Dissenting.
The Majority holds that Section 1089 of the Public School Code of 1949 (Code), 24 P.S. § 10-1089, grants the due process protections enumerated in Section 1089(c) to all persons employed by school districts who function as a Business Administrator, regardless of whether they have an employment contract or not. Because I believe that this result is patently erroneous, I respectfully dissent.
*188We granted allowance of appeal to Homer C. Knox, III (Appellant) for the limited purpose of determining whether Section 1089 applies to a business administrator employed by a school district for ten years without a written employment agreement and subsequently either removed without cause or not renewed for a term of employment. In simple terms, we are to decide whether his termination by the School District is consonant with the provisions of Section 1089. While the trial court found, inter alia, that Appellant had a property interest in his position as Business Manager for the School District conferred upon him by Section 1089, a property interest that ended on May 4, 1998, when the School District abolished the position, the Commonwealth Court disagreed. It determined that Appellant had not acquired a property interest by virtue of his public employment concluding that:
The permissive nature of Section 1089, the failure to include the situation where a business administrator is not under an employment agreement, and the lack of a comprehensive employment and tenure scheme combined with the plain words of the statute lead this Court to conclude that the legislature did not intend to establish a legitimate expectation of continued employment absent an employment agreement.
(Slip Opinion at 7.)
Section 10-1089, which is entitled simply, “Business Administrator,” provides as follows:
(a) A governing board of a school entity may employ or continue to employ a person serving in the function of business administrator of the school entity who shall perform such duties as the governing board may determine, including, but not limited to, the business responsibilities specified in section 483 of this act.
(b) The governing board may enter into a written employment agreement with a person hired after the effective date of this section to serve as a business administrator or into an amended or renewed agreement with a person serving in that function as of such effective date. The agreement may define the period of employment, salary, benefits, other *189related matters of employment and provisions of renewal and termination of the agreement.
(c) Unless otherwise specified in an employment agreement, the governing board shall, after due notice, giving the reasons therefor, and after hearing if demanded, have the right at any time to remove a business administrator for incompetency, intemperance, neglect of duty, violation of any of the school laws of this Commonwealth or other improper conduct.
(d) A person serving as business administrator shall not be a member of the governing board of the school entity.
(e) A person serving as business administrator may serve as secretary or treasurer of the governing board.
(f) For purposes of this section, the term “school entity” shall mean a school district, intermediate unit or an area vocational-technical school. The term “governing board” shall mean the board of directors or joint board of such entity.
24 P.S. § 10-1089. Until the enactment of Section 1089 in 1989, there was no statutory or constitutional provision permitting school districts to enter into contracts with business administrators. Individuals who functioned as business administrators uniformly came within the purview of Article VI, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morrisey, 86 Pa. 416 (1878) (school treasurer is a public officer of statutory creation); Muir v. Madden, 286 Pa. 233, 133 A. 226 (1926) (school treasurer is a public officer serving at the pleasure of the State); Commonwealth ex rel. Logan v. Hiltner, 307 Pa. 343, 161 A. 323 (1932) (borough treasurer is public officer); Buell v. Union Twp. Sch. Dist., 395 Pa. 567, 150 A.2d 852 (1959) (secretary and treasurer of third class school district were appointed officers removable at the pleasure and discretion of board of school directors without cause). Like the analysis proffered by the Majority here, business administrators attempted to utilize the protections of *190Section 514 of the Code2 to gain the right to be removed only for cause. However, this Court addressed the viability of this analogy and found it wanting in Buell v. Union Twp. Sch. Dist., 395 Pa. 567, 150 A.2d 852 (1959), which I believe is controlling.
In Buell, our latest pronouncement on this issue, we determined that “[t]o the extent that [Section] 514 of the School Code of 1949 is in conflict with Article VI, [Section 7] of the Constitution, the former is invalid.” Id. at 855. Significantly, Buell, was “elected” school district treasurer in June of 1957. In December of 1957, he was dismissed by the board without a hearing or stated cause. Buell sued the school district for wrongful discharge contending that Section 514 of the School Code provided the exclusive method for the removal of school district officers. The Court disagreed and held that a school district treasurer is removable at the pleasure of the appointive power and that the legislature impermissibly circumvented this constitutional provision with the language contained in Section 51b when it made it applicable to school district treasurers. Id. at 854.
Individuals functioning in the capacity of business administrator were, and still are, considered civil officers of the Commonwealth. Further, our Court has consistently held that a school district business manager, operating pursuant to whatever specific title is supplied by the individual district, is a “public officer” as distinguished from an “employee” and is subject to dismissal at the pleasure of the appointing authority. See Buell v. Union Twp. Sch. Dist., 395 Pa. 567, 150 A.2d 852 (1959); Commonwealth ex rel. Logan v. Hiltner, 307 Pa. 343, 161 A. 323 (1932); Muir v. Madden, 286 Pa. 233, 133 A. *191226 (1926);3 Commonwealth v. Morrisey, 86 Pa. 416 (1878). Although the Majority tries to dismiss as waived any discussion of constitutional limitations to Section 1089 (Slip Op. at 7 n. 2) from consideration, the application is inescapable. This Court has held that where the text of Section 514, which is virtually identical in relevant part to that of Section 1089, conflicts with Article VI, Section 7 of the Constitution, it is invalid. Buell, 150 A.2d at 855.
