I respectfully dissent. Employing a practical and realistic approach to the analysis of whether or not questionable conduct qualifies as the unauthorized practice of law, as this Court has always endeavored to do, I would hold the representation of business entities by non-lawyer officers, agents, or employees is authorized in criminal magistrate’s court proceedings.
Today, in a marked departure from prior jurisprudence of this Court as to what constitutes the practice of law, the majority focuses on the status of the individual presenting evidence rather than on the character of the services rendered, and holds that the role of the business entity’s representative in this context is “repugnant to our system of justice.” As a pragmatist who is mindful, not only of the purpose behind the magistrate’s court system, but also the impact which the majority’s decision will have on this State’s business community and solicitors’ offices, I must disagree.
The Constitution of South Carolina grants this Court the power to regulate the practice of law. S.C. Const, art. V, § 4; see also S.C.Code Ann. § 40-5-10 (2001). Rather than attempt a comprehensive definition of the practice of law, we have instead resolved to decide what is and what is not the unauthorized practice of law on a case by case basis. In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by the South Carolina Bar, 309 S.C. 304, 305-07, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124-25 (1992). This issue of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law has evolved over time. In State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, the Court held a non-lawyer insurance adjuster could not represent a corporation before the South Carolina Industrial Commission. 191 S.C. 468, 5 S.E.2d 181 (1939). Rejecting the argument that a corporation acts through its agents, and was therefore authorized to represent itself, the Court *416stated: “A corporation is not a natural person. It is an artificial entity created by law. Being an artificial entity it cannot appear or act in person. It must act in all its affairs through agents or representatives. In legal matters, it must act, if at all, through licensed attorneys.” Id. at 480, 5 S.E.2d at 186 (citation omitted).
In Unauthorized Practice of Law, the Court modified the bright line established in Wells by holding a non-lawyer, officer, agent, or employee may represent a business entity in civil magistrate’s court. 309 S.C. at 305-06, 422 S.E.2d at 124.5 The issue presented in this case is whether the Court should now sanction the similar representation of business entities’ interests in criminal magistrate’s court, a practice which has gone on, unchallenged, and apparently without incident, for years. I would find the practice is authorized, and further modify Wells accordingly.
I begin my analysis with an examination of what type of conduct constitutes the practice of law. The United States Supreme Court has defined attorneys at law as “[p]ersons acting professionally in legal formalities, negotiations, or proceedings by the warrant or authority of their clients.... ” Nat’l Sav. Bank of Dist. of Columbia v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199, 10 Otto 195, 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879); see also In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 189, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (1909) (adopting the Supreme Court’s definition of an attorney as articulated in Ward). In accordance with this definition, we have recognized that the practice of law extends beyond litigation and includes “activities in other fields which entail specialized legal knowledge and ability.” State v. Buyers Service Co., Inc., 292 S.C. 426, 430, 357 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1987). However, in determining whether the activity in question constitutes the practice of law, this Court has always focused on the character of the services rendered. Matter of Peeples, 297 S.C. 36, 41, 374 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1988) (citing Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 5 S.E.2d 181 (1939) (stating “[i]t is the character of the services rendered ... which determines whether the acts constitute the practice of law”) (emphasis in original)).
*417As described above, in Unauthorized Practice of Law, the Court determined a non-lawyer’s representation of a business entity in civil magistrate’s court did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 309 S.C. at 305-06, 422 S.E.2d at 124. In applying the same rationale used there, I fail to discern any viable reason to treat a non-lawyer’s representation of a business entity in criminal magistrate’s court any differently. Initially, non-lawyer representatives in civil and criminal magistrate’s court perform identical services. In both settings, non-lawyer representatives are responsible for marshalling and presenting evidence the corporation has against the defendant. The character of these services is more similar to those performed by a fact witness testifying at trial, rather than to services provided by an attorney or a solicitor. Significantly, the compilation, maintenance, and presentation of evidence does not require legal analysis or prosecutorial discretion.
