dissenting.
“A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty.” N.C. Const. art. 1, § 35. This case invites us to return to these fundamental democratic principles, specifically, the right of open access to the election ballot. Ballot access implicates our citizenry’s freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom to vote. While the State has an interest in the orderly administration of elections, my fear is that North Carolina’s signature requirement, N.C.G.S. § 163-96(a)(2) (2007), may unduly limit election ballot access. The majority finds the signature requirement statute to be a non-“severe” infringement of this fundamental right and deferentially reviews the statute. Because I believe *53an encroachment of this fundamental right deserves strict scrutiny, I respectfully dissent. I would remand this case to allow the trial court to conduct a thorough strict scrutiny review of § I63-96(a)(2).
While I agree with the majority that ballot access is a fundamental right, I disagree with the treatment of the right. Traditionally, the infringement of a fundamental right demands that a court apply strict scrutiny. The majority, however, now says that a statute limiting the fundamental right of ballot access is an exception to this rule: rather than apply strict scrutiny, a court will first evaluate the extent of the infringement, and if the infringement is not “severe,” then the court will apply a deferential review. I believe this to be an unwarranted and imprudent departure from North Carolina’s constitutional jurisprudence.
I agree that fundamental rights are not absolute and a burden on a fundamental right may be permissible. However, under our existing jurisprudence, once we determine that a fundamental right is burdened, the strict scrutiny standard is the sole inquiry used to determine whether that burden is permissible — there is no initial threshold inquiry. See, e.g., Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 180, 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004) (“If the statute at issue affects the exercise of a fundamental right... we apply strict scrutiny.” (emphasis added)). A burden on a fundamental right is permissible only when the State succeeds in demonstrating that the burden is narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest. See, e.g., State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 186-87, 432 S.E.2d 832, 842-43 (1993) (permitting a restraint on speech because it survived strict scrutiny); cf. Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 524-27, 681 S.E.2d 759, 764-66 (2009) (applying intermediate scrutiny to “quasi-fundamental” right).
In place of traditional strict scrutiny, the majority introduces the “severe burden” inquiry of Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-59, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 1369-70, 137 L. Ed. 2d 589, 597-98 (1996). Twin Cities is not persuasive authority for the majority’s abandonment of the strict scrutiny test for a direct burden on ballot access rights. In Twin Cities, “[t]he laws [did] not directly limit the party’s access to the ballot” but concerned whether a candidate’s name could appear multiple times on a ballot. Id. at 363, 117 S. Ct. at 1372, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 601.
Moreover, Twin Cities highlights a critical flaw in the “severe burden” inquiry: the inquiry is entirely too subjective. In Twin Cities, the trial judge and six Justices of the Supreme Court of the United *54States found the burdens to be minor, id. at 355, 359, 117 S. Ct. at 1368, 1370, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 596, 598-99; but three appellate judges determined that the laws in Twin Cities were actually “severe” burdens, id. at 363-64, 117 S. Ct. at 1372, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 601, as did three dissenting Justices, see id. at 370-71, 117 S. Ct. at 1376, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 606 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Souter, JJ., dissenting) (disputing the majority’s conclusion that the laws were “minor burdens” and calling the burdens “significant”). The federal judiciary was divided 7-to-6 regarding the severity of the burden. The majority’s approach allows a trial court to subjectively assess the degree of burden, rather than relying upon the nature of the protected right, to determine the standard of review. Thus, a citizen, after having already established that a statute burdens a fundamental right, must now convince a court that the burden is “severe” enough, or else the court will defer to the legislature. For instance, here, the majority decided that the signature requirement statute did not impose a sufficiently “severe” burden on a fundamental right, despite the statute’s impact of excluding the Green Party from the ballot and forcing the Libertarian Party to spend almost $130,000 to access the ballot.
■ In contrast to the majority, I believe strict scrutiny is the appropriate test for a burden on the fundamental right of access to the ballot. Any review that is less demanding than strict scrutiny will be an inadequate safeguard of this foundational democratic principle.
Access to the ballot is an extension of the freedom of association. The freedom to associate with others to advocate for personal beliefs is a cornerstone of our democratic society, but “[t]he right to form a party for the advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes.” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31, 89 S. Ct. 5, 10-11, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24, 31 (1968); see also Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 71-72 (Andrew Hacker ed., Henry Reeve trans., Washington Square Press 1972) (1863) (observing that the freedom of political associations permits “the partisans of an opinion [to] unite in electoral bodies, and choose delegates to represent them in a central assembly. This is, properly speaking, the application of the representative system to a party.”).
Access to the ballot is also an extension of the freedom of speech. “In our political life, third parties are often important channels through which political dissent is aired.” Williams, 393 U.S. at 39, 89 S. Ct. at 14, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 36 (Douglas, J., concurring); Munro *55v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 200, 107 S. Ct. 533, 540, 93 L. Ed. 2d 499, 509 (1986) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (“[A minor party’s] very existence provides an outlet for voters to express dissatisfaction with the candidates or platforms of the major parties.”). “The minor party’s often unconventional positions broaden political debate, expand the range of issues with which the electorate is concerned, and influence the positions of the majority, in some instances ultimately becoming majority positions.” Munro, 479 U.S. at 200, 107 S. Ct. at 540, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 509.
