(concurring in result).
In Application of Defender, 435 N.W.2d 717 (S.D.1989), this Court was in sync with my dissent in State ex rel. Joseph v. Red Wing, 429 N.W.2d 49 (S.D.1988). For an insightful, academic review of the Red Wing decision and the recognition of the correctness of this writer’s dissent in Red Wing see Case Comment, Walz State ex rel. Joseph v. Red Wing: A Dictionary Definition Rationale for the Infringement of Tribal Self-Government, 34 S.D.L.Rev. 701 (1989).
In Red Wing, the tribal court had incep-tual jurisdiction and never lost it.
In Defender, the tribal court did not have jurisdiction inceptually and therefore, I could join Defender retaining my conviction that tribal courts in South Dakota must be recognized as valid courts of law. Here, in Wells, I can join the majority without abandoning my position in Red Wing because the tribal court patently violated its own rules; and thereby, no valid service was effectuated upon the wife. Succinctly, a tribal judge cannot change a tribal code. Thus, the tribal court did not obtain jurisdiction.
My vote, to concur in result, is filled with conceptual trepidation. There is a danger to the very existence of the tribal courts (in this State) if this State Supreme Court “goes behind” a tribal court’s decree. Question: How far can this Court search to determine if personal service has been effectuated under the tribal code? We, as a sovereign Supreme Court cannot — should not, place ourselves in a position of acting as a reviewing court, if, in effect, this Court would be holding that there was no in personam jurisdiction vested in the tribal court. How far can this Court go in piercing a tribal decree? As we on this Court probe into a tribal decree, when do we pass the line where we are reviewing procedural niceties? Truly, I do not believe we are reviewing a procedural nicety of the Crow Creek Tribe, but rather, are saying that we cannot grant comity under Mexican be*407cause there is no clear and convincing evidence that the Crow Creek Tribal Judgment complied with its own laws. The error is so patent, i.e., no personal service, that there was no valid jurisdiction. In my opinion, we have not judicially bushwacked the sovereignty of the Crow Creek Tribe. This, I would be very much opposed to and especially in domestic relations, as exemplified by our shining rationale In re Guardianship of D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D.1980). This unanimous decision was written by my esteemed colleague, Justice Francis Dunn, a former Chief Justice of this Court. We have only two members left of the D.L.L. and C.L.L. Court, Senior Justice Robert Morgan and this author. Three members of this Court were appointed to this Court by the Honorable William Janklow, Governor. The D.L.L. and C.L.L. Court had as its Chief Justice, the Honorable Roger Wollman, who now sits on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals with its principal office at St. Louis, Missouri. The Wollman Court through Justice Dunn, expressed:
The fact that the children in this case spent some time off the reservation is not determinative of the proper forum. Even though a member of an Indian tribe may be outside the territorial boundaries of the reservation, the tribal government may regulate the absent member’s affairs involving questions of membership, Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 18 S.Ct. 60, 42 L.Ed. 442 (1897), and questions of domestic relations.
I agree with the observation of Federal Judge Bogue when he observed in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Kleppe, 424 F.Supp. 448 (D.S.D.1977), “... All too often, courts seem to pay little more than lip service to the right and power of Indian peoples to govern themselves.” We do not have subject matter jurisdiction over disputes in domestic relation cases of Indian people and we must zealously guard against any type of creeping encroachment thereon. See, generally, Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 96 S.Ct. 943 (1976). If state court jurisdiction on Indians or activities on Indian land would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state courts are generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law. The United States Supreme Court in Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante et al., 480 U.S. 9, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987) declared, inter alia, “We have repeatedly recognized the Federal Government’s long standing policy of encouraging tribal self-government ... Tribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government (citation omitted), and the Federal Government has consistently encouraged their development.” There is broad and expansive language in the majority opinion which greatly troubles me, example: “... once Dolly left the reservation operative facts continued to rise off the reservation.” Perhaps Dolly can establish a domicile off the reservation; this does not mean that the “operative facts” which happened on the reservation are not material nor, perhaps, governing. It would be wrong, in my opinion, to thwart settled law in this nation to honor a domicile and thus establish state jurisdiction simply because a party stepped across the reservation boundary line. A bona fide domicile would have to be established in the geography governed by the State. Dolly apparently lived off the reservation some four months before she started a divorce in the state court. It is obvious that most of the operative fact took place on the reservation. After all, the parties had lived on the reservation for approximately seven years. Each set of facts will have to be scrupulously scrutinized to preclude state courts from infringing on sovereign tribal rights. A court must reach a decision so as not to frustrate the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. This law came about as the result of an amendment to Public Law 280, by 82 Statutes 78 (25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26).
This case is far closer than the majority would lead us to believe. The parties, and all of their children, are enrolled members of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe and lived their entire married life on the Crow Creek Reservation. Appellant William Wells, all during this litigation, continued to reside on the Crow Creek Reservation. The majority writer would attempt to influence the *408reader by emphasizing the word “County” in the writing to suggest that somehow, someway this makes quite a difference. If any reader takes out a map and studies the reservations of this State, it will be readily determined that all reservations fall within the geographic confines of a “County.” This does not mean that the tribes on the reservations within the counties are under state jurisdiction. Land within the limits of any Indian Reservation under jurisdiction of the United States Government is in Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Can there be any greater threat to tribal relations and to the tribal power of self government when state court systems interfere in questions of tribal domestic relations? In United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 36 S.Ct. 699, 60 L.Ed. 1196 (1916) it was held that the unilateral act of one party in abandoning a domicile on the reservation does not alone create state court jurisdiction that would otherwise not exist, said court further holding that matters of domestic relations among tribal members is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the tribal court. In Red Wing, I expressed that Indians know about Indians; that they know their history; and they understand their own cultural heritage. Reservations have a historical anomaly in that they are within the political boundaries of the State (and obviously, counties). There can be no doubt that Appellant William Wells was a resident of the Crow Creek Reservation and had no nexus with South Dakota.