Conversely, and I might add in contravention to what was argued by the State, the majority maintains that the effect of a decision authorizing this conduct will encroach upon the prosecutorial power reserved exclusively to solicitors. See S.C.Code Ann. § 17-1-10 (2003) (stating a criminal action is prosecuted by the State, as a party, against a person charged with a public offense). However, this Court has previously permitted persons other than solicitors to prosecute criminal cases in magistrate’s court. In State v. Messervy, the Court upheld the common practice in magistrates’ courts of allowing arresting officers of the South Carolina Highway Patrol to prosecute traffic-related offenses without the assistance of a solicitor. 258 S.C. 110, 187 S.E.2d 524 (1972). While in Messervy the argument that this practice constituted the unauthorized practice of law was not raised, in State ex rel. McLeod v. Seaborn, a declaratory judgment action was brought to challenge the Highway Patrol’s practice of assigning supervisory officers to assist new or inexperienced arresting officers in the prosecution of their cases. 270 S.C. 696, 244 S.E.2d 317 (1978). The Court found no distinction between the practice previously permitted in Messervy and the procedure challenged in Seaborn, and specifically held the practices did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Id. at 698-99, 244 S.E.2d at 319. Important to the facts presented here, the Court in Seaborn noted these individuals *418did not hold themselves out to the public as attorneys, and their participation rendered “an important service to the public by promoting the prompt and efficient administration of justice.” Id. at 699, 244 S.E.2d at 319. Admittedly, the analysis was bolstered by the Court’s acknowledgment that the arresting or supervisory officers were acting in their official capacities as law enforcement officers and employees of the State in presenting cases before the magistrate’s court. Id. at 698-99, 244 S.E.2d at 319. The Court has also held a probation officer acts in his official capacity in the presentation of a probation revocation case on behalf of the state. See State v. Barlow, 372 S.C. 534, 539, 643 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2007) (citing Seaborn, 270 S.C. 696, 698-99, 244 S.E.2d 317, 319).
The majority’s decision today effectively overrules and undermines the continued viability of the Court’s longstanding and practical jurisprudence adopted in Messervy, Seaborn, and State v. Sossamon, 298 S.C. 72, 378 S.E.2d 259 (1989), as affirmed in Unauthorized Practice of Law, 309 S.C. at 307, 422 S.E.2d at 125. Alluding to Seaborn, the majority focuses on the absence of a State actor or representative in the actions in question here. Unlike the majority, however, I would not allow the status of the individual presenting the case to trump the character of the services being rendered because in my view, the non-lawyer’s status as a State employee in the earlier trilogy of cases serves as a distinction without a difference. Indeed, the majority’s selective reliance on the differences between civil and criminal law, and its corresponding determination that solicitors retain the exclusive jurisdiction to pursue criminal prosecutions, calls into question the continued viability of permitting police officers or their supervisors to prosecute traffic offenses in magistrate’s court. The majority does not undertake a practical analysis of the character of the actual services to be provided by non-lawyer agents in criminal magistrate’s court as compared to the activities already permitted by this Court in its case law, possibly because there is no practical or meaningful difference between the representation of a corporation in civil versus criminal magistrate’s courts, insofar as whether the conduct by non-lawyers should be authorized or not.
I believe the majority’s strong emphasis on the criminal nature of the proceedings involved misses the mark. According to our Constitution, the Attorney General serves as the *419State’s chief prosecuting officer, with the authority to supervise the prosecution of all criminal cases in courts of record. S.C. Const. art. V, § 24 (emphasis added); cf. State ex rel. McLeod v. Snipes, 266 S.C. 415, 420, 223 S.E.2d 853, 855 (1976) (recognizing that the duty to actually prosecute criminal cases is performed primarily and almost exclusively by the solicitors except in those situations when a solicitor calls upon the Attorney General for assistance). Magistrate’s court is summary in nature and is not a court of record. State v. Duncan, 269 S.C. 510, 514, 238 S.E.2d 205, 207 (1977); see also S.C.Code Ann. § 22-3-730 (2007). Furthermore, as discussed by the Court in In re Lexington County Transfer Court, the solicitor’s office is under no duty to prosecute a case brought under the original jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court. 334 S.C. 47, 54, 512 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1999) (citing S.C.Code Ann. § 22-3-545(C) (2007)) (explaining a difference between magistrate’s court and the transfer court system established by the General Assembly, wherein cases transferred to the magistrate’s court from general sessions court “must be prosecuted by the solicitor’s office”). Therefore, contrary to the majority’s view, there is no requirement that the Attorney General or a solicitor prosecute criminal misdemeanor charges in magistrate’s court.