Further, ballot access implicates the right to vote. The inclusion of additional political parties facilitates voting by increasing the options on the ballot, Williams, 393 U.S. at 31, 89 S. Ct. at 11, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 31 (“[T]he right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for a place on the ballot.”), while simultaneously increasing the information conveyed to voters, see Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 220, 107 S. Ct. 544, 552, 93 L. Ed. 2d 514, 527 (1986) (“To the extent that party labels provide a shorthand designation of the views of party candidates on matters of public concern, the identification of candidates with particular parties plays a role in the process by which voters inform themselves for the exercise of the franchise.” (citation omitted)). At our nation’s inception, the founders warned that unduly restricting ballot access could make illusory the right to vote: “It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans and claim for their government the honorable title of republic.” The Federalist No. 39, at 233 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
This Court has consistently interpreted the North Carolina Constitution to provide the utmost protection for the foundational democratic freedoms of association, speech, and voting. See, e.g., State v. Frinks, 284 N.C. 472, 477-83, 201 S.E.2d 858, 862-65 (1974) (upholding restriction on right to assemble because necessary to assure safety and convenience); State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 182-84, 432 S.E.2d 832, 839-41 (1993) (infringement of political speech receives strict scrutiny); Northampton Cnty. Drainage Dist. No. One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 745-47, 392 S.E.2d 352, 355-56 (1990) (infringement of right to equal vote receives strict scrutiny). It is *56inconsistent for the majority to now afford the fundamental right of ballot access, which is clothed in this triumvirate of fundamental rights, less protection than one of these rights receives individually.
Because I believe strict scrutiny is appropriate, I also question whether the trial court properly applied the standard to § 163-96(a)(2). The trial court ruled that the statute survived strict scrutiny, and the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Libertarian Party of N.C. v. State, _ N.C. App. _, _, 688 S.E.2d 700, 707-09 (2009). Based on the trial court’s findings, however, it appears the trial court improperly maintained a presumption of constitutionality during its strict scrutiny analysis.
In my view, the presumption of constitutionality places an initial burden on the challenger of a statute, who must clearly demonstrate a conflict with a constitutional right before we proceed any further in our review. See State ex rel. Att’y-Gen. v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 352, 85 S.E. 418, 427 (1915) (“When the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly is questioned, the courts place the act by the side of the Constitution, with the purpose and the desire to uphold it if it can be reasonably done, but under the obligation, if there is an irreconcilable conflict, to sustain the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution, and not the will of the legislators, who are but agents of the people.”).
If a challenger clearly shows that a statute infringes on a fundamental right — as happened in the case at hand — -strict scrutiny is applied, meaning the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the statute is narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 377, 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (2002). If the challenger succeeds in demonstrating that the statute is in conflict with only a quasi-fundamental right, the State then bears the burden of showing the statute is substantially related to an important government interest. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 353 N.C. 671, 675, 549 S.E.2d 203, 207 (2001). However, if the challenger shows a conflict with a non-fundamental right, then the challenger bears the burden of demonstrating that the statute is not rationally related to a legitimate State interest. See id. Thus, the presumption of constitutionality is a precursor — rather than an alternative — to constitutional review.
In this case, if the trial court assumed the plaintiffs and intervenors had demonstrated a conflict with a fundamental right, then the initial presumption of constitutionality was defeated and the *57State had the burden of demonstrating that the statute is narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest. The trial court, however, retained the presumption of constitutionality during its strict scrutiny analysis and failed to shift the burden to the State. For example, it seems the State never demonstrated that the 2% requirement in § 163-96(a)(2) was narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling interest: the State’s witness, Gary Bartlett, could not recall any legislative studies or debates regarding the 2% requirement, and he disclosed that any discussion about the requirement “was basically, ‘Okay, this looks good; let’s try it,’ that sort of conversation.” In fact, Mr. Bartlett admitted that he believed 1% would accomplish the State’s objective. Because the strict scrutiny standard was not properly applied to this fundamental right, I would remand the case to allow the trial court to conduct a thorough strict scrutiny review of § 163-96(a)(2).
Today’s decision jeopardizes a quintessential component of our democracy by examining this statute under a deferential standard of review, rather than a strict scrutiny analysis. Given the vital role ballot access plays in our democratic society, we should only condone an infringement of this right when absolutely necessary. I do recognize the State’s interest in the orderly administration of elections, and I do believe it is within the province of the General Assembly to place necessary restrictions on ballot access. However, such restrictions burden a fundamental right, and I believe the judicial branch must strictly scrutinize them to ensure that the General Assembly imposes only narrowly tailored, necessary burdens. After reviewing the trial court’s findings, it appears a misunderstanding of our constitutional presumptions infected the trial court’s application of the strict scrutiny standard. Having clarified our precedent, I would remand this case to the trial court to strictly scrutinize North Carolina’s signature requirement statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.