dissenting.
I must dissent from the decision of the majority which creates a new class of lies which our trial courts must permit and imposes new limits on the traditionally broad discretion of the trial courts in sentencing.
There is more wrong with this decision than the gradations of deceit that it countenances and the specious arguments that it embraces. The majority’s opinion reinforces a view embedded in recent decisions of this Court that the truth does not count if it hinders lying.
The majority strains to protect a liar from the consequences of his deceit as this Court did in Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1977), where an oath in Pennsylvania has two different meanings, as well as Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973) and Commonwealth v. Roots, 482 Pa. 33, 393 A.2d 364 (1978), and their teratogeny, where a truth-testing tool fashioned from the transcendental experience of mankind, i.e., the use of prior convictions to measure present credibility, was squan*583dered in a tangle of rules that has allowed a warm comfortable refuge for seasoned liars to practice their arts from witness stands all over the Commonwealth. In the case at bar, the majority wiggles through several definitions of lying to grasp a gratuitous opportunity to excuse a defendant whose conduct would poison the very function of a court as a truth determining institution.
The issue in this case is simply whether a sentencing court may enhance a sentence when it catches a defendant in a flat out lie in the course of a criminal prosecution. After being charged with murder in the cold-blooded shooting of an unarmed man, appellant filed a Notice of Alibi Defense. He provided a list of witnesses who were prepared to testify in support of his alibi. Upon being confronted by his attorney with the weaknesses of his alibi claim, however, appellant withdrew it on the day before trial and proceeded in an equally spurious theory of self-defense. Because appellant’s blatant fabrication did not occur "while testifying at trial,” the majority holds that his duplicity may not be considered by the trial court in sentencing. At 1384 (emphasis supplied).
In United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978), which the majority distinguishes without approving, the Supreme Court of the United States held that it is the ancient duty of a sentencing court to consider the totality of a defendant’s conduct and character in fashioning an appropriate sentence. The Supreme Court rejected the arguments adopted today by the majority that a sanction for lies would “deter” defendants from the truth and affirmed the propriety of enhancing a sentence for lying. Grayson involved the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence in light of his trial testimony which the sentencing court believed to be false. The majority erroneously concludes that the Grayson situation provides a stronger case for the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence than does the instant case. At 1384.
The majority’s distinction is a patently false one. If anything, enhancement of the sentence is more appropriate *584in this case than in Grayson. First, in the instant case, the finding that appellant attempted to deceive the court does not depend on a subjective assessment of his credibility. Appellant’s willful deception is inescapably obvious from his contradictory assertions of alibi and self-defense. Secondly, and more importantly, appellant’s assertion of a false alibi evidences a more pervasive and cynical plot than would false testimony alone. Not only did appellant cling to his perjurious alibi defense with every intention of presenting it until confronted by his attorney on the eve of trial, but he was willing to involve others in his scheme, jeopardizing their freedom by inducing them to commit perjury. This calculated attempt to subvert the vital truth-determining process is even more probative of appellant’s character and need for rehabilitation than false testimony would be. Rather than abusing his discretion, the trial judge applied well-settled principles by considering appellant’s mendacity in imposing sentence.
We have long stated that sentencing is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose judgment will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Erdington, 490 Pa. 251, 416 A.2d 455 (1980); Commonwealth v. Knight, 479 Pa. 209, 387 A.2d 1297 (1978). An abuse of discretion will not be found unless the sentence exceeds the statutory limit or is manifestly excessive. Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 275 A.2d 78 (1971); Commonwealth v. Campolei, 284 Pa.Super. 291, 425 A.2d 818 (1981). Because the instant sentence of four to ten years for voluntary manslaughter is within the statutory limit, the issue is “whether the sentence is for some other reason ‘manifestly excessive.’” Commonwealth v. Campolei, 284 Pa.Super. at 298, 425 A.2d at 822. In evaluating the excessiveness of a sentence we consider, “whether the confinement imposed on appellant is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the appellant’s offenses, and the appellant’s rehabilitative needs.” Commonwealth v. Campolei, 284 Pa.Super. 299, 425 A.2d at 822. See Commonwealth v. Green, 494 Pa. 406, 431 A.2d 918 (1981); Common*585wealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976). The willingness of an accused to offer perjured testimony is highly relevant to the sentencing inquiry. As the Supreme Court of the United States stated in Grayson:
[W]e must conclude that the defendant’s readiness to lie under oath —especially when, as here, the trial court finds the lie to be flagrant — may be deemed probative of his prospects for rehabilitation.
438 U.S. at 52, 98 S.Ct. at 2616 (emphasis supplied).
Instead of following these time-honored standards, however, the majority cuts out of whole cloth another allowable lie. The majority opinion goes farther than merely allowing another series of unsanctioned lies — it gives a surreptitious smile to their practice. So long as a defendant does not take the witness stand, he may practice any form of fabrication and never have it count in the consideration of his character. He may, as here, offer two totally inconsistent defenses, alibi and self-defense, solicit lies to fortify them and send the prosecution on a wild goose chase of investigation. He may then select the one he believes most plausible and the court cannot treat such conduct as a reflection on his character to be considered in sentencing.