The majority relies heavily on what it perceives to be the inevitable confluence of self-interest and our criminal justice system. See supra (“[W]e can be absolutely certain that the interests of the private party will influence the prosecution .... ”). It is argued that the State, and by extension the solicitor, prosecutes an individual for a crime in the pursuit of justice alone, while allowing a self-interested party to assume that role would interject issues that would corrupt the integrity of magistrate’s courts. While I am mindful of the pitfalls that could potentially accompany the decision to allow representation by non-lawyers in this context, these concerns are, in my view, wholly speculative. Moreover, it is worth noting that whether evidence is presented by a solicitor, an attorney, or a non-lawyer agent, the magistrate judge retains complete control over the pursuit of justice in his or her courtroom. Accordingly, I do not share the majority’s apparent lack of confidence that a business-entity’s self-representation will somehow undermine magistrate’s court system. As noted by the Court in Messervy, the practice of allowing non-lawyer *420participation in magistrate’s court is not without its problems; nevertheless, the non-lawyer’s conduct is subject to the same level of scrutiny by the magistrate that has heretofore adequately overseen this critical level of our court system. 258 S.C. at 113, 187 S.E.2d at 525.
Furthermore, I believe consideration of the very nature of magistrate’s court hits the bulls-eye in terms of whether or not this practice should be sanctioned. Magistrates have exclusive jurisdiction of all criminal cases for which the punishment does not exceed a fine of one hundred dollars or imprisonment for thirty days. S.C.Code Ann. § 22-3-540 (2007). In addition, magistrates have jurisdiction over all offenses which are subject to: penalties of a fine or forfeiture not exceeding five hundred dollars; imprisonment not exceeding thirty days per offense, or a total of ninety days if sentencing consecutively;6 and magistrates also have the power to order restitution in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars. S.C.Code Ann. § 22-3-550 (2007). Rather than by indictment, criminal magistrate’s court proceedings are commenced on information under oath, plainly and substantially setting forth the offense charged, after which an arrest warrant is issued. S.C.Code Ann. § 22-3-710 (2007). Additionally, our law provides that where the arrest warrant is signed by non-law enforcement personnel, the person charged is given a courtesy summons notifying him or her of the charge or charges. S.C.Code Ann. § 22-3-330 (Supp.2009).
One of the purposes of magistrate’s court is to dispense with the formalities required of a court of general sessions, allowing for a more expedient and layperson-friendly disposition of certain select grievances and offenses. The fact that the General Assembly has not required magistrates to be attorneys is further indication of its intention to retain the citizen focus of the court. See S.C.Code Ann. § 22-1-10 (2007). In short, magistrate’s court was created by the General Assembly to be the “peoples’ court,” a distinction that seems to have been overlooked by the majority in its analysis.
*421Finally, at the risk of discussing a possible parade of horribles, the practical consequences of the majority’s decision should nonetheless be examined. This decision will place an additional burden on the South Carolina business community, as well as on the already budget-strained and time-challenged prosecutorial arm of the State. Without the ability to make a cost/benefit analysis of whether to pursue their own claims, corporations may be more willing to pursue prosecution, secure in the knowledge that the burden of prosecuting the claims rests squarely on the shoulders of the solicitor’s office. On the other hand, overburdened solicitor’s offices may exercise prosecutorial discretion to not prosecute these minor cases, which might very well have the end result of businesses refusing to accept checks in payment for merchandise. As discussed by then acting circuit judge, John Kittredge in Lexington County Transfer Court, limited resources and budgetary constraints can serve as a valuable consideration in determining whether practices should qualify as an exception to the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law. 334 S.C. at 53-54, 512 S.E.2d at 794. As a state, we certainly want these and all crimes to be prosecuted; nonetheless, a process that becomes too cumbersome and costly for the State to pursue does not successfully address the problem. Permitting a process whereby business entities can pursue these claims through an agent, in a manner which is cost-effective for both the State and the corporations, yet checked by the integrity of our judicial system, is, in my opinion, a practice which should be sanctioned by this Court.
I would therefore further modify Wells today and logically extend our case law to permit a business entity to be represented by a non-lawyer officer, agent, or employee in criminal magistrate’s court proceedings. Under my view, businesses would be able to continue the practice which has been going on for years and thus make informed decisions about whether their interests are adequately protected by non-lawyer representatives in magistrate’s court, both civil and criminal. Any potential pitfalls in this process would be counterbalanced by the direct control and oversight of the magistrate’s courts of this State.
TOAL, C.J., concurs.. Thereafter, in Renaissance Enterprises, the Court declined to extend Wells to allow a non-lawyer to represent a corporation in the circuit or appellate courts of this State. 334 S.C. 649, 653, 515 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1999).
. An exception to the rule that a magistrate may not sentence someone to more than ninety days imprisonment, if sentencing consecutively, does not apply to convictions resulting from violations of Chapter 11 of Title 34, pertaining to fraudulent checks, or violations of section 16-13-110(B)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2003), relating to shoplifting. S.C.Code Ann. § 22-3-550(B) (2007).