Dissenting Opinion by
BATTAGLIA and MURPHY, JJ.We respectfully dissent. To us, a trial judge cannot commit reversible error when the supplementing instruction given was legally correct and it was REQUIRED to be given under State v. Baby, 404 Md. 220, 946 A.2d 463 (2008). From our review of the record, furthermore, although there are cases in which a party is unfairly prejudiced by a post-argument instruction that undermines the party’s theory of the case, the case at bar is not such a case.
A.
As the majority recognizes, see op. at 210, 963 A.2d at 1189, a trial judge “must respond to a question from a deliberating *223jury in a way that clarifies the confusion as evidenced by the query when the question involves an issue central to the case.” Baby, 404 Md. at 263, 946 A.2d at 488, citing Lovell, 347 Md. 623, 659-60, 702 A.2d 261, 279 (1997). In Baby, the issue was whether a defendant could commit first degree rape when the victim withdrew her consent after penetration. The trial judge originally instructed jurors that “Rape is unlawful vaginal intercourse with a female by force or threat of force and without her consent,” and also supplied them with descriptions of “vaginal intercourse,” “force,” and “consent,” which were taken from the pattern jury instructions.1 Id. at 262, 946 A.2d at 488. During deliberations, the jury presented the trial judge with a note, asking, “If a female consents to sex initially and, during the course of the sex act to which she consented, for whatever reason, she changes her mind and the man continues until climax, does the result constitute rape?.” Id. at 262, 946 A.2d at 487. The trial judge, concluding that the question was ambiguous and potentially presented a question of fact rather than law, responded that she was “unable to answer this question as posed” and instructed the jury to “reread the instructions as to each element and apply the law to the facts as you find them.” Id. at 262, 946 A.2d at 487-88. The following morning, jurors rephrased the question in a note, asking, “If at any time the woman says stop is that rape?.” Id. at 262, 946 A.2d at 488. The trial judge again *224refused to give a supplementing instruction, characterizing the question as a simplification of the first question. Id.
In our determination that the trial judge erred, we discussed Lovell, 347 Md. at 623, 702 A.2d at 261:
In Lovell, we held that a trial court must respond to a question from a deliberating jury in a way that clarifies the confusion evidenced by the query when the question involves an issue central to the case. We concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in a capital case when it refused to provide further guidance on the term “youthful age” when youthful age was a statutory mitigating circumstance. In reaching our holding, we cited Bollenbach v. United States, in which Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, stated that when “a jury makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy,” as well as to Price v. Glosson Motor Lines, Inc., for the proposition that when “a jury makes a specific difficulty known ... and when the difficulty involved is an issue ... central to the case ... helpful response is mandatory.”
Baby, 404 Md. at 263, 946 A.2d at 488 (internal citations omitted). Applying Lovell, we held that the trial judge abused her discretion by failing to answer the jury’s specific question regarding withdrawal of consent:
The question before us, then, is whether the jury’s questions made explicit its difficulty with an issue central to the case such that the trial court was required to respond to the questions in a manner that directly addressed the difficulty. In both questions, the jurors inquired about the effect of a woman withdrawing consent during vaginal intercourse. The jury’s questions relating to the timing of withdrawal of consent certainly touched upon an issue central to its ability to determine whether Baby had committed the crime of first degree rape. Referring the jury to the legal definition of rape that the court had previously provided was not sufficient to address either of the jury’s questions as the definition makes no reference to the issue of post-penetration *225withdrawal of consent which was central to the jury’s questions.
Id. at 263-64, 946 A.2d at 488-89. The gravamen then legally is that the supplemental instruction must be accurate and responsive to the jury’s question.
Certainly, here, the jury’s question, “is Y falling on a sidewalk & hitting head while being chased by a bat by X, an assault by X on Y,” necessarily touches upon a central issue of whether intent to cause offensive physical contact, or physical harm, is an alternative theory by which a defendant can be convicted of an assault. As a result, the trial judge was obliged to give a supplemental instruction regarding the alternative theory of assault, which was an accurate recitation of the law, as acknowledged by the majority. The majority decision places the trial court between a rock and a hard place, because under Baby, the trial judge must give a legally accurate and responsive supplemental instruction, while now, the judge is in error for doing so.
B.
