(dissenting).
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a limited upward durational departure, I respectfully dissent.1 Tina Leja was convicted of second-degree felony murder. The murder, as acknowledged by the majority, was “particularly gruesome.” However, in concluding that a limited upward departure was not justified, the majority later describes Leja’s conduct as nothing “other than a typical offense of second-degree felony murder.” (Emphasis added.) I cannot agree.
Leja was in love with Darnell Smith. As a prison guard, she violated known employment rules and began a romantic relationship with him while he was an inmate, stating that she “chose” to begin a relationship with Smith knowing he was in prison for raping a 12-year-old girl, had “contact with drugs and selling drugs,” and was a suspected gang member. At trial, Leja admitted that she lied to her supervisors about the relationship.
After being fired from her job, she continued writing letters to him, professing her love with proclamations such as
I love you so much. If there is anything I can do, let me know. If you want money, I’ll get it. I’ll do anything for you if I could. I love you.
As events unfolded, her words proved only too true.
While Leja would have us focus on her tears and regrets, the standard of review requires us to focus on the evidence that supports the second-degree murder verdict and the trial court’s decision to depart upwardly. To that end, Tina Leja was the lynchpin in this crime. As the trial court remarked, if Leja had not allowed Smith to overcome her “good judgment and will,” Holder “would be alive today.” Instead, as Holder’s mother stated, Leja “served [Bobby] up on a silver platter to Darnell, knowing full well what Darnell was about.”
*454Leja had her day in court. She told her story of being afraid of Smith and being controlled by him. But the jury and the judge had to reconcile her “remorseful” version of the facts with the stark reality of what was — and was not — done. In the end, the jury rejected her defense of duress and convicted her for the death of Holder. The judge, hearing the same evidence, decided that her role in the crime was anything but “typical.”
Leja’s own chilling testimony tells us what, in fact, ensued after she lured Holder to the apartment where he was beaten and shot. As Holder was being beaten, she did not try to intervene, and she did not try to help Holder after he was shot. Instead, she remained in the bedroom where Holder was shot and slept through the night with the body on the floor at the foot of the bed. When she woke up many hours later with Holder’s blood still on her, she took a shower and then accompanied Smith and Andre Parker to a St. Paul park. When they could not “find a good spot to leave a body,” Smith told her to “take the body” and “get rid of it.” And she did. Not only did she lure Holder to his death, she was the principal agent of the concealment of his dismembered remains.
In Leja’s own words, she got into her car and started driving alone — with her cell phone — and with Holder’s body parts packed in a cooler in the trunk of her car. While acknowledging that Smith was not present, that she “did not have a gun to her head” or a “knife to her throat,” she chose not to call the police and did not do anything to attract the attention of the police. Instead, she led Parker, who was following her in Holder’s car, to Wisconsin and picked the exact spot to abandon his car — in front of a sign in the parking lot stating that the car would not be towed for 14 days. She also chose the swampy backyard area of her father’s unoccupied house in Wisconsin to bury Holder’s torso. After burying the torso, Leja and Parker continued on a lengthy drive through western Wisconsin and northeast Minnesota to abandon the other body parts. On cross-examination, Leja acknowledged that Parker did not threaten her, did not have a gun, and did not strike her.
Leja’s defense that she left “clues” around her father’s property in the hopes of being caught is belied by her own testimony. Not only did she acknowledge on cross-examination that she knew that the house was unoccupied and in a rural, sparsely populated area, she also testified that she did not tell her father anything about Holder or ask for help when her father called her and told her he had found the torso buried on his property. The day after she returned from disposing of the body parts, Leja was back at work — working for two full weeks. During this time, she talked with her father, her law-student sister, and coworkers. She never asked any of them for help. She even lied to the agent assigned to investigate Holder’s death when he asked her if she knew anything about the death. Instead of seeking help, when the “heat was on,” she fled with Smith to Mississippi.
These facts lead to the inescapable conclusion that Leja’s trial testimony that she was frightened by Smith and “wanted to get caught” was not credible. “ The jurors simply did not see her as a victim and found her guilty of second-degree murder. The majority fails to acknowledge this fact and instead emphasizes that “she was not the person who assaulted and shot Holder or dismembered his body.” This focus ignores our law that under the aiding and abetting statute, Leja is “criminally liable” for the assault of Holder, as well as his death. Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2002). By virtue of her conviction of second-de*455gree felony murder, the jury found that Leja intentionally aided, advised, counseled, or conspired to commit the assault of Holder, and his death was a foreseeable consequence of the assault. Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subds. 1, 2 (2002); § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2002).
