Dissenting Opinion on Rehearing
Landis, J.— Appellees in their brief in support of the petition for rehearing ask the Court to:
“(1) Clarify the confusion created by the Court’s statement in the [majority] opinion that it was not ruling upon the status of the advancement from the Veterans Memorial School Construction Fund, while [at the same time] mandating the lower court to enjoin the issuance of 'any’ bonds which was proper. only if the advancement is a debt.
“(2) Clarify the confusion created by the reference in the opinion to the controlling assessment as the one' Hn the year previous to the incurring of the indebtedness.’
“(3) Review the holding that assessed value, not true value, of property is controlling under the Constitution [of Indiana].”
The majority on rehearing has modified its original opinion , as to (1) above to hold that advancements pursuant, to Ch. 312 of the Acts of 1955, as amended, to the appellee school township should not be considered as an indebtedness within the meaning of Art. 13, §1 of the Indiana Constitution. I agree with such modified opinion that such advancements are not a debt within the constitutional limitation.
The original opinion has heretofore been modified as to (2) by striking out the reference in the opinion to. the controlling assessment as being “in the year previous to the incurring of the indebtedness”. and *690substituting therefor a reference to the last assessment previous to the incurring of indebtedness.
In regard to (3), it should be noted as stated in my previous dissenting opinion, that Art. 13, §1, of the Indiana Constitution does not state the debt limit shall be two percent of the assessed value of the property but rather two percent of the value of the taxable property to be determined by the assessment.
As appellees have pointed out in their brief on rehearing, whether the word “value” as used in Art. 13 means “actual value” or “assessed value,” it. would necessarily be ascertained by reference to the last assessment for taxes, as the assessment for taxes is the only official index to the property values within a municipal corporation. The assessed valuation is thus made the basis for making certain of the actual value of property.
Appellees on rehearing pose the question: “Why [if ‘assessed value’ is to be the criterion] did the drafters of Art. 13 use the somewhat awkward phrase ‘value of taxable property to be ascertained by the last assessment’ rather than last ‘assessed valuation’ of property?”
As indicated in my previous dissent the word, value “has been generally held to mean cash value,” market value, reasonable cash market value.
Citing authorities. See also: Words and Phrases (Vol. 44, Value, 1962 Ed., pp. 56-94) to the effect that value generally means true value, cash value, or actual value.
It is readily apparent ■ that it- would have been entirely redundant and superfluous for the constitutional provision to have' contained the word “actual” as a modifier of the word “value” for “value” to *691receive its normal interpretation of “actual value.” Yet that is the strained construction placed upon it by the original majority opinion in this case.
Not only is the original opinion of the majority of the Court a narrow and illogical limitation of the words used in the Indiana Constitution, but its effect, as pointed out by appellees is to place upon the taxpayers, in order to procure needed school construction and other improvements required of local municipalities, the further expense of forming additional building corporations and floating bonding issues at higher interest rates than would be required if existing municipal or school corporations could be utilized which have the financial stability of a taxing authority.
Both upon the basis of reason and legal precedent this Court should not by its decision in this case put an illogical limitation on Art. 13, §1, of the Indiana Constitution upon the sole authority of the early Illinois case of 1901 which has since been repudiated by all six decisions of courts of last resort thereafter to consider the question.
I submit that §2, ch. 122 of the Acts of 1961, providing for the determination of the valuation base according to a method predicated upon actual or cash value rather than assessed value, is not contrary to a reasonable construction of Art. 13, §1, of the Constitution of Indiana, and that we should grant a rehearing of this case and affirm the judgment of the lower court.
Note. — Reported in 184 N. E. 2d 25.
Rehearing denied 192 N. E. 2d 316.