Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell:Plaintiffs, grantees of Drateh Construction Company, prayed (1) for an injunction, and (2) for a reformation of their respective deeds by deleting therefrom Dratch’s right to grant the use of the present 15 foot driveway.
Drateh Construction Company, owners and developers of a large piece of ground fronting on Rugby Street, conveyed parcels of said ground to plaintiffs “reserving unto the said Grantor, its Successors and Assigns, the right and privilege of granting the use of the aforesaid driveway to any person or persons, . . . to whom all or any part of the remaining ground pioned by it may at any time hereafter be sold and conveyed ” Could any reservation be clearer or more explicit?
The question involved is: Did Drateh Construction Company have a legal right to grant to these defendants the use of the present 15 foot driveway?
It is important to note at the outset that the majority opinion does not assert any fraud on the part of Drateh or any party in this case; and that those defendants who claim title from the owner and common grantor, Drateh, are innocent purchasers for value, — without notice of any claim by plaintiffs or by anyone questioning or seeking to limit or invalidate the clear and explicit reservation — and that all the deeds containing the aforesaid reservation of the right to grant the use of the driveway were recorded. Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that Drateh, the common grantor, instead of deeding to them the 3 foot strip of ground bordering their land, retained title thereto *198for the purpose of better protecting them. Such a contention is absurd. Dratch, as the owner and common grantor, could have reserved, as has been done thousands of times before, the right to grant the use of this driveway to others in each deed it made to the purchaser of each of its lots fronting on Rugby Street, without the necessity of reserving to itself the title to a 3 foot strip of land or any land whatsoever. The majority opinion points out that plaintiffs’ contention is unreasonable and absurd; yet strangely decides that that is what the reservation in effect meant. The majority hold that the developer (grantor) who owned Ihe 3 foot strip, even if it bought the property adjoining the 3 foot strip, could not allow subsequent purchasers of that property to use the driveway. The effect of the majority’s opinion is to make the ownership and reservation of the 3 foot strip — with its right to grant to a subsequent purchaser the use of the 15 foot driveway — absolutely useless, meaningless and absurd, for it is obvious and indisputable (1) that no building of any kind could be erected on a 3 foot strip of land; and (2) that the grantor, by viHue of owning the remaining ground with Rugby Street frontage, could grant such easement to all subsequent purchasers of that land without reserving to itself the oAvnership of this 3 foot strip of land. What possible use was there, therefore, for this 3 foot strip of land except the use contended for by Dratch and the other defendants herein? What possible good could that 3 foot strip of land be to Dratch if it did not intend either (a) to purchase the ground on the other side of the 3 foot strip which fronted on Woolston Avenue, divide it into lots and allow the purchasers thereof to use this driA^eAvay, or (b) to sell the 3 foot strip to the owner or owners of the adjoining contiguous land, granting him or them in turn the right to use the *199driveway. Any other construction is so unreasonable as to be unbelievable. This reservation is explicit and clear as crystal. Where a contract is clear, its meaning must be ascertained by the Court from its language; it must receive a reasonable interpretation; and if it is susceptible of two interpretations, a construction will not be adopted which is unreasonable or absurd or which will produce a result that is unreasonable or absurd. Cf. Brown v. Raub, 357 Pa. 271, 54 A. 2d 35; Mowry v. McWherter, 365 Pa. 232, 238, 74 A. 2d 154; Com. v. Hallberg, 374 Pa. 554, 97 A. 2d 849; Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, §52, P.L. 1019, 46 PS 552.
That our construction accurately evidences the intention of the parties is further confirmed by the fact that little more than a year thereafter Dratch Construction Company, unable to purchase the adjoining ground, sold and conveyed the 3 foot strip to the owner of this adjoining contiguous remaining half of the block by a deed which contained the following grant: “TOGETHER with the free and common use, right, liberty and privilege of said Fifteen feet wide driveway as and for a passageway, driveway and watercourse at all times hereafter forever, for any buildings hereafter built by the purchaser, or nominee, his or her heirs and assigns, on Woolston Avenue between Yernon Road and Phil-Ellena Street or on the Northwesterly side of Phil-Ellena Street between Woolston Avenue and said Fifteen feet wide driveway, this use to be for its entire distance from PhilEllena Street to Yernon Road, . . . .”
The authorities cited by the majority that “an easement cannot be extended by the owner of the dominant tenement to other land owned by him adjacent to or beyond the land to which it is appurtenant, [where] such an extension would constitute an *200unreasonable increase of the burden of the servient tenement,” are, on their facts, clearly distinguishable. Furthermore, the fallacy of applying such a principle to the facts in the instant case is, on analysis, clear, because the burden is not increased by this extension, for (according to the majority) no burden can exist at all by virtue of the 3 foot strip ownership. Moreover, when an easement is granted or reserved, the fact that the burden of the servient tenement will be increased by future use is immaterial if the language of the grant or reservation is broad enough to permit, as here, such use.
I would reverse the decree of the Court below and dismiss plaintiffs’ Bill of Complaint.