(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in part and dissent in part from the majority’s decision. I believe the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the medical malpractice claims against the appellants. The trial court and the majority disregarded our directive to carefully evaluate the degree of prejudice suffered by appellants and failed to consider less drastic alternatives to dismissal as discussed in Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188 (Minn.1990). There we held:
In deciding whether a procedural dismissal should be granted, the trial court should carefully evaluate the degree of prejudice' to the defendant caused by the inadequate disclosures. In borderline cases where counsel for a plaintiff identifies the experts who will testify and give some meaningful disclosure of what the testimony will be, there may be less drastic alternatives to a procedural dismissal. In these instances, the court may authorize a deposition of the expert at the plaintiffs expense or limit the expert’s testimony to those matters adequately disclosed. These measures would encourage full disclosure and eliminate the prejudice suffered by a defendant as a result of an inadequate disclosure.
Id. at 193. (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added).
*580In Sorenson, we applied our analysis relating to the discovery rules in interpreting Minn.Stat. § 145.682. See Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193; Dennie v. Metropolitan Med. Ctr., 387 N.W.2d 401 (Minn.1986). This application was consistent with our other decisions holding that procedural dismissal is not to be favored over “the primary objective of the law [] to dispose of cases on the merits.” Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 192. In Dennie, the court noted that expenses and time delays which could adequately be addressed by less drastic measures would not justify dismissal. 387 N.W.2d at 405. The court further noted that “[t]he defense has the burden of showing particular prejudice of such a character that some substantial right or advantage will be lost or endangered if plaintiff is permitted to dismiss and reinst-itute the action.” Id. (quoting Firoved v. General Motors Corp., 277 Minn. 278, 283-84, 152 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1967). In that case, the court found no prejudice where the issue was clear and where “[i]t would not be difficult for defendant to anticipate the expert’s testimony and prepare its cross-examination.” Id. at 406.
This case is analogous to the facts in Dennie. While I concur that the expert affidavit was inadequate, it supplied much more information than the expert affidavits we found to be deficient in the past. See, e.g., Stroud v. Hennepin County Med. Ctr., 556 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn.1996). This affidavit not only identified the expert but also contained a summary of the facts and opinion, including the causation requirement, to which the expert was expected to testify. What concerns me is that the appellants submitted no evidence or arguments that this affidavit prejudiced them in any way. In fact, the medical affidavit in issue supplied enough information for the appellants to fully anticipate the respondent’s expert’s testimony and prepare for cross-examination. Appellants retained two experts who thoroughly critiqued and criticized the affidavit of respondent’s medical expert. There is now a factual dispute. The quality of the affidavit may have justified taking the deposition of the expert at respondent’s expense or limiting the respondent’s expert testimony to the matters that were disclosed, but does not justify a summary dismissal.
This was not the “frivolous litigation” that Minn.Stat. § 145.682 (1998) was intended to remedy, rather it is one of those borderline cases where counsel retained a qualified expert and made a good faith effort to disclose meaningful information of what the expert testimony would be. The allegations of medical malpractice relating to the stillborn fetus are supported by an affidavit of a board-certified specialist in obstetrics and gynecology who reviewed the relevant medical records. The record also contains an unobjected to affidavit of plaintiffs attorney. Rather than dealing such a harsh result under these unique facts and order a procedural dismissal, a less drastic alternative should have been utilized by the trial court.
In the majority’s zeal to establish this new “sharp but clean edge” standard, it ignored (without overruling) our reasoned discussion in Sorenson and the wisdom of using less drastic measures where there is an absence of prejudice.1 Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals.
. The prejudice issue was not addressed in the only other case cited by the majority, Stroud, 556 N.W.2d 552.