(dissenting).
An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws. He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates his duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself.
Thomas Paine, Dissertation on First Principles of Government, in The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 588 (Philip S. Foner ed., The Citadel Press 1945) (1795).
The fundamental issue before the court is whether the Sexually Dangerous Person Act (SDP Act), MinmStat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998), violates substantive due process by allowing the state to use civil commitment to indefinitely confine sexual predators who do not have a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. As I read the court’s opinion, the court concludes that the only constitutional limit on the state’s ability to confine such individuals indefinitely is a showing of the individual’s future dangerousness. The court is wrong. The Constitution requires more. In upholding the SDP Act, the court is acting as nothing more than an arm of the legislature in violation of our duty “to provide safeguards against the state’s improper use of civil commitment as a constitutionally invalid form of preventive detention.” In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 192 (Minn.1996) (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter Linehan III).
In In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn.1994) (hereinafter Linehan I), we vacated Linehan’s commitment under the Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act (PP Act) because the state, while establishing Linehan’s dangerousness, failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence, as required by our decision in State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 555, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270, 273, 60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940), that Linehan exhibited an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses. See Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 614. In effect, we concluded that the state failed to prove that Linehan had a volitional impairment rendering him dangerous beyond his control. On the heels of and in direct response to Linehan I, the Minnesota Legislature passed the SDP Act under which the state immediately sought and quickly obtained Linehan’s *879commitment.1 The PP Act and the SDP Act are for all practical purposes the same except for one very important difference. The difference is that the PP Act requires an individual to have an' “utter lack of ability to control” his or her sexual behavior before he or she may be committed whereas the SDP Act is explicit that the inability to control one’s sexual behavior is not a factor to be considered. Compare Pearson, 205 Minn. at 554, 287 N.W. at 302, with, Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b) (providing that “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person’s sexual impulses”). In order to circumvent the PP Act’s “utter lack of ability to control” requirement, which we deemed necessary to make the PP Act constitutional in Pearson, the legislature simply dispatched with that requirement. While the PP Act seeks to protect the public from sexually dangerous people who are unable to control their sexual behavior, the SDP Act is designed to permit the indefinite commitment of not only those individuals covered by the PP Act but all other sexually dangerous people. No sexually dangerous person is excluded from its reach.
In reviewing Linehan’s commitment under the SDP Act, this court in Linehan III first concluded that there is no principled and constitutionally significant distinction between Linehan’s commitment under the SDP Act and the commitments of other sexual predators upheld under the PP Act. See Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 179. The court went on to conclude, consistent with the SDP Act’s express language, although somewhat inconsistent with the above conclusion and our holding in Pearson, that the “utter lack of ability to control” requirement of the PP Act was not necessary to narrowly tailor the SDP Act to meet substantive due process requirements. See Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 182. Linehan appealed that decision to the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted his writ of certiorari and then remanded for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997).
In Hendricks, a pedophile with an admitted inability to control his dangerous sexual behavior challenged his commitment under a Kansas law, which the court says is similar to the SDP Act,2 on substantive due process grounds.3 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350, 117 S.Ct. 2072. In upholding the Kansas law, the Supreme Court noted that it had “sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’ ” Id. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (listing cases in which the Court upheld state civil commitment statutes). The Court further noted that the Kansas law was “consistent with the requirements of these other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerous*880ness.” Id. In essence, the Court concluded that the individual’s mental illness or mental abnormality has to render them unable to control their dangerousness before they may be civilly committed. In doing so, the Court treated “mental illness” and “mental abnormality” as synonymous with inability to control. At the same time, the Court implicitly reaffirmed its holding from Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 76, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992), that “[an individual] is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous ⅜ * * [and] may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356-57, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780). Thus, as I read Hendricks and Foucha, before a sexual predator may be civilly committed the state must establish two things: (1) the individual’s dangerousness, and (2) the individual’s inability to control his or her dangerous sexual behavior.4 Failure to establish either means that the state may not use civil commitment to confíne the individual.
