dissenting.
Because I believe that the instructions given by the trial court in this case fairly cover the law relating to the requested mistake of fact instruction, I respectfully dissent.
The trial court’s authority with respect to jury instructions is governed by Maryland Rule 4-325, which provides:
The court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding. The court may give its instructions orally or, with the consent of the parties, in writing instead of orally. The cm,rt need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given.
Rule 4-325(c)(emphasis added). Thus, the mandatory language of the first portion, see Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 237, 596 A.2d 1024, 1040-41 (1991) cert. denied, 503 U.S. 972, 112 S.Ct 1590, 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992); Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 592, 479 A.2d 1344, 1348 (1984), is limited by the discretionary language of the second portion. See Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 347-48, 701 A.2d 374, 381-82 (1997)(stating that “Md. Rule 4-325(e) is not absolute” and that “a requested instruction need not be given where other instructions ‘fairly cover’ the subject matter of the requested instruction”). When reviewing the propriety of the trial court’s refusal to *492give a requested jury instruction, our Court must examine whether the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law, whether that law was applicable in light of the facts of the case and the evidence before the jury, and finally, and most pertinent to the issue before us, whether the instruction actually given fairly covered the substance of the requested instruction. See Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 683-84, 741 A.2d 1119, 1122 (1999); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 58, 702 A.2d 699, 718 (1997); Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 612, 616 A.2d 392, 401 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963, 113 S.Ct. 2936, 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993)(quoting Mack, 300 Md. at 592, 479 A.2d at 1348). As the trial court is only required to give a requested instruction if the instruction satisfies each of these conditions, appellate review is also so limited: “[s]o long as the law is fairly covered by the jury instructions, reviewing courts should not disturb them.” See Tharp v. State, 129 Md.App. 319, 329, 742 A.2d 6, 11 (1999), aff'd, 362 Md. 77, 763 A.2d 151 (2000)(quoting Farley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 355 Md. 34, 46, 733 A.2d 1014, 1020 (1999)); see also Dean v. State, 325 Md. 230, 239, 600 A.2d 409, 413 (1992)(stating that courts “are not required to give requested instructions if the matter is fairly covered by the instructions actually given”).
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on the law — and a court errs by failing to issue a requested instruction — when generated by the evidence and not covered by the instructions actually given. See Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418, 427, 749 A.2d 787, 792 (2000)(stating that a trial judge is required to “give a requested instruction which correctly states the applicable law and which has not been fairly covered in instructions”)(quoting Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 239, 412 A.2d 88, 91 (1980)); Patterson, 356 Md. at 683-84, 741 A.2d at 1122 (quoting Ware, 348 Md. at 58, 702 A.2d at 718). No error is committed, however, when the trial court refuses to grant a requested instruction, the substance of which is embodied in those instructions actually administered by the court. See Gunning v. State, 347 Md. at 348, 701 A.2d at 382; Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 535, 499 A.2d 1261, 1286 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986); England v. State, *493274 Md. 264, 276, 334 A.2d 98, 105 (1975). This, I believe, is precisely the situation before us today: the substance of the requested jury instruction on the mistake of fact defense was embodied by the instructions pertaining to the knowledge and intent requirements for the crimes for which the defendant was on trial.
With respect to the intent requirement, and in accordance with Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:31, the trial court stated:
With regard to intent, you are instructed intent is a state of mind and ordinarily cannot be proved directly, because there is no way of looking into another person’s mind. Therefore a defendant’s intent may be shown by surrounding circumstances. In determining the defendant’s intent, you may consider the defendant’s acts and statements, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Further, you may but you are not required to infer that a person ordinarily inten[d]s the natural and probable consequences of his acts. When instructing the jury as to the requisite knowledge of
the defendant, the trial court stated:
With regard to knowledge, and knowledge is required in the second [failure to remain at the scene of an accident involving bodily injury or death], third [failing to return to the scene of an accident involving personal injury or death], and fourth [failing to render assistance to a person injured in an accident], of the charged offenses, and I instruct you as follows. Knowledge, in the context of this case, can be proven in one of two ways.
The first way is actual knowledge. In other words, did the State produce any evidence that the defendant actually saw or perceived the accident or injury?
The second way in which knowledge is proven is by showing that the defendant should have known that an accident occurred or should have anticipated that ... the accident resulted in an injury to a person.
The term ‘should have known’ is an objective standard and not a subjective one. It means that given all of the *494evidence that you believe, you are to determine whether a reasonable person who possessed all of the information at the time of the collision, should have known that a collision occurred and should have anticipated that [the] accident resulted in an injury to a person.
