Board of Education of Danville Community Consolidated School District No. 118 v. Danville Education Ass'n

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN,

specially concurring:

I agree with the majority that a proper balance between the restricted first amendment right to picket and the public interest in the operation of government, and particularly the operation of the constitutionally mandated system of public schools, requires us to rule that the picketing should not have been enjoined here.

I disagree with the majority’s reluctance to speak with more specificity as to the duty of a trial judge when faced with a request to enjoin picketing related to an illegal strike by school employees. Our decision requires a trial judge to draw a fine line between this case and Redding. The sole reason for our deciding this moot case is because the issue involved is one of great public importance which is likely to recur and upon which public officials need a determination for further guidance. (People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz (1952), 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied (1952), 344 U.S. 824, 97 L. Ed. 642, 73 S. Ct. 41.) If each case depends primarily upon the circumstances of that case, our decision here is useless.

Although Redding recognizes that the specific situation controls as to whether the public interest overrides the right to picket, that opinion clearly states that the court is required to enjoin picketing against a school district if the picketing (1) is for the “purpose of fostering and supporting an unlawful strike,” or (2) impedes and obstructs the functioning of the school system.

Here, unlike in Redding, the illegal work stoppage was suspended by the DEA in obedience to the temporary restraining order prior to the hearing on the request for the temporary injunction. Because of this time interval, any subsequent picketing would not necessarily be in support of an illegal purpose but could merely inform the public of the issues in the dispute which gave rise to the work stoppage. The school district made no showing that future picketing would be for any such purpose. Although the trial court, when ruling upon the request for a temporary restraining order, properly followed Redding in including in the order a prohibition against the picketing which was occurring in support of the illegal strike, no such strike existed at the time of the hearing on the request for the temporary injunction.

I agree with the majority that here, unlike in Redding, no showing was made that the picketing had caused substantial absenteeism, or deterred purveyors, deliverymen, or repairmen from servicing the schools. That this would necessarily result from picketing will not be presumed. However, our decision should not be interpreted to mean that if subsequent picketing, even though peaceful and purely informational, were later shown to cause substantial absenteeism or a disruption of services, the court would not be under a duty to enjoin the picketing.