In a brazen effort to save the SDP Act at any cost, the court, in both Linehan III and today’s decision, ignores the teachings of the Supreme Court. Linehan III fails for the reasons stated in the dissents to that decision. See Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 191-201 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting); id. at 201-02 (Page, J., dissenting). Today’s decision fails because the court continues to contend that the state need only establish a sexual predator’s dangerousness in order to commit them under the SDP Act.5 Although the court’s opinion says that the SDP Act requires the state to establish that the individual has a “lack of adequate control”6 over his sexual behavior in addition to dangerousness, in *881reality this requirement is an illusion that amounts to nothing more than a euphemism for dangerousness.7 Any and every individual who commits a sexual assault “lacks adequate control” over their sexual behavior. Moreover, in creating this standard, the court abandons its rationale for upholding the constitutionality of the SDP Act in Linehan III and willfully disregards the clear and unambiguous language of the SDP Act.
This new “lack of adequate control” standard is illusory in that the court provides no definition of what “lack of adequate control” means. As a result, the court’s “lack of adequate control” standard provides no guidance as to which individuals with a mental illness or mental abnormality do not have enough control over their sexual behavior to make them dangerous beyond their control. The court provides no definition because “lack of adequate control” is not capable of definition.8 Because this standard lacks definition, there is no limit on the state’s ability to civilly commit all sex offenders,9 and therefore, substantive due process protections are rendered meaningless.
More important, even if the “lack of adequate control” standard were capable of definition, it cannot meet constitutional muster because it completely eliminates *882the boundary between civil commitment and criminal liability. With respect to those who engage in sexual misconduct, the objectives of civil commitment are to prospectively protect the health and safety of the community and to provide treatment for the committee. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (“Accordingly, States have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety.”); Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 181 (stating that “the state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexual assault * * * [and] a compelling interest in the care and treatment of the mentally disordered”). See also Carol S. Steiker, Forward: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 771, 785 (1998) (arguing that the state must “reserve indefinite civil commitment to those who are truly incapable of choosing to understand or to comply with the law”). The objectives of criminal liability are to punish offenders for their past wrongdoing and to deter those offenders and others from engaging in future misconduct. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (“A State, pursuant to its police power, may of course imprison convicted criminals for the purposes of deterrence and retribution.”); see also Steiker, supra, at 785. We allow preventive detention by way of civil commitment to confine individuals who cannot control their behavior in order to protect the public and to treat individuals for the malady causing their inability to control their behavior. If an individual regains the ability to control their behavior, then Foucha mandates the individual’s release from detention, even if the individual continues to be dangerous. 504 U.S. at 76, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (stating that “[an individual] may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer”) (emphasis added). We do not allow preventive detention in the criminal setting because the state may not punish an individual for some potential future misconduct. See id. at 83, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (permitting the state to indefinitely confine all dangerous persons “would also be only a step away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our present system, which, with only narrow exceptions * * *, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law”). Thus, in order to preserve the distinction between civil commitment and criminal liability, something more than a finding of dangerousness is required. What is required is a finding that the individual suffers from a mental illness or mental abnormality that causes a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.10 This requirement is consistent with the Supreme Court’s statement that individuals such as Linehan, whose volitional impairment renders them only dangerous and not dangerous beyond their control are “more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (emphasis added). Therefore, Linehan, who the court concedes retains “enough control to ‘plan, wait, and delay the indulgence of [his malady] until presented with a higher probability of success,’ ” Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 182 (quoting In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 318 (Minn.App. 1996)), is more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.
Substantive due process requires that Linehan’s civil commitment be based on a finding of a volitional impairment rendering him dangerous beyond his control. *883Absent such a finding, the Constitution, as explained in Hendricks and Foucha, precludes the state from civilly committing Linehan. Interestingly, at no place in its lengthy opinion does the court either say or suggest that Linehan suffers from a volitional impairment that renders him dangerous beyond his control. There is a simple reason for the omission: on the record before the court no such finding can be made.
Moreover, to withstand constitutional attack, the SDP Act must be narrowly tailored to meet the objectives of civil commitment. See Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 181 (citations omitted). Without a requirement that an individual be dangerous beyond their control, a civil commitment statute cannot be narrowly tailored because every individual who is dangerous, whether or not they are dangerous beyond their control, becomes subject to preventive detention. Yet, implicit in the court’s discussion of the SDP Act is the unsupported assumption that every individual who suffers from a mental illness or mental abnormality that causes a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous is dangerous beyond their control. Thus, under the court’s interpretation of the SDP Act, no one who is dangerous is “more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings,” and therefore, the state may civilly commit any and every sexual offender. This result cannot stand.
