In this case, we consider whether defendant, who was represented by retained counsel, should be permitted to set aside a defective OUIL 2d plea fourteen months after it was entered where (1) defendant’s subsequent ouil arrest and desire to avoid sentencing as an ouil 3d offender obviously motivated the motion, and (2) retained counsel, in the absence of the prosecutor, knowingly entered a woefully defective plea at arraignment without bringing the defects to the court’s attention. Thus, retained counsel preserved the strategic possibility of setting aside the plea if defendant were ever charged with another ouil offense.
As explained below, we answer this question in the negative. Unlike the dissent, we decline to allow this transparent manipulation of the system. We will not allow defense counsel to harbor plain error as a parachute in the event of a subsequent OUIL charge. A contrary ruling would provide no incentive to defense counsel to ensure that valid pleas are taken; in fact, such a ruling would encourage counsel to enter pleas that do not comply with the court rules.
*605On February 1, 1995, defendant pleaded guilty of OUIL 2d,1 and of operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended or revoked.2 3Fourteen months later, after being charged with OUIL 3d,® and driving with a suspended or revoked license, second offense,4 in an unrelated case, the defendant moved to set aside his OUIL 2d plea. Defendant alleges that the plea lacked a factual basis and that the district court had failed to comply with the requirements for accepting a plea under MCR 6.610(E). The district court granted the motion, and the circuit court affirmed.
On remand from this Court, the Court of Appeals affirmed.5 The prosecutor has filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court.6 We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in setting aside defendant’s plea, and reverse.
i
On January 19, 1995, defendant was arrested for drunk driving and driving with a suspended license. On February 1, 1995, with the assistance of retained counsel, he was arraigned in the 52-1 District Court. At the arraignment, defendant pleaded guilty as charged of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor, second offense, and operating a motor vehicle with a suspended or revoked license. The *606record reflects that no prosecutor was present for the arraignment and guilty plea.7
The district judge accepted the plea without observing the requirements of MCR 6.610(E). Specifically, the judge did not question defendant and did not determine that the plea was understanding, voluntary, and accurate. Likewise, he did not inform defendant of the maximum sentence or of the rights he was giving up by offering the plea. When defense counsel announced the decision to plead guilty, the judge accepted the plea and immediately imposed the sentence of two years probation, with thirty days to be served in jail, together with fines and costs.8
On February 3, 1996, defendant was again arrested for drunk driving and charged in the 52-1 District Court with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor, third offense, and operating a motor vehicle with a suspended or revoked license, second offense. One of the prior offenses used to support the OUIL 3d charge was defendant’s February 1, 1995, guilty plea conviction of ouil 2d in the 52-1 District Court.
Approximately two months after he was charged with ouil 3d, defendant moved to withdraw the 1995 guilty plea conviction on the ground that the judge’s deviation from MCR 6.610(E) affected his substantial rights. The prosecutor contended that the motion to withdraw was filed merely to extricate defendant *607from the charges of OUIL 3d. The prosecutor further argued that the fourteen-month delay made the motion an impermissible collateral attack on the 1995 conviction.
The district judge set aside defendant’s 1995 guilty plea conviction. The court determined that the failure to question defendant concerning the offense or to obtain a factual basis for the plea, along with the failure to advise defendant of any of his rights, constituted a deviation affecting substantial rights. The district court further held that the motion to withdraw the plea was not a collateral attack, since it occurred in the same court in which the conviction was entered, not in a different case in which a subsequent charge was being prosecuted.
The prosecutor appealed to Oakland Circuit Court. On July 31, 1996, the circuit court denied leave to appeal. The prosecutor filed an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. On November 22, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.
The Oakland County prosecutor filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration as on leave granted. We directed the Court of Appeals to consider whether the district court properly set aside the 1995 guilty plea conviction of ouil 2d. 454 Mich 894 (1997).
n
On remand, the Court of Appeals saw the critical question as whether the attack on the ouil 2d plea was “collateral” or “direct.” The majority examined *608our decision in People v Ingram, 439 Mich 288, 294-295; 484 NW2d 241 (1992), in which we said:
[The] failure of a plea-taking court to adhere to applicable plea-taking requirements during the plea proceeding does not provide a defendant the opportunity to challenge by collateral attack. The validity of such a plea, where the defendant was represented by an attorney when entering the plea or when the defendant intelligently waived the right to counsel, including the right to court-appointed counsel if indigent, is unassailable.
The Court of Appeals majority concluded that if the defendant’s attack on the February 1995 plea-based conviction was collateral, as opposed to direct, the defendant was not entitled to have it set aside. It noted that in Ingram, we defined “collateral attacks” as “those challenges raised other than by initial appeal of the conviction in question.” 439 Mich 291, n 1. The Court found defendant’s challenge direct rather than collateral, explaining:
(1) it was made in the case instituted for the specific purpose of prosecuting the charge at issue, compare Ingram, supra, and [People v] Howard [212 Mich App 366; 538 NW2d 44 (1995)], and (2) it was a necessary step in the process of filing an appeal to the circuit court. [230 Mich App 95, 100-101; 583 NW2d 495 (1998).]