The lie the sentencing court considered here was not merely an “attempted” or “premature” or “implicit” lie. See pp. 1384, 1384-1385 n. 7. It was an overt act of deceit, which precipitated a useless and unnecessary investigation by the Commonwealth. Appellant notified the trial court that he intended to assert an alibi. The Commonwealth investigated and, if the prosecution had not produced an eyewitness, the fabricated alibi might have succeeded.1
*586On the day before the trial appellant suddenly dropped his alibi claim and switched to self-defense. Two more inconsistent theories there could hardly be. The contempt of truth inherent in such an inconsistency would defy the father of lies himself. To condone such conduct, as the majority does despite its disclaimer, or even to waste the energy in distinguishing this fabrication from a “testimonial lie” is almost sinister.
The majority justifies its decision in a passage of epistemic nihilism holding that the unsanctioned right to lie will actually aid the search for truth:
If this Court were to adopt the theory advanced by the Commonwealth, ... a defendant once having filed a fabricated alibi defense notice would perforce be compelled to pursue it. That is, a defendant could not abandon the fabrication without risking the possibility of an enhanced sentence. Such a result would not only be needlessly harsh but would also deter future defendants from testifying truthfully.
At 1384 (footnotes omitted).2 In short, the majority holds, if one starts lying and it seems unprofitable, he will not be compelled to continue. He may adopt the truth or switch to a richer vein of lies. How we are to know when the lies end and the truth begins, or what combinations of both has been finally practiced, is presumably left to coin flipping.3
One may gather from today’s decision that in our courts telling the truth first, last and always is only for the meek or unimaginative. Even the majority must realize that a possible enhanced sentence for playing fast and loose with a *587court of law might deter a fabrication at the beginning of a case so that one need not live with a lie. Moreover, the notion that the enhanced sentence is “needlessly harsh,” while indisputably within the statutory limits,4 abandons any pretense of crediting the sentencing court’s discretion.
For this Court to fashion elaborate sanctuaries for blatant lies or to demand anything less than the truth, is not only to abandon our function, but also to invite more mendacity, fabrication, hoax, fraud and chicanery. To believe blindly that the path to ideal justice is paved with specious distinctions, such as the majority draws today, is to hope that water lillies will grow in a septic tank.5
LARSEN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.. Appellant’s trial counsel stated at the sentencing hearing:
The alibi did not fall apart. I could have presented it, and we had a shot at walking out of this courtroom with not guilty.
% * * * * *
No doubt about it ....
N.T. Sentencing Hearing at 21. This assertion certainly indicates that appellant had convinced counsel of his alibi. To suggest, as does the majority, that appellant did not know the meaning of offering an alibi defense is a ridiculous indulgence. See p. 1384 n. 6.
. It is no surprise that the majority cites no legal authority to support its position, but merely attempts to distinguish the instant case from United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978), and Commonwealth v. Thurmond, 268 Pa.Super. 283, 407 A.2d 1357 (1979). This is simply because there is no authority for the majority’s novel restraint of the sentencing court’s discretion.
. The majority notes that the sentencing court was unable ultimately to determine whether the alibi notice was false or whether the trial testimony was perjured or whether appellant had ever told the truth. At 1384 n. 5. See also, N.T. Sentencing Hearing at 44. Who could make the determination on these facts?
. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1103(2), 2503(c). Indeed, the trial court recognized that it could have imposed a stiffer sentence:
[T]he sentence I did impose was based on a lot of thought and was not ... an angry response to the lies which I felt were perpetrated because had I so reacted, you would be assured that I would have given you the maximum on each bill which would have totaled not less them seven and one half nor more than fifteen years in jail.
N.T. Sentencing Hearing at 45.
. Finally, the majority’s result is particularly revolting in light of the success of appellant’s scheme. This is a case in which this Court does, indeed, permit appellant to “get away with murder.”
By waiting until the last minute to switch to a self-defense theory, appellant successfully deceived the prosecutor, who had been preparing to meet the alibi defense. N.T. Post Trial Motions 3/12/79 at 4-5. The prosecutor did not impeach appellant with his spurious alibi notice, which he was entitled to do either under Pa. R. Crim. P. 305 C (1)(g) or a prior inconsistent statement theory. See Commonwealth v. Bey, 294 Pa.Super. 229, 439 A.2d 1175 (1982) (defendant may be cross examined on discrepancies between his alibi notice and trial testimony).
Thus, appellant was able to testify with his credibility intact and create a reasonable doubt in the trial judge’s mind as to his guilt of first degree murder. This doubt dissipated when the trial judge belatedly learned of appellant’s alibi scheme. N.T. Post Trial Motions 3/12/79 at 8. Appellant cleverly weasled his way out of a first degree murder conviction, which carries a mandatory life sentence. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 1102(a).
We should not now disturb the trial court’s discretion to further reduce appellant’s rather lenient sentence. As we stated very recently “... a concededly guilty defendant [should not be permitted] by virtue of his gamesmanship, to flaunt his guilt in the face of the judicial system, the Commonwealth, and the citizens of Pennsylva*588nia.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 497 Pa. 7, 12-3, 438 A.2d 592, 595 (1981).