Even if we assume, for purposes of argument, that the court’s “lack of adequate control” standard is constitutional, the state still cannot continue to confine Line-han without a finding that he currently has a “lack of adequate control” over his sexual behavior. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (stating that “keeping [a committed aequittee] against his will in a mental institution is improper absent a determination in civil commitment proceedings of current mental illness and dangerousness”) (emphasis added). No such factual finding has ever been made, unless we accept the facts found by this court to be sufficient. However, the last time I checked, this court’s role on appeal is not that of a fact finder. See Stiff v. Associated Sewing Supply Co., 436 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn.1989) (holding that an appellate court “exceeds its proper scope of review” when it substitutes its own findings for those of the trial judge). Even if we accept the facts found by this court, there is nothing before the court which suggests that Linehan currently meets the court’s undefined “lack of adequate control” standard because the court relies on a record that was created sometime before December of 1996.11 At a minimum, Linehan is entitled to a hearing on whether he currently fits within this newly-created standard.
The court’s transparent attempt to hold the SDP Act constitutional at all costs is made more obvious by the fact that the court, in violation of the most basic rules of statutory construction, ignores the plain language of the SDP Act. The court clearly misreads the SDP Act when, quoting Hendricks, it says that the Minnesota Act requires “a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dan*884gerous behavior’ ” when in fact the SDP Act explicitly states that “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control [their] sexual impulses.” See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072; Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b). The SDP Act’s language is free from ambiguity and cannot be read to include an inability to control requirement.
In Linehan III, we gave effect to the language of subdivision 18c(b) by concluding that inability to control was not required to civilly commit an individual. See Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 183. While I believe the court’s constitutional analysis was flawed in Linehan III, at least its holding was consistent with the unambiguous language of the SDP Act. Now, in response to Hendricks, the court has done an about face and created the illusory “lack of adequate control” standard in an effort to force the SDP Act to fit within the strictures of Hendricks. The problem with this new standard, which the court pretends does not exist, is that the language of the SDP Act specifically and unequivocally states that an individual’s inability to control their sexual behavior need not be proven. Yet, according to the court, the state must prove that the individual “lacks adequate control” — whatever that means.
In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, “we must, when confronted with a statute which is susceptible of different interpretations, accept that one which is in conformity with the purpose of the act and in harmony with the provisions of the constitution.” Pearson, 205 Minn, at 555, 287 N.W. at 302 (citations omitted). When the statute in question is free of ambiguity, we must give effect to the statutory language. See Tuma v. Comm’r of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn.1986); see also Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1998). When doubts arise as to a statute’s constitutionality, “[those] doubts must be resolved in favor of the law.” Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302 (citations omitted). In construing a statute, we may not substitute amendment for construction. See State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 269, 95 N.W.2d 6, 11-12 (1959). We may not read into the statute that which the legislature, for whatever reason, left out and conversely, we may not read out of the statute that which the legislature has explicitly included. We followed the above principles in upholding the PP Act in Pearson. There, the statute in question was ambiguous but capable of being read in a way that upheld its constitutionality, which is what we did. See Pearson, 205 Minn, at 554-55, 287 N.W. at 302. We stated that:
[conceding that [the PP Act] is imperfectly drawn, the statute is nevertheless valid if it contains a competent and official expression of the legislative will. * * *
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Applying these principles to the case before us, it can reasonably be said that the language of $ * * the act is intended to include those persons who, by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses.
Id. While ultimately reaching what I believe to be the wrong result, the court also followed these principles in Linehan III when it held that inability to control was not a factor to be considered.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the court now fails to follow these principles. The language of subdivision 18c(b) of the SDP Act is clear and unambiguous and expressly precludes consideration of the individual’s inability to control their sexual behavior. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b); see also Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555-56, 287 N.W. at 302-03 (explaining that the court could not endorse “an unwarranted departure from the accepted meaning of the words defined”). The court may not read language out of *885the statute in order to join the legislature’s crusade to ensure Linehan’s preventive detention.12 When the court so blatantly disregards the legislature’s intent as expressed in the statute’s unambiguous language, it not only wears on the constitutional fabric of our law, it also tarnishes the credibility ' of this tribunal. The court’s ongoing effort to keep Linehan confined through increasingly tortured interpretations of the Constitution and the SDP Act is shameless. As Thomas Paine said, “An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty.” Paine, supra, at 588. I would add that it is also dangerous to the moral credibility of our criminal justice system. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn.1994).