Article VI, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968, provides in part that “[appointed civil officers, other than judges of the courts of record, may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed.” Further, we have held that “[a]ll persons who, by authority at law, are entrusted with the receipt of public moneys, through whose hands money due to the public or belonging to it passes on its way to the public treasury, must be considered public officers, by whatever name or title they may be designated in the law authorizing their appointment and whether the service be special or general, transient or permanent.” Commonwealth v. Evans, 74 Pa. 124, 139 (Pa. 1873).
When enacting Section 1089, the General Assembly is presumed to know the state of the law as set forth in the Pennsylvania Constitution and the decisions of this Court. It knew that the language it drafted would violate a constitutional provision and the decisions of this Court if it made business administrators anything other than civil officers subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power. However, in order to provide some employment protections for these individuals without conflicting with the Constitution, it authorized school boards to enter into employment contracts that may *192vary the terms of employment by agreement. Recognizing that the existence of an employment contract conferred a property right in employment, the General Assembly ensured that due process protections were afforded to those who possessed employment contracts, but whose contracts did not contain the requirements for termination. The Board’s letter of March 16, 1988, notifying Appellant that he had been “elected” to a three-year term of employment without specifying grounds for termination is a perfect example of the type of agreement that Section 1089(c) was meant to cover. If the Board had chosen to terminate Appellant’s employment after July 8, 1989 but prior to September 15, 1990, Section 1089(c) would have required a hearing and dismissal for cause.
In Commonwealth v. Sulzner, 198 Pa. 502, 48 A. 476 (1901) this Court was faced with the precise issue that we address here. Mr. Sulzner was chosen by a Pittsburgh school board as treasurer and was without a contract. The board changed its collective mind and subsequently selected a Mr. Ripple for the position. Mr. Sulzner refused to deliver the funds and property of the school district to Mr. Ripple on the basis that he could not be removed from office except for cause. This Court concluded that, pursuant to Article VI, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 18744 (now Article VI, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968), Mr. Sulzner could be removed from office at the will of the appointing power. Sulzner, 198 Pa. 502, 48 A. 476.
*193I recognize that there is no constitutional challenge to the provisions of Section 1089 of the Code, although business administrators are still unquestionably public officers, serving at the pleasure of the appointing authority. In my view, Section 1089 presumes two classes of business administrators — those with contracts and those without contracts. Those without contracts need not be addressed by Section 1089 because they are covered by Article VI, Section 7. The class of business administrators with contracts falls into two subsets — those whose contracts have termination provisions and those who do not have termination provisions. Section 1089 ensures that business administrators with contracts have the benefit of the due process protections that the property interest existing consonant with the contract affords.
Enactment of Section 1089 enabled school districts to attract better candidates by offering contracts for their employment. Those contracts could enumerate the terms of employment within the terms of the agreement and thereby supply a property interest in continued employment. However, Section 1089 must be read in conjunction with Article VI, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968 and the corresponding decisions of this Court. Within that context, Section 1089(c) can only govern those business administrators who have employment agreements with their respective school districts. Were we to broaden that section, as the Majority does, to include all business administrators, we are in conflict with Article VI, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and previous holdings of this Court. Thus, where the agreement contains termination provisions, those provisions govern. Where the agreement does not contain termination provisions, then Section 1089(c) governs. If there is no such agreement, I agree with the Commonwealth Court that the individual is an employee at will. I would affirm the Commonwealth Court in its holding that Section 1089 is inapplicable to the instant matter due to the lack of an employment agreement.
I believe that the instant matter fails to distinguish itself from Buell, Muir, Sulzner, Logan, Morrisey, and Evans. Although these cases predate the enactment of Section 1089, *194they reflect the existing law in Pennsylvania and are consonant with our Constitution. Appellant is without a contract, unable to establish a property right in his appointed employment, and may serve only at the pleasure of the Board, which expired on June 30,1997.
. Constitutional Article VI, Section 7, provides in part that "[ajppointed civil officers, other than judges of the courts of record, may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed.”
. The basic text of Section 514 pre-existed the Code in a 1911 enactment (24 P.S. then § 342) and contained identical language to the current Section 514, which states:
The board of school directors in any school district, except as herein otherwise provided, shall after due notice, giving the reasons therefor, and after hearing if demanded, have the right at any time to remove any of its officers ... for incompetency, intemperance, neglect of duty, violation of any of the school laws of this Commonwealth, or other improper conduct.
24 P.S. §5-514.
. In Muir, this Court addressed a 1911 enactment, which provided a method for the removal of school district officers pursuant to Section 514 of the Public School Code of 1949 identical in language to the present Section 514 of the School Code. The problem presented was the removability of a school board treasurer without cause. This Court affirmed per curiam a ruling of the trial court that a school district treasurer is a civil officer removable at the pleasure of the board of school directors.
. Article VI, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 stated: All officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave themselves while in office, and shall be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime. Appointed civil officers, other than judges of the courts of record and the Superintendent of Public Instruction, may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed. All officers elected by the people, except Governor, Lieutenant Governor, members of the General Assembly, and judges of the courts of record learned in the law, shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 permitted officers of deeds and probate to be dismissed at the will of the appointing authority, while all others were subject to impeachment for cause. Pa. Const, of 1776, Section 34.