Lastly, I wish to refer to South Dakota Indian Jurisdiction 11 S.D.L.Rev. 101 (1966) by Walz. I also draw upon State v. Onihan, 427 N.W.2d 365 (S.D.1988) and Rosebud Sioux Tribe et al. v. the State of South Dakota et al, United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, Federal Judge Donald Porter presiding which was decided March 19, 1989. South Dakota has long danced with Public Law 280. It has unsuccessfully attempted to conditionally or partially assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory. See, In re High Pine, 99 N.W.2d 38 (S.D.1959). Said decision overruled Chapter 391 of the Session Laws of 1957 which gave South Dakota criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian land. Another key decision in this Court is In re Hankin’s Petition, 125 N.W.2d 839 (S.D.1964). In Hankins, chapter 464 of the Session Laws of 1961 was ruled inconsistent with the congressional purposes of Public Law 280. There has been a historic struggle by the State Legislature with the Congress of the United States to acquire, in one fashion or the other, state jurisdiction to supplant inherent tribal sovereignty. In the end, the Crow Creek Tribe has a right to” make and enforce its own laws subject only to the will of Congress. The members of this Court cannot manifest a power, by broad language, to carte blanche assume jurisdiction over controversies between the Indians exclusively arising within the borders of their own reservation. Hearken unto the words of a unanimous United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556, 95 S.Ct. 710, 717, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975), reversing a 1973 Tenth Circuit Court decision as found at 487 F.2d 14. Speaking through Justice Rehnquist the highest court of this land stated:
This Court has recognized limits on the authority of Congress to delegate its legislative power.... Those limitations are, less stringent in cases where the entity exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter ... Thus, it is an important aspect of this case that Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory, they are a ‘separate people,’ possessing ‘the power of regulating their internal and social relations ... ’
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959).
Year of Reconciliation
As I pen my legal thoughts, a wave of legal concern comes upon my spirit. For over one decade, I have attempted to recognize the Indian community’s struggle for social and governmental autonomy, as well as justice for our Red Brothers in this State’s courts. State v. Chief Eagle, 377 *409N.W.2d 141 (S.D.1985), Henderson, J., dissenting. Comity and mutual respect to the decisions of tribal courts has been a long time message of mine. Mexican. I have in the past, and now, recognize that in South Dakota we have tribal and state court systems. As found in the 1990 Legislative Senate Journal (pg. 60, 2nd legislative day), our present Governor has declared this year to be a Year of Reconciliation, requesting Indians and non-Indians to come closer together. Our Governor has asked us to set goals, to make strides toward better understanding in 1990. He is quoted in an article on page 2 of the Rapid City Journal, January 12, 1990 as follows: “The end result should not only be fun, but mutual respect and trust.” Chairperson, Judy Petersen, who acts as the “Chairman” of the Flandreau Sioux Tribe, observed that the gathering should go beyond pure enjoyment. Governor Mickelson thus appeared before the State Indian Affairs Commission on January 11, 1990 in an attempt to bring together the Indian and white community in a spirit of friendship. Id. pg. 1.
On February 1, 1990, Governor Miekel-son and representatives of eight of the state’s nine Sioux Tribes began what has now been called the “Year of Reconciliation.” The Governor sat cross-legged on the floor of our State Capitol rotunda and shared a peace pipe with these Sioux representatives. Filled with legislators, state and tribal officials, the rotunda rang out with traditional Indian songs honoring the Indian people and expressing a hope for peace. See, Rapid City Journal, pg. 1, February 2, 1990.
This is the beginning of the second century of South Dakota statehood. It is good that Indians and whites now seek a year of racial understanding and a new beginning of peace with one another.
Alas, but hopefully only for a moment, as the tide of understanding ebbs and flows, South Dakotans read, via a February 3, 1990, Rapid City Journal article that our Governor has said: “We’re not going to solve jurisdictional issues.” He also expressed that jurisdictional disputes could not be settled by the State and tribes and should not be part of the 1990 Reconciliation effort. Disappointment was expressed by the Chairman of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe who observed that the gatherings should go beyond pure enjoyment thereof indicating that: “If he’s (the Governor) not interested in jurisdictional things and the issues that are really tearing us apart, there is no sense trying to pull this thing together. It’s rhetoric.” However, other tribal leaders took a more positive approach after the reconciliation ceremony. Increased understanding by the non-Indians and Indians could bring about help and economic development, health care and education for Indian people, they asserted.
A deep wound exists in the State of South Dakota by virtue of jurisdictional disputes between tribal courts and state courts. The Indians tell us that their inherent sovereignty pre-dates the Constitution of the United States. They want to decide cases, within tribal courts, which involve their people and their children. State court actions which undermine the authority of tribal courts are an impermissible infringement upon the right of tribal self government. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223, 79 S.Ct. 269, 272. Let us, in the Year of Reconciliation, pursue all avenues of peace to include open-minded solutions to jurisdictional conflict between the Indians and non-Indians of this state.