The petitioner requested that the trial court provide the following instruction regarding the mistake of fact defense based on Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction 5:06:
You have heard evidence that the defendant’s actions were based on a mistake of fact. Mistake of fact is a defense and you are required to find the defendant not guilty if all of the following three factors are present:
(1) the defendant actually believed (alleged mistake);
(2) the defendant’s belief and actions were reasonable under the circumstances; and
(3) the defendant did not intend to commit the crime of (crime) and the defendant’s conduct would not have amounted to the crime of (crime) if the mistaken belief had been correct, meaning that, if the true facts were what the defendant thought them to be, the [defendant’s conduct would not have been criminal][defendant would have the defense of (defense) ].
In order to convict the defendant, the State must show that the mistake of fact defense does not apply in this case by proving, beyond a reasonable belief, that at least one of the three factors previously stated was absent.
While I believe that even a cursory comparison of the requested mistake of fact instruction and the issued intent and knowledge instructions reveals the substantive similarities, I will proceed with the following factor-by-factor analysis.
First, pursuant to the requested mistake of fact instruction, the jury would have been instructed that it must find that the petitioner actually believed he hit a trash bag (the mistaken fact) and not the victim, Lynn Thompson (the accident which caused the injury/death). Under the issued instructions, the jury was instructed that it must find that the petitioner had actual knowledge that the accident or injury occurred, and that the State produced evidence demonstrating that the *495petitioner perceived the accident or injury. No consequential distinction between these instructions exists. A finding that the petitioner had actual knowledge of the accident or injury implicitly requires a finding of the absence of mistake; one who actually believes he hit a trash bag cannot have actual knowledge that the accident or death occurred, and vice versa.
In addition to requiring the jury to find that the petitioner actually believed he hit a trash bag, the requested instruction would have required the jury to find that this belief was reasonable under the circumstances. Similarly, the issued instructions required the jury to “determine whether a reasonable person who possessed all of the information at the time of the collision, should have known that a collision occurred and should have anticipated that the accident resulted in an injury to a person.” To achieve such a finding and attain a conviction, the State was required to demonstrate that the petitioner’s beliefs (i.e. that he hit a trash bag when, in fact, he actually hit and killed a woman) and actions (i.e. subsequently leaving the scene of an accident) were objectively unreasonable. Again, no consequential distinction between these instructions exists. If, pursuant to the requested instruction, the jury had found that the petitioner’s belief — i.e. hitting a trash bag instead of a human being — was reasonable, then clearly the State would not have met its burden to demonstrate that the petitioner “should have known” that the accident and injury occurred, pursuant to the issued instruction. These instructions are mirror-images; a finding of one outcome necessarily requires the absence of the other.
Finally, the third factor of the requested mistake of fact instruction would have required the jury to find that the petitioner did not intend to commit the crimes for which he was charged. That the trial judge in this case independently instructed the jury on the intent requirements for the crimes charged is indisputable, as is, I believe, the conclusion that this portion of the requested instruction and the issued instruction on intent are comparable.
As discussed, supra, this Court may disturb a trial judge’s instructions only when errors of law occur. When the judge’s *496instructions fairly cover the substance of the requested instruction, the trial court, in denying the requested instruction, cannot be said to have committed an error warranting reversal. A purely commonsensical application of the “fairly cover” standard, as outlined by Rule 4-325(c), prescribes the conclusion that the requested instruction is fairly covered by the issued instructions in this case, and that no error of law occurred.1 That notwithstanding, I will delve briefly into the case law on which the majority relies, as I believe it is distinguishable from, and inapplicable to, the case at hand.
*497The majority emphasizes the principle that whether a particular instruction must be given depends upon whether there is any evidence in the case that supports the instruction. See maj. op. at 487 (citing Roach, 358 Md. at 428-29, 749 A.2d at 792-93; Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 655 A.2d 370 (1995); Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 582, 583 A.2d 1037, 1041 (1991)). While correctly restating the law, the sufficiency of the evidence generated by the petitioner regarding a mistake of fact is not in dispute. Unfortunately, the decisional issue before this Court — whether the requested instruction was fairly covered by the issued instructions — becomes muddled with the majority’s discussion of sufficiency of evidence rather than retaining its separate and independent structure and analysis. I agree that a particular instruction only may be given upon the presentation of some evidence that supports the requested instruction. See Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 216-17, 571 A.2d 1251, 1256-57 (1990). That an instruction is supported by the evidence, however, does not necessarily mean that the failure to give the requested instruction renders the instructions actually given inadequate; nor does it mean that the defendant is entitled automatically to the very instruction he requests. To the contrary, a defendant is entitled to the instruction so long as it is generated by the evidence AND is not fairly covered by the instructions given. These are two separate inquiries; the petitioner may have satisfied the first, but he failed to satisfy the second condition.
