Dissenting. I agree with the majority on three points. First, a finding the allegation in a pleading is true is insufficient to fix the degree of the offense, even where the petition alleges a burglary in the first degree. Second, sentencing a minor to the prescribed term for first degree burglary is not the equivalent of fixing the degree. (In re Jacob M. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 58, 63 [240 Cal.Rptr. 418].) Third, an appropriate statement at a dispositional hearing is sufficient to fix the degree. (In re Dorothy B. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 509, 516 [227 Cal.Rptr. 472].)
I part company with the majority where it concludes a statement by the court that a burglary is “residential” or of “an inhabited dwelling” is sufficient. The majority finds the use of a descriptive label satisfactory designation of the degree. However, as this division recognized in Jacob M., the Supreme Court has held to the contrary.
In particular, the court in People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 629, footnote 2 [105 Cal.Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905], gave great deference to the specific statutory language in the complementary statutes, Penal Code sections 1157 and 1192. There, the jury found the defendant guilty of robbery and also found an allegation he was armed with a deadly weapon to be true. *584However, it failed to fix the degree of the crime. Because armed robbery was of the first degree, the prosecution argued the jury’s factual finding on the weapon enhancement was sufficient to imply a first degree finding. The Supreme Court disagreed: “We cannot assume, contrary to the clear legislative direction, that because a factual finding was made which would have warranted a determination of first degree robbery, the jury unmistakably intended [citation] to make that determination when it refrained from expressly fixing the degree.”
Cases following Beamon have likewise refused to draw inferences where the degree was not specifically expressed. (See, e.g., People v. Thomas (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 281, 285 [148 Cal.Rptr. 532].) In People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 [208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 46 A.L.R.4th 1011], the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Beamon principle and its intervening decisions on this question (People v. Dixon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 51-52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752]; People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 94-95 [115 Cal.Rptr. 225, 524 P.2d 353]) and cited approvingly the decision in Thomas and other appellate court cases. (Id. at p. 380.)
The McDonald court concluded: “In the present case the verdict form failed to specify the degree; in the absence of such specification, the jury’s finding on the special circumstance allegation is irrelevant and the conviction must be deemed second degree murder as a matter of law pursuant to the unambiguous language of section 1157.” (Id. at p. 382.) Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the statutes in a manner irreconcilable with the majority opinion.
Here, the majority declares the judge’s reference to a factual finding, by implication, fixed the degree of the offense. This it cannot do. As the statutes presently read, the court must specifically fix the degree of the crime.
The majority opinion goes a step beyond mere legislative revision, however, leaping toward judicial activism. It holds the trial court’s reference to a residential burglary obviates the duty to make the required finding under California Rules of Court, rule 1488(e)(5).1
As we emphasized in In re Dorothy B., supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 509, the rule (then numbered 1355(f)(5)) requires certain findings to be made after the trial court has determined the allegations of the petition are true. But the *585majority holds that once the evidence has established the minor could only have committed an offense of a higher degree, the juvenile court has no further discretion. Under the majority’s reasoning, the required finding under the statute would not only be unnecessary, it would be ineffectual.
In In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616 [189 Cal.Rptr. 867, 659 P.2d 1156], the Supreme Court had occasion to address the application of the rule in a case where the juvenile court had found a burglary petition true. At the dispositional hearing, the court made no finding as to whether the offense was a felony or misdemeanor. (Id. at p. 618.) The Supreme Court held the burglary “was necessarily of the second degree for two independent reasons: first, the entry giving rise to the charge occurred in the daytime; [fn. omitted] second, the court made no finding as to the degree of burglary as required by Penal Code section 1157, as well as rule 1355(f)(5), [fn. omitted] rendering it of the second degree by operation of law. [Citation.] Therefore, the crime which had been found true was one which, if committed by an adult, can be either a misdemeanor or a felony. (Pen. Code, § 461.)” (Id. at p. 619, italics added.)
Because the court declared its two reasons to be independent, we must conclude each was sufficient alone to achieve the result. Here, too, there was no finding as to the degree of the burglary. Therefore, the offense should be deemed to be in the second degree and remanded for determination of whether it is a misdemeanor or a felony.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 15, 1991. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Subdivision (e)(5) of rule 1488 provides, in pertinent part: “(e) If the court determines . . . that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall make findings on each of the following, noted in the order: . . . [U] (5) In a section 602 matter, the degree of the offense and whether it would be a misdemeanor or felony had the offense been committed by an adult. These determinations may be deferred until the disposition hearing.”