We also do not share the majority’s concerns that the defendant was unfairly prejudiced by the supplemental jury instruction, based on our review of (1) the opening statement of petitioner’s trial counsel, (2) the on-the-record instructions conference, (3) the instructions delivered prior to final argument, (4) the final arguments, and (5) the jury verdicts.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see why the jury asked the question that was answered by the supplemental instruction. The record shows that, after instructing that “[ajssault is causing offensive physical contact to another person,” the trial court stated:
In order to convict the defendant of assault the State must prove: one, that the defendant caused offensive physical contact with, and, or physical harm to Heder Meza Herrera and[yjor Oscar Martinez. Two, that the contact was the result of an intentional or reckless act of the defendant and was not accidental. And, three, that the contact was not *226consented to by Heder Meza Herrera and/or Oscar Martinez.
The defendant is charged with first degree assault on Heder Meza Herrera and Oscar Martinez. In order to convict the defendant of first degree assault the State must prove all of the elements of second degree assault and must also prove the defendant intentionally caused, or attempted to cause, serious physical injury to Heder Meza Herrera and [/]or Oscar Martinez.
In light of those instructions, it was not surprising that one or more jurors would want to know whether (1) “physical harm” to a victim includes injuries sustained by the victim in an attempt to avoid “offensive physical contact,” and/or (2) whether a defendant could be convicted of first degree assault upon proof that the defendant “intentionally attempted to cause serious physical injury” to the victim even though the victim suffered no harm whatsoever. In light of the instructions that were delivered, we do not think that this Court should decide the case at bar by speculating on why the jury convicted petitioner of assaulting Mr. Herrera. Because petitioner was acquitted of the first degree assault of both victims, and of the second degree assault of Mr. Martinez, we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was not unfairly prejudiced by the supplemental instruction at issue.
While it is true that petitioner’s trial counsel objected to the supplemental instruction at issue, she did not (1) note an exception on the ground that the new instruction permitted a verdict of guilty under the theory of the case that she had presented during closing argument, (2) request the opportunity to present additional argument in defense “against the new theory of culpability” generated by the new instruction, or (3) request a new trial on the ground that the new instruction had undermined her closing argument. Under these circumstances, we should limit our review to the issue of whether the supplemental instruction was a correct statement of the applicable law generated by the evidence presented to the jury.
*227Moreover, there appears to be a very good reason why the claim that the supplemental instruction undermined the closing argument of petitioner’s trial counsel was never asserted in the Circuit Court. The record shows that the opening statement of petitioner’s trial counsel included the following comments:
[TJhese two [victims] are much bigger than my client. And the evidence will show these two minors are bullies.
[S]uddenly, these two bullies turned from where they were ... and go in front of my client and begin to insult him. ... But when the words escalated and the words were “MS your mother” or “F your mother,” that was the big offense for my client. Not only that, we heard the word “culero,” which ... means that a person is a faggot, you are a coward, and that’s what these two so-called juveniles were telling my client in front of his friends.
At that point, it is true, he took a bat____[M]y client did take the bat. My client felt that he was in a corner. His mother was being insulted. And he took the bat and he swung the bat, not this way, but he was doing like that to keep these two guys away. That’s what he was trying to do and that’s what he wanted to do.
They began to run and he did chase them. When [Herrera] fell on the snow, it was by the sidewalk, right there on 355. My client stopped, turned around, saw the other one coming, and went to his car. And he did leave.
The evidence will show that [Herrera] fell on ice, got up and left laughing with his friends. That’s what they did. His falling was the one [ ] that gave my client sufficient time for him to run to the car, get in the car and leave.
Because the strategic concession that petitioner “went after” Herrera was made at a time when it would have been unreasonable to assume “that attempted battery was off the table,” and because of the instructions that were delivered prior to final arguments, we would hold that petitioner was not *228unfairly prejudiced by the trial court’s response to the jury’s question. Accordingly, we dissent.
. The judge in Baby stated:
Vaginal intercourse means the penetration of the penis into the vagina. The slightest penetration is sufficient. An emission of semen is not required. The amount of force necessary depends upon the circumstances. No particular amount of force is required, but it must be sufficient to overcome the resistance of the victim. You must be satisfied that the victim either resisted and that this resistance was overcome by force or threat of force or that the victim was prevented from resisting by force or threat of force. She must have resisted to the extent of her ability at the tipie unless her resistance or will to resist was overcome by force or fear that was reasonable under the circumstances. Finally, consent means actually agreeing to the act of intercourse rather than merely submitting as a result of force or threat of force.
State v. Baby, 404 Md. 220, 263, 946 A.2d 463, 488 (2008), quoting Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction, Section 4:29.