The majority states that “[o]nce the defendant properly has generated the defense of mistake of fact, he or she is entitled to have the jury understand that the State must still prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and that the burden never shifts to the defendant.” See maj. op. at 485-86. While this, too, is a legally sound assertion, the majority fails to explain how this principle was thwarted by the trial court’s failure to give a mistake of fact instruction. The court’s instructions neither allude to a shift in the burden of proof nor do they fail to assist the jury in understanding that the State is required to establish each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It is altogether unclear *498how the majority’s assertion — that a jury must understand that the State must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt — is better promoted by the conclusion it demands, i.e. requiring the trial court to issue a mistake of fact instruction. Furthermore, as will be discussed in greater detail infra, the authority for establishing such a requirement is seemingly lacking: The mistake of fact defense remains a common law defense in this State; accordingly, the authority to demand a mistake of fact instruction cannot be based on any explicit legislative recognition of the specific theory of defense. Furthermore, Rule 4-325(c) only mandates that the issued jury instructions fairly cover the requested instruction; I firmly believe the issued instructions in this case met the requirements of Rule 4-325(c).
The majority relies on the case of Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 486 A.2d 196 (1985), to advance its contention that a defendant has a right to an instruction on mistake of fact. Such reliance is misplaced, and the legal principles for which the Smith case stands, inappropriately applied. The issue before our Court in Smith was whether the evidence generated by the defense, i.e. his alibi, was sufficient to require the trial court to issue the requested instruction on the alibi issue, see id. at 179, 486 A.2d at 197; the issue was not whether the issued jury instructions fairly covered the requested (alibi) instruction. That we supported a defendant’s right to an alibi instruction because we held the evidence to be sufficient to warrant the instruction, see id. at 183, 486 A.2d at 200, does not mean that we should, today, grant a defendant an automatic right to a mistake of fact instruction upon generating sufficient evidence, particularly when the substance of the requested instruction has been fairly covered by the issued instructions concerning knowledge and intent in this case. Furthermore, that we mentioned that “the defendant is entitled to a specific alibi instruction, and ... the trial court’s general instructions concerning the prosecution’s burden of proof, etc., are not deemed ‘fairly to cover’ the matter of alibi,” has little persuasive value to the issue in the case sub judice. Id. at 180, 486 A.2d at 198 (citing Pulley v. State, 38 Md.App. 682, 688-91, 382 A.2d 621, 624-26 (1978)). Unlike an alibi *499instruction and a “court’s general instructions concerning the prosecution’s burden of proof, etc.,” the mistake of fact instruction and the intent and knowledge instructions are mirror images, easily meeting the standard established by Rule 4-325(c) because the intent and knowledge instructions “fairly cover” the requested mistake of fact instruction.
The cases to which the majority cites from other jurisdictions are also distinguishable. In Iowa v. Freeman, 267 N.W.2d at 70, the Supreme Court of Iowa did indeed consider a similar issue, i.e. whether the concept of mistake of fact was adequately covered in the trial court’s intent instruction. There exists one important factual distinction, however, which makes the application of the Iowa decision inappropriate: contrary to the trial court’s instructions in the case sub judice, the lower court in Iowa did not provide the jury a knowledge instruction, rather, the court only provided an instruction on intent.2 The Supreme Court of Iowa was required to consider the necessity of a mistake of fact instruction in terms of the issued intent instruction. Id. As I indicated supra, the intent instruction only “fairly covers” prong three of the standard mistake of fact instruction. Without a knowledge instruction, two critical elements of the mistake of fact defense — the actual belief by the defendant and the reasonableness of that belief — would not have been “fairly covered.”
I cannot predict whether the Iowa Court would have decided differently had a knowledge instruction been issued along with the intent instruction. I can state confidently, however, *500that had the trial court in this case neglected to adequately instruct the jury on the knowledge requirements for the crimes for which the defendant was charged, I would not be dissenting today. Knowledge and intent are similar concepts, but not synonymous. Knowledge is an “understanding of a fact or circumstance,” see Black’s Law Dictionary 876 (7th Ed.1999), and intent is “the mental resolution or determination to do” an act.3 See Black’s Law Dictionary 813 (7th Ed.1999). A mistake of fact defense requires both an absence of knowledge about the facts or circumstances and an absence of intent to commit the criminal act. Therefore, the Iowa Court’s analysis — based only on a review of an intent instruction — is immaterial to the issue presently before us.