The Court reasoned that a motion to withdraw the plea is a prerequisite to appealing the plea-based conviction. MCR 6.610(E)(7)(a). There is no time limit in the rule for filing such a motion. Further, the Court of Appeals noted that MCR 7.101(B)(1) provides a twenty-one-day period for appeals from district to circuit court. Defendant’s motion was not filed within that period. However, under MCR 7.103, the circuit *609court may grant leave to appeal from the district court after the time for taking an appeal has expired.
Thus, the Court reasoned that if the defendant could challenge his plea-based conviction only on direct appeal, then to prevent him from taking one of the steps necessary to do so would defy logic. The Court concluded:
Because we conclude that defendant’s challenge to his plea-based conviction was a direct attack, and the prosecution does not otherwise contest the merits of the district court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to set aside his plea-based conviction. [230 Mich App 102.[9]
The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals said that although the defendant is challenging his conviction on a direct appeal rather than collateral attack, it was an appeal that would never have been brought had the defendant not been charged as a third offender. The dissent found this unacceptable:
This Court has previously suggested that long-delayed direct attacks on plea-based district court convictions will *610be deemed collateral and therefore must surmount a high threshold before judicial relief will be considered. People v Erwin, 212 Mich App 55, 66; 536 NW2d 818 (1995). The present case involves precisely the sort of delayed direct attack that should be deemed collateral in the interest of “considerations of finality and administrative consequences [which] must become part of the process with which we assure the achievement of proceedings that are consistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” People v Ingram [supra at 293-294]. [230 Mich App 104.]
in
The Court of Appeals characterization of defendant’s request to withdraw his plea as a “direct attack” on his OUIL 2d conviction is technically correct. The rule governing motions to withdraw pleas does not set a time limit. MCR 6.610(E)(7).10 However, the rule does require a motion to set aside the plea before issues regarding the plea procedure are raised on appeal.
Because the offense occurred after December 24, 1994, the defendant had no appeal of right from his plea-based conviction.* 11 Thus, defendant’s appellate rights are governed by MCR 7.103(A), which provides:
Availability. The circuit court may grant leave to appeal from a trial court or municipal court when
(1) no appeal of right exists, or
(2) the time for taking appeal under MCR 7.101(B)(1) has expired.
*611Subrule (B)(1) provides the time for filing an application:
Except when another time is prescribed by statute, an application for leave to appeal must be filed within 21 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
The only provision regarding late appeals is MCR 7.103(B)(6), which suggests that late appeals are allowed, but sets no time limit:12
An application under subrule (A)(2) or an application that is not timely under subrule (B)(1), must be accompanied by an affidavit explaining the delay. The circuit court may consider the length of and the reasons for the delay in deciding whether to grant the application.
We adopt the rationale of People v Erwin, supra. Long-delayed “direct” attacks on convictions may be viewed as collateral attacks. However, regardless of the label one affixes to such long-delayed challenges, it is entirely appropriate that a much higher standard be applied to a defendant who seeks relief from a judgment long after the conviction. Just as an appellate court is to consider the length of and reasons for delay in deciding whether to grant leave to appeal, the delay in bringing such a motion is a factor that the trial court must consider in determining whether to grant relief. In such cases, our concerns for finality and the efficient and effective administration of justice grow in importance. People v Ingram, supra.
In the circumstances of this case, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in setting aside the *612defendant’s conviction for ouil 2d. The request came fourteen months after the conviction, only after the defendant was charged with the felony offense of OUIL 3d, in part predicated on this OUIL 2d conviction. Defendant was represented by experienced, competent counsel at the ouil 2d plea.13 Despite the obvious deficiencies in the plea-taking procedure, counsel raised no objection.14 This raises the obvious inference, suggested by the Court of Appeals majority, that what took place was a wilful manipulation of the system. As that Court noted, pointing to People v Nydam, 165 Mich App 476; 419 NW2d 417 (1987), permitting a defendant charged with ouil 3d to collaterally attack a prior plea-based ouil conviction several years later “ ‘would in effect grant to a defendant a license to lie in the weeds, voluntarily enter a guilty plea, accept the consequences thereof, and then (when once again convicted of driving while intoxicated) attempt to avoid the effect of his prior conviction through a legal artifice.’ ” 230 Mich App 102. Accordingly, because the validity of the plea was contested merely out of subsequent sentencing concerns, defendant’s ability to directly attack his OUIL 2d conviction was foreclosed when he was arrested and charged with ouil 3d.