As painful and as unpleasant as it may be, the SDP Act is unconstitutional and cannot be saved by construction. The language of the statute eliminates any requirement that the state prove that the person to be committed “has an inability to control [their] sexual impulses” and is applicable to all individuals irrespective of their ability to control their dangerous sexual behavior. See Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 802 (stating that “[i]t would not be reasonable to apply the provisions of the statute to every person guilty of sexual misconduct nor even to persons having strong sexual propensities. Such a definition would * * * make the act impracticable of enforcement”). Thus, the SDP Act can be distinguished from those statutes that “limit involuntary civil [commitment] to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control,” and which the Supreme Court has said pass constitutional muster.13 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.
In the final analysis, the court’s- decision to uphold the SDP Act symbolizes a process that is more concerned with short-term results than the long-term impact of a law that requires, based solely on a showing of future dangerousness, preventive detention of an individual who has served the sentence imposed by law for his past crimes. By its decision, the court has neither sought nor achieved justice. We are a nation of laws. If we base our constitutional jurisprudence on our desire to confine a particular individual, we have not only failed to protect that individual’s rights, we have failed to protect the rights of all Minnesotans.
Therefore, I dissent.
. The Minnesota Legislature convened a special session specifically to prevent Linehan's release. "The reason we're here, one of the reasons we’re here obviously is because Mr. Linehan is on the streets.” Hearing Before the Joint Meeting of H. and S. Jud. Comm, and S. Crime Prev. Comm., 78th Minn. Leg., Spec. Sess., Aug. 24, 1994 (audio tape) (statement of Senator Ember Reichgott Junge, Chair of S. Jud. Comm.).
. In fact, the Kansas law is more similar to our PP Act as interpreted by this court in Pearson. The SDP Act expressly provides that the individual's inability to control their sexual behavior is not a factor to be considered in making the commitment determination while the PP Act and the Kansas law have no such provision. Compare Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b), with Minn.Stat. §§ 526.09- 10 (1992), and Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp.1998).
.Hendricks also challenged his commitment on ex post facto and double jeopardy grounds. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350, 117 S.Ct. 2072.
. It is not enough for the state to prove that an individual has a mental illness or mental abnormality and is dangerous; the state must show that the individual’s mental illness or abnormality causes the individual to be “unable to control their dangerousness.” See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.
. The court states that the mental illness prong of the SDP Act limits the reach of indefinite preventive detention. However, the court fails to address the fact that the Supreme Court stated that the mental illness or mental abnormality must cause the individual’s inability to control their harmful sexual conduct. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (stating that “[w]e have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor such as ‘mental illness' or ‘mental abnormality' ”). Minnesota Statutes section 253B.02, subd. 18c(b) eliminates a finding of inability to control, leaving only mental illness and dangerousness. The court's interpretation of the SDP Act allows the state to lock up anyone whose mental abnormality makes them dangerous, whether or not they are dangerous beyond their control. Thus, the court impermissibly expands "the class of persons eligible for confinement” by allowing preventive detention of individuals with a mental illness or mental abnormality who are not dangerous beyond their control.
.The court also uses the phrases "some lack of volitional control,” "some degree of volitional impairment,” "a degree of volitional impairment,” and "a lack of adequate control.” I will use the phrase "lack of adequate control” to refer to the court's inability to control requirement.
In creating the "lack of adequate control” standard, the court relies on the Supreme Court's fleeting statement in Hendridcs that the Kansas Act "requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnormality’ or 'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (emphasis added). What the court cites but ignores, however, is the fact that the Supreme Court went on to explain this language by stating that the Kansas Act "is consistent with the requirements of [the other civil commitment] statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness. ” Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, throughout its opinion in Hendridcs, the Supreme Court refers to those who are "unable to control,” "who have a lack of volitional control,” or who "suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." Thus, even though the Supreme Court used the phrase "difficult, if not impossible,” it *881clearly meant that the state must make a showing that the individual being committed is “unable to control [his or her] dangerousness. " This interpretation is also supported by the facts in Hendricks. During a jury trial, "Hendricks admitted that he had repeatedly abused children whenever he was not confined[,] * ⅜ * [that] he ‘can’t control the urge' to molest children^ and] that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing children in the future was 'to die.' ” Id. at 355, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Thus, the Supreme Court analyzed the inability to control issue in the context of an individual with an utter lack of control over his sexual behavior. Our case presents a far more difficult set of facts that forces us to draw some outer limit on the state's ability to civilly commit sexual predators. Accordingly, the court's reliance on select portions of Hendriclcs to justify Linehan's commitment is inappropriate.