The majority also relies on the analysis of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Crane, 145 Ill.2d 520, 165 Ill.Dec. 703, 585 N.E.2d 99 (1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 924, 112 S.Ct. 1977, 118 L.Ed.2d 576 (1992), which considered whether the defendant was denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to instruct on mistake of fact defense. Again, the issue appears facially similar to the one presently before us, but two important distinctions exist. First, contrary to Maryland Rule *5014-325(c), the comparable Illinois Rule,4 has largely been interpreted by its Supreme Court as a compulsory rule, i.e. “[a] defendant is entitled, to an instruction on his theory of the case if there is some foundation for the instruction in the evidence.” See id. at 102 (citing People v. Unger 66 Ill.2d 333, 5 Ill.Dec. 848, 362 N.E.2d 319, 321 (1977))(emphasis added). A trial court’s consideration on the necessity of a jury instruction in Illinois is solely dependent upon the sufficiency of the evidence, while trial courts in Maryland have the additional consideration of whether the issued instructions have fairly covered the substance of the requested instruction.5 See Rule 4-325(c).
*502The second distinction between Illinois and Maryland law, which makes the application of the Crane analysis improper, is that while a mistake of fact is a common law defense in Maryland, see Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 330-31, 718 A.2d 588, 599-600 (1998); Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 47-48, 641 A.2d 870, 883-84 (1994), the Legislature explicitly provides for a mistake of fact defense in Illinois. See § 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/4-8 (West 1993). In fact, nearly every jurisdiction to which the majority cites, see maj. op. at pg. 490, statutorily recognizes a mistake of fact defense. See e.g. GaCode. Ann. § 16-3-5 (1999); § 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/4-8 (West 1993); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 501.070 (Michie 1999); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 36 (West 1983); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.02 (West 1994).
This Court has never stated that a defendant is only entitled to a theory of defense instruction when the defense is recognized by the Legislature; nor do I propose the adoption of such a principle today. I do believe, however, that when the Legislature explicitly recognizes a theory of defense, an instruction regarding that defense is independently compulsory. Our Court affirmed this principle in Sibert v. State, 301 Md. 141, 482 A.2d 483, (1984), holding that “when the legislature explicitly enumerated four defenses to the crime of theft, it intended a defendant to be entitled to a jury instruction on any defense generated by the evidence.” Id. at 154, 482 A.2d at 490; accord Binnie v. State, 321 Md. at 582-83, 583 A.2d at *5031042.6 Where the Legislature does not provide a statutory theory of defense and one exists only on the basis of judicial creation, this Court should measure the necessity of a requested jury instruction under the only guidance and authority remaining, the guidance provided to all courts for jury instruction matters: Maryland Rule 4 — 325(c). Thus, this Court must consider whether the issued jury instructions “fairly cover” the requested instruction; if so, no error occurred.
Because I believe that the knowledge and intent instructions issued by the trial court in this case fairly cover the requested mistake of fact instruction, I would find no error of law. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. That intent and knowledge instructions fairly covered a requested mistake of fact instruction is also evidenced by LaFave and Scott’s Substantive Criminal Law, quoted in part by the Court of Special Appeals in its unreported affirmance of the trial court's judgment, which provides:
[i]n actuality, the basic rule is extremely simple: ignorance or mistake of fact ... is a defense when it negatives the existence of a mental state essential to the crime charged. Indeed it is so simple because, unlike the other defenses discussed in this chapter, it is merely a restatement in somewhat different form of one of the basic premises of the criminal law. Instead of speaking of ignorance or mistake of fact or law as a defense, it would be just as easy to note simply that the defendant cannot be convicted when it is shown that he does not have the mental state required by law for commission of that particular offense.
1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, § 5.1, at 575-76 (1986). See Iowa v. Freeman, 267 N.W.2d 69, 70 (Iowa 1978). Several jurisdictions have held in accordance with this principle and do not require a trial court to specifically give a mistake of fact instruction so long as the court instructed the jury adequately on intent and knowledge. See State v. Charles, 628 N.W.2d 734, 738 (S.D.2001)(stating that "whenever an intent instruction involving the defendant's mental state is given, the mistake of fact concept is automatically included and does not merit a separate instruction”) (quoting State v. Johnston, 478 N.W.2d 281, 283 (S.D.1991)); State v. Dellatore, 761 A.2d 226, 231-32 (R.I.2000)(holding that instructions regarding the requisite intent of the defendant precluded the necessity for a mistake of fact instruction); State v. Molin, 288 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1979) (holding that “so long as the court instructed the jury adequately on intent,” a mistake of fact instruction was not required); State v. Nieto, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442, 447 (2000)(stating that "the trial court need not give a mistake of fact instruction ‘where the intent element of the crime is adequately defined by the other instructions given by the trial court' "(quoting State v. Bunce, 116 N.M. 284, 861 P.2d 965, 968 (1993)).
