OPINION
GARDEBRING, Judge.Appellant Thomas B. Wilson, the personal representative of the estate of Beverly Thompson, brought an action for declaratory judgment seeking to recover uninsured motorist benefits under the insurance policy issued by respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). The trial court granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and ruled appellant was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 12, 1987, Beverly Thompson was intentionally killed when struck by a Cadillac driven by her husband, Robert Thompson. At the time of the collision Beverly was a pedestrian. Appellant stipulated for its summary judgment motion that Robert intended to inflict bodily harm on Beverly.
*218Beverly had purchased automobile insurance from State Farm and paid premiums on three cars, including the Cadillac, for $100,000 of liability coverage and $100,000 of uninsured motorist coverage on each car. Each policy named Robert and Beverly as insureds. The relevant State Farm provision reads as follows:
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.
(Emphasis in original.)
In a wrongful death action, the trustee of the heirs of Beverly commenced suit against Robert Thompson. The defense of this action was tendered to State Farm which refused it because Robert’s intentional killing of Beverly precluded liability coverage. Appellant commenced this action asserting Beverly had a right to uninsured motorist benefits under the State Farm policy that insured the Cadillac. Both parties moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted State Farm’s motion. The court concluded: (1) the death of Beverly Thompson was not caused by accident; (2) her death did not arise out of the use of an uninsured motor vehicle for transportation purposes; and (3) the vehicle was not an uninsured motor vehicle pursuant to the policy’s definition of uninsured motor vehicle. This appeal followed.
ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in concluding Beverly Thompson’s bodily injuries were not caused by accident?
2. Did the trial court err in concluding the incident which caused Beverly Thompson’s death did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle for transportation purposes?
3. Did the trial court err in concluding the vehicle used to kill Beverly Thompson was not an uninsured motor vehicle?
ANALYSIS
On appeal from summary judgment, the function of the appellate court is limited to determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1979). A question involving interpretation of the language of an insurance contract is one of law. Associated Independent Dealers, Inc. v. Mutual Service Insurance Cos., 304 Minn. 179, 183, 229 N.W.2d 516, 519 (1975). Thus, on appeal we are to determine whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the law to the facts of this case. Id. at 183-84, 229 N.W.2d at 519.
We start by noting appellant must show the trial court erred in its conclusion on each of the three issues raised on appeal. Failure to meet any one of the three necessary conditions of uninsured motorist coverage dictates affirming the trial court.
I. Accident
The first issue is whether Beverly’s injuries were caused by accident. The trial court held Beverly’s death was not caused by accident since Robert stipulated his conduct was intentional. We agree.
This court’s recent decision in Petersen v. Croft, 447 N.W.2d 903 (Minn.Ct.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990), disposes of this issue in favor of State Farm. In Petersen, three tortfeasors killed Randi Petersen in a drive-by shooting while she slept on her porch. Randi’s husband sought uninsured motorist benefits. The trial court found the intentional killing of Randi was caused by accident. On appeal, this court reversed the trial court and held that when determining whether an occurrence is an accident for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, the occurrence is to be viewed from the perspective of the tortfeasor. Id. at 905.
We reasoned that no situation could arise in which an occurrence would not be caused by accident if viewed from the victim’s perspective. Id. Therefore, to avoid rendering the accident requirement in uninsured motorist policies nugatory, the occur*219rence must be viewed from the perspective of the tortfeasor. Id. at 905-906.
It follows from appellant’s stipulation that Robert’s conduct was intentional and Beverly's death was therefore nonaccidental. On this issue alone the trial court properly granted respondent’s summary judgment motion.
II. Maintenance or Use of a Motor Vehicle
Since we believe Beverly’s death was not caused by accident, we need not reach the next issue. We note, however, three factors control the question of whether Beverly’s injuries arose out of the use of a motor vehicle. First, there must be adequate causation between the Cadillac and Beverly’s death. Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn.1987). That is the vehicle must be an “active accessory” to the injury sustained. Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 310 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn.1981). The causation standard is “something less than proximate cause in the tort sense and something more than the vehicle being the mere situs of the injury.” Id. The Cadillac was unquestionably an active accessory in causing Beverly’s injuries and death as Robert used it as a weapon to strike and kill his wife.