. Reading the court's opinion is reminiscent of walking through a house of mirrors. As with walking through a maze of mirrors where every reflection in every direction, no matter how distorted, is a reflection of yourself, so too is reading today's opinion where no matter what words the court uses, dangerousness is reflected as the only limiting factor for commitment under the SDP Act.
. It is interesting to note that in the criminal setting, we have rejected the doctrine of diminished capacity because it “inevitably opens the door to variable or sliding scales of criminal responsibility[, but] [t]he law recognizes no degree of sanity ⅜ * ⅜. For the purposes of conviction there is no twilight zone between abnormality and insanity. An offender is wholly sane or wholly insane.” State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982) (internal citation omitted). Yet, while this court does not allow a defendant to use diminished capacity to avoid criminal re- . sponsibility, by its decision today it will allow the state to use diminished capacity’s mirror opposite, "lack of adequate control,” to civilly commit an individual. If there is "no twilight zone between abnormality and insanity” and an “offender is wholly sane or wholly insane,” then what does "lack of adequate control” mean?
.In fact, taking the court's interpretation of the SDP Act to its logical extreme would allow the state to indefinitely commit any class of individuals who have a record of past harmful conduct, suffer from a mental illness or mental abnormality, and who will likely engage in harmful conduct in the future. For example, we can predict that certain children who suffer from severe childhood onset-type Conduct Disorder, manifested by "forced sex, , physical cruelty, use of a weapon, stealing while confronting a victim, and breaking and entering,” will develop Antisocial Personality Disorder. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and ,Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 87-89 (4th ed.1994). As adults, these children will engage in a "pervasive pattern” of behavior that features the "disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others.” Id. at 645. Under today’s decision, because these children have engaged in harmful and dangerous conduct in the past, have a mental abnormality, and can be predicted to engage in future dangerous conduct, there is nothing to prevent the state from enacting a statute permitting their preventive detention.
. The court justifies Linehan's continued confinement in part by stating that the district court had “great concern that [Linehan] will reoffend.” The court reasons that if Linehan is likely to reoffend, the state has met its burden. This reasoning illustrates how the court collapses the "lack of adequate control” requirement with the dangerousness requirement, making them indistinguishable from one another.
. The facts found by the court, which it contends justify Linehan’s continued detention, do not in fact support that contention. What those facts support is the conclusion that whatever Linehan’s volitional impairment may be, it does not render him dangerous beyond his control. If anything, the record establishes just how much control he has over his sexual behavior. For example, the court plainly contradicts itself when it cites the masturbation incidents to conclude both that Linehan “had recently displayed impulsiveness in his sexual impulses,” and that Linehan "conceals his sexual misconduct.” While these facts may be disturbing to the community and the court, they necessarily indicate that Linehan has the ability to control his behavior.
. I agree with the court that the legislature passed the SDP Act in the "wake of appellant's release” after this court’s decision in Linehan I. The legislature, in effect, ordered Linehan’s continued confinement by removing the inability to control standard.' The legislature did so because of enormous public pressure. The court now endorses this denial of Linehan’s freedom and his substantive due process rights because he is a potentially dangerous person and panders to what is politically expedient rather then to what is constitutionally permissible. Cf. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (stating that the role of Article III is to safeguard a litigants' "right to have claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government”); Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn.1992) (stating that the goal of any system to select judges is "to create and maintain an independent judiciary as free from political, economic and social pressure as possible so judges can decide cases without those influences”).
. The court glosses over this distinction by stating both that the SDP Act does not require proof of an individual's inability to control his or her sexual behavior and that the legislature "shift[ed]” away from an utter inability to control requirement. This is precisely the point. The legislature shifted away from an utter inability to control requirement by eliminating altogether any consideration of the individual's inability to control their sexual behavior. Yet, in a vain attempt to save the statute, the court now adds consideration of that factor back into the statute.