. The trial court’s intent instruction in Freeman was very similar to the intent instruction issued by the trial court in the present case:
Where intent is an essential element of any of the offenses charged, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The intent with which an act is done is a purpose or mental condition seldom capable of proof by positive or direct evidence. Such intent, if any, may be arrived at by such just and reasonable inferences and deductions from the facts and circumstances proved by the evidence as the guarded judgment of a candid and cautious person would ordinarily draw therefrom. The law warrants an inference that when a person intentionally commits an act, he intends the natural results or consequences to follow which ordinarily do follow such acts.
267 N.W.2d at 70.
. The commentary to the definition of "knowledge” in Black’s Law Dictionary 876 (7th Ed.1999) states:
It is necessary ... to distinguish between producing a result intentionally and producing it knowingly. Intention and knowledge commonly go together, for he who intends a result usually knows that it will follow, and he who knows the consequences of his act usually intends them. But there may be intention without knowledge, the consequence being desired but not foreknown as certain or even probable. Conversely, there may be knowledge without intention, the consequence being foreknown as the inevitable concomitant of that which is desired, but being itself an object of repugnance rather than desire, and therefore not intended.
Id. (quoting John Salmond, Jurisprudence 380-81 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed,1947)(internal quotations omitted)). The commentary continues:
[Bjecause there are several areas of the criminal law in which there may be good reason for distinguishing between one’s objectives and [one’s] knowledge, the modern approach is to define separately the mental states of knowledge and intent....
Id. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 218 (2d ed.1986)).
. Jury instructions in criminal cases in Illinois courts are governed by Rule 451, which provides, in relevant part:
(a) Use of IPI-Criminal Instructions; Requirements of Other Instructions. Whenever Illinois Pattern Instructions in Criminal Cases (IPI Criminal) contains an instruction applicable in a criminal case, giving due consideration to the facts and the governing law, and the court determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, the IPI Criminal instruction shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law. Whenever IPI Criminal does not contain an instruction on a subject on which the court determines that the jury should be instructed, the instruction given on that subject should be simple, brief, impartial, and free from argument.
(b) Court’s Instructions. At any time before or during the trial, the court may direct counsel to prepare designated instructions. Counsel shall comply with the direction and copies of instructions so prepared shall be marked “Court’s Instructions.” Counsel may object at the conference on instructions to any instruction prepared at the court’s direction, regardless of who prepared it, and the court shall rule on these objections as well as objections to other instructions. The grounds of the objections shall be particularly specified.
(c) Section 2-1107 of the Code of Civil Procedure to Govern. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, instructions in criminal cases shall be tendered, settled, and given in accordance with section 2-1107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but substantial defects are not waived by failure to make timely objections thereto if the interests of justice require. The court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed, or, in its discretion, at the close of all the evidence.
Ill. S.Ct. Rule 451 (2001). Section 2-1107 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure discusses the procedural aspects of requesting and issuing jury instructions. See 735 Ill Comp Stat. Ann. 5/2-1107 (West 1992).
. The Illinois Supreme Court has used a "totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether a defendant received a fair trial, including *502circumstances where a defendant claimed that he was denied a fair trial because his counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction and failing to object to those issued. See People v. Casillas, 195 Ill.2d 461, 255 Ill.Dec. 382, 749 N.E.2d 864, 874 (2000)reh’g denied. Using the totality of the circumstances test, the Illinois Court found that all jurors were thoroughly instructed on the burden of proof and presumption of innocence, and thus, the court’s failure to use the specific language of Illinois Pattern Criminal Instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and his right to a fair trial was not impeded. Id. at 877. While the Illinois courts may consider the adequacy of the issued jury instructions under a totality of the circumstances analysis at the appellate level, Maryland Rule 4-325(c) is still singular in that it specifically instructs trial courts that they "need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given.” Rule 4-325(c).
. I recognize that an alibi defense in Smith was not statutorily prescribed. The factual circumstances in Smith, however, would likely lead to the conclusion (as is so stated in dicta by the Smith Court, see Smith, 302 Md. at 180, 486 A.2d at 198) that the alibi defense was not adequately covered by the other general instructions provided by the trial court. Therefore, an alibi instruction would have been required upon proper application of Rule 4-325(c).