concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the portion of the trial court’s order vacating plaintiff’s Writ of Execution and finding the corpus of defendant’s IRA accounts exempt under N.C.G.S. § lC-1601(a)(9), I believe that all withdrawals from an IRA are similarly exempt. Accordingly, the parties and the trial court lacked legal authority to set up and enforce their escrow agreement.
The issue before us is not whether the escrow agreement is a good idea or whether the parties were acting in good faith. The issue is whether the agreement between the parties and endorsed by the trial court is legal. Because I believe all withdrawals are exempt under N.C.G.S. § lC-1601(a)(9), the trial court had no power, equitable or otherwise, to participate in an agreement that treats some withdrawals as exempt but others as subject to the claims of creditors.
IRA accounts are unquestionably exempt. The pertinent statute provides that:
Each individual, resident of this State, who is a debtor is entitled to retain free of the enforcement of the claims of creditors:
*535(9) Individual retirement plans as defined in the Internal Revenue Code and any plan treated in the same manner as an individual retirement plan under the Internal Revenue Code, including individual retirement accounts and Roth retirement accounts as described in section 408(a) and section 408A of the Internal Revenue Code, individual retirement annuities as described in section 408(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, and accounts established as part of a trust described in section 408(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.
N.C.G.S. § lC-1601(a)(9) (2009). While this portion of the statute is silent as to the status of early withdrawals from an IRA, in another subdivision of the statute the General Assembly demonstrated its ability to differentiate assets when it provided that exempted funds include: “Alimony, support, separate maintenance, and child support payments or funds that have been received or to which the debtor is entitled, to the extent the payments or funds are reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or any dependent of the debtor.” Id. § IC-1601(a)(12) (2009) (emphasis added). Thus, in the context of alimony funds received by a debtor, the General Assembly permitted some receipts covered by subdivision (a) (12) to be exempt, but not others. Under the doctrine of statutory interpretation that expressio unius est exclusio alterius, because the General Assembly differentiated the treatment of (a)(12) funds but not (a)(9) funds, it follows that all withdrawals from an IRA are exempt from creditors without qualification. See In re Investigation of the Death of Miller, 357 N.C. 316, 325, 327, 584 S.E.2d 772, 780, 781-82 (2003) (applying the doctrine); Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 319 N.C. 298, 303, 354 S.E.2d 495, 498-99 (1987) (same)..
This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the statute. “[T]he North Carolina General Assembly’s purpose in enacting N.C.[G.S.] § lC-1601(a)(9) was to protect a debtor’s right to receive retirement benefits . . . .” In re Grubbs, 325 B.R. 151, 154-55 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2005). Statutory exemptions should be given a liberal construction in favor of the debtor. See Elmwood v. Elmwood, 295 N.C. 168, 185, 244 S.E.2d 668, 678 (1978) (“The humane and beneficent provisions of the law in regard to exemptions, being remedial in their nature and founded upon a sound public policy, should always receive a liberal construction so as to embrace all persons coming fairly within their scope.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).This interpretation is also sound public policy. Escrow agreements of *536the type employed in this case would not only subject debtors to litigation over every withdrawal from an IRA account, they would also entangle trial courts in the day-to-day supervision of those withdrawals. The substantial penalties for early withdrawals provide sufficient disincentive to discourage debtors from using an IRA as a ready source of exempt funds.
Defendant’s appeal is not foreclosed by judicial estoppel. That doctrine, discussed in detail in Whitacre Partnership v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 591 S.E.2d 870 (2004), is a “discretionary equitable doctrine” that effectively precludes a party from asserting inconsistent positions before a tribunal. Id. at 27-30, 591 S.E.2d at 887-89. Although the record does not indicate who initiated the proposed escrow agreement, both parties agreed to it on the. record before the trial court. Nevertheless, plaintiff filed notice of appeal on 20 August 2008, while defendant did not respond with its notice of appeal until 29 August 2008. A discretionary doctrine of equity should not be invoked to deprive defendant of the right to defend his position after his opponent, who also agreed to the escrow arrangement, appealed.
The majority’s holding both thwarts the General Assembly’s intent to exempt retirement funds and puts trial courts in the untenable position of determining which withdrawals from a debtor’s IRA represent legitimate retirement expenses. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion reversing the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Chief Justice PARKER and Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.