Contrary to the suggestions of the majority, the horrific death, decapitation, dismemberment, and disfigurement of Holder should not be considered a “distraction]” in reviewing Leja’s sentence for his murder. Indeed, our prior decisions have held aiders and abettors accountable at sentencing for the cruelty inflicted by other participants in the crime. For example, in the case of State v. Campbell, 367 N.W.2d 454, 460-61 (Minn.1985), we reviewed a sentencing departure for the girlfriend of a man who brutally killed a woman. The defendant in that case did not assist in the actual murder, but helped her boyfriend gain access to the victim’s apartment, maced the victim, and helped conceal the crime afterward. Id. at 457. In affirming the sentencing departure, we concluded that, in addition to other aggravating factors, the “murder was committed with particularly cruelty” and explained “even if defendant did not inflict the brutal injuries and psychological terror which proceeded and were part of the murder, as a participant she was legally responsible for those actions under Minn.Stat. § 609.05,” the aiding and abetting statute. Id. at 461 (emphasis added). Similarly, in a ease where a robbery victim was severely beaten, we disagreed with the trial court’s determination that legal grounds did not exist for a departure on the basis that the defendant did not participate in the attack on the victim, holding that aggravating circumstances were present and observing that “[ejven if defendant did not inflict the injury on the victim, as a participant in the robbery he was legally responsible for the injury under Minn.Stat. § 609.05 (1980).” State v. Jones, 328 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn.1983) (emphasis added) (discussing aiding and abetting statute).
Like those cases, this is not a case where the defendant appears on the scene after the crime has been completed. In fact, Leja admitted at sentencing that through her actions she “ultimately caused [Holder’s] death.” In sentencing Leja, the trial court focused on her “principal role” in his death, noting that her “footprints are in every chapter.” Nonetheless, the majority tries to isolate Leja’s conduct to her “participation in the concealment of Holder’s remains” and then concludes that her participation in the concealment of the remains, “without more,” does not support an upward durational departure.
Not only is the majority incorrect in finding that Leja played a minor role in this crime, we never have held, as the majority does today, that concealment alone is not a sufficient basis for an upward departure. Rather, this court has considered concealment to be an appropriate aggravating factor in sentencing for over 20 years. See State v. Ming Sen Shiue, 326 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn.1982). Since Shine, we have affirmed other sentencing departures based in part on the fact that the defendant had concealed the murder victim’s body. See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 744 (Minn.1998); State v. Folkers, 581 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn.1998). In Folkers, we stated that “finding that the victim was treated with particular cruelty alone would be enough to justify [a] departure,” and cited approvingly the holding of Shiue that “concealment of the victim’s body shows particular cruelty and is an appropriate aggravating circumstance justifying departure.” Folkers, 581 N.W.2d at 327 (emphasis added) (citing Shiue, 326 N.W.2d at 655).
*456The dismemberment of Holder’s body and the concealment óf his remains, some of which were never recovered, demonstrate that the victim and his family were treated with particularly cruelty and adequately support the trial court’s limited upward departure. In Shiue, we explained that treating concealment as an aggravating factor is justified by the trauma suffered by close relatives. 326 N.W.2d at 655. In this case, Holder’s mother stopped working so that she could investigate his disappearance “day and night”; she spent “hours driving through Wisconsin in the woods looking for him”; and she has not been able to bury her son because she cannot find the rest of him. The majority states “there can be no dispute” that “Holder and his family were treated with particular cruelty,” yet somehow concludes that this cruelty was not meted out by Leja. At sentencing, even Leja’s own counsel acknowledged “[t]he pain she caused this family,” remarking, “It is just inconceivable that would not be an aggravating factor.”
The special concurrence asserts that the concealment of Holder’s remains cannot be used to enhance the sentence for second-degree felony murder, relying on the decision of the court of appeals, which vacated Leja’s conviction and sentence for the offense of accessory after the fact. According to the special concurrence, “the law of the ease is that Leja cannot be convicted or sentenced for the offense of accessory after the fact arising out of the separate behavioral incident of concealment of the victim’s body.” The special concurrence concludes that “when, as a matter of law, the district court cannot convict or sentence for misconduct arising from a distinct behavioral incident, the court cannot rely upon such misconduct to enhance a sentence for a different offense, arising out of a separate behavioral incident.”