Reinstating the defendant’s conviction is consistent with our decision in People v Ingram, supra. The two *613cases differ somewhat in that the appeal in Ingram came to this Court as a challenge to the defendant’s circuit court conviction for OUIL 3d. However, the critical question was virtually identical to that presented here. The instant Court of Appeals panel accurately summarized the Ingram facts as follows:
The defendant in Ingram was charged with ouil 3d (Case 5) based on four underlying plea-based ouil convictions (Cases 1-4). After the circuit court ruled that two of the underlying convictions (Cases 1 & 2) were infirm because of the defendant’s lack of counsel, the defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of ouil 3d in Case 5, preserving his right to challenge on appeal the validity of one of the other underlying convictions (Case 3). Before appealing his ouil 3d conviction in Case 5, the defendant made a separate motion in Case 3 to have his plea-based conviction set aside. After this motion was granted, the defendant moved in the circuit court to withdraw his plea in Case 5, and this motion was denied. [230 Mich App 99-100.]
On those facts, we upheld the defendant’s OUIL 3d conviction, in effect treating defendant’s earlier challenge to the district court conviction of ouil 2d as a collateral attack.
The holding in Ingram is consistent with the analogous principle that long delayed new trial motions are disfavored. See People v Johnson, 386 Mich 305; 192 NW2d 482 (1971) (no error in the denial of a motion for a new trial where the motion was brought fourteen years after the plea); People v Curry, 142 Mich App 724, 730; 371 NW2d 854 (1985) (no abuse of discretion in denying a motion for a new trial brought fourteen years after conviction where the defendant never indicated he was innocent of the crime to which he pleaded guilty).
*614Similarly, where an appeal to the Court of Appeals is delayed by more than twelve months after judgment, appeal is foreclosed and defendant is limited to the post-appeal relief provisions under MCR 6.501 et seq. MCR 7.205(F)(3). In essence, a long delayed direct appeal is treated as collateral. No principle countenances giving a defendant in district court greater freedom to attack a plea-based conviction than our rules allow for felony convictions. Accordingly, we hold today that long delayed direct appeals are deemed collateral.
Where a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made after conviction and sentencing, it must be made based on a showing of miscarriage of justice. People v Winegar, 380 Mich 719, 731; 158 NW2d 395 (1968); MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096. See also Peguero v United States, 526 US 23; 119 S Ct 961; 143 L Ed 2d 18 (1999) (the failure of a trial court to inform a defendant of his right to appeal is harmless where he knew of his right to appeal). Requests to withdraw pleas are generally regarded as frivolous where circumstances indicate that the true motivation behind the motion is sentencing concerns. People v Holmes, 181 Mich App 488; 449 NW2d 917 (1989). No miscarriage of justice would result here by rejecting defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Defendant has never claimed actual innocence, and the principal motivation behind the motion is plainly extrication from the sentencing implications of ouil 3d.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the defendant’s conviction of OUIL 2d is reinstated. In view of the ambiguity in the rules regarding delayed appeals, we are today, by separate order, publishing for comment proposed amendments *615of MCR 6.610 and 7.103 to clarify the time limits for challenging plea-based convictions in district court.
Weaver, C.J., and Brickley, Taylor, Corrigan, and Young, JJ., concurred.MCL 257.625(7)(b); MSA 9.2325(7)(b).
MCL 257.904(l)(a); MSA 9.2604(l)(a).
MCL 257.625(7)(d); MSA 9.2325(7)(d).
MCL 257.904(l)(b); MSA 9.2604(l)(b).
230 Mich App 95; 583 NW2d 495 (1998).
The prosecutor also filed a motion for immediate consideration and the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan filed a motion for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae. Those motions are granted.
While the state’s presence would have plausibly rectified the deficient plea, we are aware of no court rule that compels the prosecutor’s presence at misdemeanor arraignments where defendant pleads guilty as charged.
The judge actually imposed a jail term of six months, but suspended the last five months on various conditions.
The Court of Appeals recognized the potential for manipulation of the system that such a rule permits. See People v Nydam, 165 Mich App 476, 479; 419 NW2d 417 (1987). However, it said if any criticism is to be assigned “it should fall most squarely on the district court that took the defective plea in the first place.” 230 Mich App 103. It noted the following from People v Erwin, 212 Mich App 55, 65-66; 536 NW2d 818 (1995):
Ouil offenses are exceptional inasmuch as the Legislature has provided for augmented punishment of a simple misdemeanor for repeat offenders up to and including felony treatment. It is therefore of special importance that courts follow regular procedures in accepting misdemeanor pleas to these offenses and carefully consider the potential consequences of such pleas for subsequent felony offenses.
This is in contrast to the rule applicable to circuit court pleas, which permits such motions only within the time for filing an application for leave to appeal. MCR 6.311(A).
Const 1963, art 1, § 20, as amended by the voters at the 1994 general election.
This is in contrast to MCR 7.205(F), which allows the Court of Appeals to grant late appeals if the application is filed within twelve months of the judgment or order on the merits.
Counsel’s knowledge and experience handling drunk driving cases is evidenced by his significant publications in the legal community. Counsel has authored several continuing education publications, including Defense of Drunk Driving Cases in Michigan, Drunk Driving Law and Practice and the 1998 Drunk Driving Defense Update.
Cf. MCR 6.302(E). The same attorney represented defendant at the ouil 2d and ouil 3d proceedings, although substitute counsel was utilized to make the motion to withdraw the plea.