We believe the second requirement is also met. No act of independent significance may occur which breaks the causal link between “use” of the vehicle and the injuries inflicted. Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878. In Edwards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 399 N.W.2d 95 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1987), this court found an intervening act where the tortfeasor drove the victim to the countryside, stopped the car and then raped and killed her. In another case, this court held an intervening act occurred when assailant, who had exchanged insults from his car, stopped his car, walked to plaintiff’s car and punched him. Wieneke v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 397 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Minn.App.1986). By contrast, Robert never departed from the Cadillac in his plan to strike Beverly. Thus, no act of independent significance broke the link between Robert’s use of the Cadillac and Beverly’s injuries.
The third factor concerns a determination of what type of use of the Cadillac was involved. Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878. The question of whether injury arose out of the use of a motor vehicle turns on the particular facts of each case. Associated Independent Dealers, 304 Minn. at 182, 229 N.W.2d at 518. Coverage should exist only for injuries resulting from use of the Cadillac for transportation purposes. Classified Insurance Corp. v. Vodinelich, 368 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1985).
State Farm argues, and the trial court concluded, the Cadillac was not used for transportation purposes. We disagree. Klug provides guidance for our decision. In Klug, the tortfeasor chased and rammed the victim’s car, ultimately wounding the victim by firing a shotgun from his moving car. The supreme court concluded the victim’s injuries arose from the use of the car for motoring purposes. Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878. The court reasoned the tortfeasor used his car to drive beside the victim and maneuver into a position to shoot. Id. at 878-79. Similarly, Robert used the Cadillac as a means to maneuver into a position to injure his wife.
The trial court’s reliance on Vodinelich is misplaced. In Vodinelich, the supreme court denied automobile liability coverage to a woman’s two children who were accidentally asphyxiated while she committed suicide by idling her car in the garage. The court held the car in this instance was not used for transportation purposes. Vodinelich, 368 N.W.2d at 923. However, in this case, unlike the woman in Vodinelich, Robert used his vehicle for transportation purposes when he intentionally struck his wife.
III. Uninsured Motor Vehicle
The final issue is whether the Cadillac was an uninsured motor vehicle so as to entitle appellant to benefits. We need not reach this issue; however, we note that in this case the Cadillac was indeed uninsured.
*220Uninsured motor vehicle is defined as one “for which a plan of reparation security meeting the requirements of sections 65B.41 to 65B.71 is not in effect.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 16 (1988). State Farm asserts a plan of reparation security is in effect even though Robert’s intentional killing of Beverly, in reality, precluded available liability insurance benefits.
This assertion is without merit. The supreme court concluded that as long as insurance is available to cover the vehicle at the time of accident, the vehicle is not uninsured. Sorbo v. Mendiola, 361 N.W.2d 851, 853 (Minn.1985). Conversely, if no insurance is available to cover the vehicle, as occurred in this case, the vehicle has no plan of reparation security in effect. Hence, the Cadillac was an uninsured vehicle.
The trial court concluded the Cadillac was not an uninsured vehicle under the insurance policy’s definition. In State Farm’s policy an uninsured motor vehicle includes one for which “the insurance company denies coverage.” By itself this provision would include the Cadillac. However, the policy excludes from the definition a motor vehicle which is (1) insured under the liability coverage of this policy (emphasis added), or (2) furnished for the regular use of [the named insured] or any relative.
The first provision excludes the Cadillac as an uninsured motor vehicle, but does not preclude appellant from uninsured motorist coverage under two of the other State Farm policies held by Beverly. Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1988) provides:
If at the time of the accident the injured person is not occupying a motor vehicle, the injured person is entitled to select any one limit of liability for any one vehicle afforded by a policy under which the injured person is insured.
If the other requirements were satisfied, Beverly would be entitled to uninsured motorist benefits but for State Farm’s exclusion. To extend the policy exclusion regarding the Cadillac to other policies held by Beverly on different vehicles would conflict with section 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) and would, therefore, be impermissible. See Roering v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co., 444 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn.1989). Beverly may rely on her other two policies.
Furthermore, we find unenforceable State Farm’s provision which excludes coverage when the vehicle is furnished for use of another family member. A policy exclusion that denies recovery under one’s own policy is unenforceable because first party coverage follows the person. See Petrich by Lee v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 427 N.W.2d 244, 245 (Minn.1988). This is not a case where Beverly was negligent in insuring her vehicles. Moreover, Beverly did not purchase first party coverage and expect it to function as liability insurance. See Myers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 336 N.W.2d 288, 192-92 (Minn.1983).
DECISION
Appellant’s claim for benefits under Beverly’s uninsured motorist coverage with State Farm is denied. The trial court correctly interpreted the policy to preclude coverage when the tortfeasor’s conduct is intentional.
Affirmed.