(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because (1) the Commissioner’s conclusion of comparability is supported by the record and applicable *780law, and (2) Polley failed to give her employer notice of the complained-of conditions.
First, I find no basis either in the record or in existing law to reverse the Commissioner’s conclusion of comparability. The record demonstrates the position given to Polley upon her return1 was comparable in terms of duties, hours, and pay to the position she held prior to her leave. Although the general manager admitted Pol-ley’s new job responsibilities were different, he testified those responsibilities were of no less value or importance to the company because Polley was now the primary interface between the company and its customers. This assessment of equal value is also reflected in the fact that Polley received the same rate of pay as she did in her former position. The general manager also guaranteed Polley at least 35 hours per week, and assured her of an increase to 40 hours as additional duties or positions in the company arose. While Polley testified her supervisor told her in early July that her hours would be cut back, the record demonstrates Polley actually worked at least thirty-seven hours per week during the weeks leading up to her departure on August 14, 1990.
Minnesota’s Parenting Leave Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 181.940-.944 (1990), requires only that an employee returning from parenting leave be “entitled to return to employment in the employee’s former position or in a position of comparable duties, number of hours, and pay.” Minn.Stat. § 181.942 (1990). “Comparable” does not mean “identical” or “equal.” See Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir.1973) (when Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), it chose to require equal pay for employees in positions of “equal” and not “comparable” skill, effort, and responsibility, and this reflects Congress’ decision to adopt the narrower standard of “equality” or “substantial equivalence” rather than the broader standard of “comparability” in mandating equal pay for equal work). See also Minn. Stat. § 471.991, subd. 3 (1990) (defining “comparable work value” as “the value of work measured by the skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions normally required in the performance of the work”). Under these circumstances, the position given to Polley upon her return was comparable.
Second, Polley’s failure to give her employer notice of its alleged violation of the Parenting Leave Act should preclude her from relying on that violation as good cause for terminating her employment so as to enable her to receive unemployment benefits. This court has required notice when an employee seeks to rely on alleged sexual harassment as “good cause attributable to the employer” for terminating employment under Minn.Stat. § 268.09, subd. 1(a) (1986). Biegner v. Bloomington Chrysler/Plymouth, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Minn.App.1988). In Biegner, we stated:
An employee subjected to harassment has the burden of demonstrating that he gave his employer notice of sexual harassment, but the employer failed to take timely and appropriate action.
Id. We have also held on numerous occasions that when an employee seeks to rely on offensive working conditions as good cause for terminating employment, the employee must report the allegedly offensive working conditions to the employer so as to give the employer an opportunity to address them. Failure to give notice disqualifies an employee from receiving unemployment benefits. See, e.g., Ryks v. Nieuwsma Livestock Equip., 410 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn.App.1987); Tru-Stone Corp. v. Gutzkow, 400 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Minn.App.1987); Burtman v. Dealers Discount Supply, 347 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Minn.App.1984), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. July 26, 1984).
Moreover, once an employer provides an employee with a reasonable expectation of assistance to rectify the complained-of con*781ditions, the burden remains on the employee to fully apprise the employer of any continuing harassment or offensive conditions. If the employee fails to do so, the employer cannot be charged with having caused the employee’s unemployment. Larson v. Dept. of Economic Security, 281 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Minn.1979); Biegner, 426 N.W.2d at 486; Youa True Vang v. A-1 Maintenance Serv., 376 N.W.2d 479, 482-83 (Minn.App.1985). After returning from her leave on May 1, Polley expressed concern to the general manager about her need to continue working full time. The general manager’s assurance of guaranteed hours and of his efforts to find more work for her were sufficient to create a reasonable expectation of assistance. See, e.g., Larson, 281 N.W.2d at 669; Youa True Vang, 376 N.W.2d at 483. Yet when Polley quit her job, she said her reason for doing so was to stay home with her baby. Under these circumstances, the Commissioner was correct in concluding “the employer clearly was given no reasonable opportunity to respond to the claimant’s true complaints in a manner which prospectively may have saved the employment relationship.”
I would therefore affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
. Before her maternity leave, Polley informed the general manager that if her husband found permanent employment she intended to remain at home with her children. This uncertainty as tó Polley’s return to work was cited by the employer as the reason he hired a replacement to fill Polley's position as billing clerk.