidence reflects the status of the licenses after the arrests.
The majority considers Jennings' statement that he did not have a license further evidence of the suspended status of Jennings' license. The statement is susceptible of several interpretations. Jennings may not have had his license with him when he was stopped or as noted in Jones, supra, 482 N.E.2d at 747, n. 1, Jennings' license may have been considered suspended because he had not paid a reinstatement fee. In either of the two examples Jennings would have been guilty of driving without a valid license, a Class C infraction. Thus, the statement could not be considered evidence that Jennings' license was suspended.
The final bit of evidence concerning Jennings' conviction for driving with a suspended license, considered by the majority, is the officer's testimony that someone at the Indiana State Police post reported over the radio that Jennings' license was suspended.1 This testimony was received without objection by Jennings. Normally, unobjected to hearsay testimony may be considered for its probative value. See, Busam v. State (1983), Ind.App., 445 N.E.2d 118, 122. See also, Turentine; Ingram v. State (1979), 179 Ind.App. 161, 164, 384 N.E.2d 1119, 1121-1122 (unobject-ed to hearsay afforded same probative ef-feet as otherwise competent evidence of similar import). Giving the hearsay in this instance its probative value would net a quantum of proof far below that necessary to support a criminal conviction.2 The evidence did not include any explanation of the circumstances, who determined or how it was determined that Jennings' license was suspended. No conclusive proof of the status of Jennings' license was presented.
For the foregoing reasons I dissent.
. This information would form the basis for probable cause to arrest, but does not constitute evidence sufficient to support a criminal conviction.
. While not binding upon this Court it is instructive that other jurisdictions have concluded that unobjected to hearsay may not, standing alone, support a criminal conviction. State v. McGann (1982), 132 Ariz. 296, 645 P.2d 811; State v. Allien (1978), La., 366 So.2d 1308.