I concur in the reversal of the judgment on the issue of damages. However, I would reverse the entire judgment.
The majority conclude that it was error to instruct the- jury that interference with the mall doors could amount to a constructive eviction. With this I agree.
On the other hand the majority concludes that evidence was properly admitted concerning the landlord’s duty to keep open the mall doors. With this I disagree. Neither Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal.2d 222 [65 Cal.Rptr. 545, 436 P.2d 561], nor Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co,, 69 Cal.2d 33 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641, 40 A.L.R.3d 1373], has changed the rule prohibiting extrinsic evidence from adding to or detracting from the terms of a contract that has been reduced to writing. (Weisenburg v. Thomas, 9 Cal.App.3d 961 [89 Cal.Rptr. 113].)
*81The parol evidence offered in this case had the effect of adding a specific covenant to the lease which was not contained in the written instrument, to wit, that the landlord would undertake to keep the mall doors open. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the landlord had authority to prevent Grant’s from closing its doors or that the landlord’s permission was required for such closing. Therefore, there was no act by the landlord which could amount to constructive eviction.
In any event, whether instructing the jury concerning the interference with the mall doors was error for the reasons stated by the majority or for the reason I have stated, it is impossible at this juncture to determine what effect such instructions had on the jury’s verdict as to the issue of liability. Since the majority agrees that it was error to instruct the jury that the closing of the mall doors could constitute a constructive eviction, that error goes not only to the issue of damages but also as to the issue of liability. Such a significant error in the jury instructions could hardly be described as harmless or inconsequential.
The case as to liability should be retried on the issue of whether the failure to keep the parking lot lighted, alone, constituted a constructive eviction.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 11, 1972, and respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 8, 1972. Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.