We have before us a petition to transfer from an opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals, which opinion is reported in 294 N.E.2d 833.
This is an appeal by the petitioner below from a denial of her petition for a name change as provided under IC 34-4-6-1, Burns Ind. Ann. Stat., 1972 Supp., § 3-801 et seq.
Appellant is married to Denis J. Hauptly. Her maiden name was Elizabeth Marie Howard. She filed her petition to change her name from her married name to her maiden name.
A hearing was had on the petition which revealed that her husband concurred in the request for change of name.
' Mrs. Hauptly testified at the hearing that, among other things, she was unhappy with the name of Hauptly in that she felt it hid her true identity and heritage. She appeared to be quite proud of her maiden name and the ethnic background which it represented. She testified that she was not seeking the name change in order to perpetrate fraud on anyone or to hide her identity from any creditors or to escape identification for any criminal action.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court rendered finding and judgment as follows:
“The Court finds the Petitioner abandoned her maiden name when the Petitioner and her husband were married. The Court further feels that her sense of dignity and existence as an individual are not impaired; that the use of her husband’s name is not an affront to her dignity and sense of individuality; that neither her ambitions or identity are curtailed by her using her married name. It is, therefore, the Order and Judgment of this Court that the Petition of Elizabeth Marie Hauptly be and is hereby denied. Judgment.”
The Indiana statute permitting change of name is quite simple and reads as follows:
“The circuit courts in the several counties of this state may change the names of natural persons on application by petition.” IC 34-4-6-1, Burns Ind. Ann. Stat., 1972 Supp., § 3-801.
*152There is no statutory requirement in Indiana that the petitioner establish any particular reason other than his personal desire for change of name. There is, of course, the common law restriction that a name change should not be permitted in order to defraud others or to hide criminal activity. See 57 Am. Jur. 2d Name, § 22.
The appellant has not only attacked the judgment of the trial court in this matter, but has also seen fit to attack the statute providing for a change of name in that she states the statute violates the concept of equal protection by denying a change of name to a married woman.
Appellant misconceives the language of the statute. It by no stretch of the imagination purports to distinguish between the sexes or married or unmarried perons.
The appellant also in one part of her brief states that she was forced to practice her profession as a nurse under her husband’s name of Hauptly, much to her embarrassment. In another portion of her brief she observes quite correctly that a woman has a common law right to do business in a name other than her married name, citing the case of Emery v. Kipp (1908), 154 Cal. 83, 97 P. 17. In fact, there is no legal requirement that any person go through the courts to establish a legal change of name. The statute merely provides for an orderly record of the change of name in order to avoid future confusion. In the absence of a statute, a person may ordinarily change his name at will without any legal proceedings. The person need only adopt another name. This may be done so long as the change of name is not done for a fraudulent purpose. 57 Am. Jur. 2d, Name, § 10. This is the state of the law in Indiana today. Indiana has no statute that would prevent the taking of an assumed name without judicial order. This would appear to be a matter which should be obvious to any person of reasonable intelligence within our society. It is common knowledge that persons in entertainment and like occupations quite often present themselves to the public under an assumed or stage *153name, which name they retain regardless of their marital status at subsequent times. This is a practice which has been long accepted and readily understood by the public including the bench and bar. However, at any time one of these persons, or in fact any member of our society who wishes to make a public legal record of a name change, may take advantage of the Indiana statute. The only duty of the trial court upon the filing of such a petition is to determine that there is no fraudulent intent involved. Once having so found, we hold that it is an abuse of judicial discretion to deny any application for a change of name under the statute.
The State in its brief makes a personal attack on the appellant because she is a married woman, claiming that her reaction to her maiden name is an insult to her husband and at one point characterizes her as “a kind of oddball.” It is true that under the common law and by tradition in this country a married woman assumes the surname of her husband. 57 Am. Jur. 2d, Name, § 9. However, we find nothing in the law that states that in so doing a married woman in any sense gives up her right as a person to change her name as anyone else might change his.
The State also argues that since the appellant is the mother of a child that her decision to change her name might cause embarrassment to her child. We cannot see how as a matter of law this can have any bearing on the case. There is certainly no direct or positive evidence in this regard, and the mere speculation by the State that such would occur is not sufficient to justify the trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition. The mere fact that appellant chooses to deviate from the common law requirement that she use the name of her husband does not justify the State’s terming her “an oddball” nor do we see any public purpose tó be served by denying her the right to such a deviation from the norm. The record in this case clearly reveals there is no vicious or ulterior motive on the part of the appellant. It simply discloses she prefers her father’s surname to that of *154her husband. She readily conceded in her testimony that should she bear a daughter in the future she would expect her daughter possibly to take the same position concerning a desire to retain the Hauptly name when she married for many of the same reasons the appellant now seeks to regain her maiden name of Howard.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition to transfer is granted.
The trial court is reversed.
Arterburn, C.J., and DeBruler, J., concur; Hunter, J., concurs with opinion; Prentice, J., dissents with opinion.