These statements are misleading, because Leja never argued that the concealment of the body arose from a distinct behavioral incident, and the court of appeals never even mentioned the issue, let alone based its holding on the fact that there were two distinct behavioral incidents. In fact, Leja consistently has taken the position throughout the trial proceedings and this appeal that her conduct constituted a single behavioral incident. At sentencing, defense counsel stated:
She’s convicted of many counts of what I consider to be a single behavioral incident. She committed a crime and without interruption covered it up.
In vacating the conviction of accomplice-after-the fact, the court of appeals simply concluded “it is not possible, as a matter of law, for a principal to be guilty of being an accomplice-after-the-fact.” State v. Leja, 660 N.W.2d 459, 466 (Minn.App.2003). Nonetheless, the special concurrence persists in calling the concealment of the body a “separate offense.”2
Moreover, the special concurrence’s assertion that “the act of concealing the victim’s dismembered body two days after the murder was a different behavioral incident ‘separated by time, place, and motive’ from the murder” is not supported by either the facts of this case or by our case law. “[Ajpart from-the factors of time and place, the essential ingredient of any test” for determining whether there is a single behavioral incident is whether the conduct “was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 404, 141 N.W.2d 517, 525 (1966). In this case, Holder’s remains were concealed, in defense counsel’s words, so that Leja could “extricate her*457self.” As Leja’s counsel noted, such “[concealment is a classic example of ‘avoidance-of-apprehension.’ ” See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 478 N.W.2d 496, 497 (Minn.1991) (citing line of “avoidanee-of apprehension cases” where we have held that two crimes are part of the same course of conduct “if the defendant, substantially contemporaneously committed the second offense in order to avoid apprehension for the first offense”). In this case, the concealment was substantially contemporaneous with the murder. Although there was a day-and-a-half interval between Holder’s death and the concealment of his remains, the medical examiner testified that the dismemberment of Holder’s body would have involved a substantial amount of time and effort, and the dismemberment was followed by an aborted attempt to leave the remains at a park in St. Paul. In addition, Leja claims to have been in an extended post-homicidal slumber following Holder’s death and still had his blood on her when she finally woke up. As defense counsel observed, “from the beginning to the end,” there was “little interruption.”
In summary, the concealment of the body was relevant to Leja’s conviction of felony murder and therefore was an appropriate sentencing consideration. We have concluded that “a defendant’s presence, companionship, and conduct before and after an offense is committed are relevant circumstances from which the jury may infer criminal intent” for aiding and abetting a crime. State v. Gates, 615 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn.2000) (emphasis added); see also 9 Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nordby, Minnesota Practice-Criminal Law and Procedure § 45.4 (3d ed.2001) (noting that evidence of “concealing or assisting another to escape” is relevant in “aiding and abetting” cases to prove that a crime was committed and that a defendant knowingly participated in it). If the jury could consider Leja’s concealment of Holder’s remains in finding her guilty of aiding and abetting the murder, it seems incongruous to conclude that the trial court may not consider it in sentencing for that offense.
A trial court “sits with a unique perspective on all stages of a case, including sentencing” and “is in the best position to evaluate the offender’s conduct and weigh sentencing options.” State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn.1998). In this case, the trial court concluded that Leja played a major role in the crime by luring Holder to his death and “actively participating] in taking him to Wisconsin, disposing of his car, burying his torso, [and] leaving his other remains at a roadside park where they can never be found.”
Considering Leja’s role in this heinous crime, I conclude that the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in imposing a limited upward departure of 1.4 times the presumptive sentence. After recognizing that this was a “gruesome crime” involving “particular cruelty” and that Leja’s actions were “reprehensible,” it is inconceivable that the majority could find that her conduct fails to reach the threshold of substantial and compelling circumstances needed to justify an upward durational departure. If not now, when? I would affirm the sentence imposed.3
. Although a majority of the Court does not join in the opinion authored by Justice Paul Anderson, because the special concurrence agrees with the result reached, I will refer to Justice Paul Anderson’s opinion "as the majority opinion.
. The state did not seek review of any issue relating to the vacating of the conviction.
. As noted by the majority, the parties did not raise Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) or Blakely v. Washington, - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) issues on appeal and they are therefore waived. Without deciding the issue, I further note that because the jury convicted Leja of accomplice-after-the-fact, Minn.Stat. § 609.495, subd. 3 (2002), the case may fall outside the holding in Blakely.