dissenting.
The majority opinion states: “We conclude, therefore, that the proposed service is that of a common carrier and, if such authority is to be granted, it must be shown that it is required by public convenience and necessity.” That conclusion is contrary to the specific factual finding of the railway commission, which was supported by evidence. The conclusion is also directly opposite in result from that reached by this court more than two years ago. The former case was Samardick of Grand Island-Hastings, Inc. v. B.D.C. Corp., 183 Neb. 229, 159 N. W. 2d 310, decided by this court on June 7, 1968. In that case we affirmed an order of the railway commission authorizing “operations as a contract carrier by motor vehicle to transport cash, letters, checks and other commercial papers, data processing materials, and other documents and records thereto related.” The parties were the predecessor of the present applicant and the identical protestant involved heré. The case involved the same type of commodities, the same type of service, the same type of certificate, and the same economic and policy issues. The applicant here' is presently operating as a contract carrier of the commodities involved under the regular route certificate granted in that case.
■ The only real distinction between the prior case and this one is that the applicant here seeks to extend its contract carrier authority from a specific regular route authority to an irregular route authority extending over the entire state.
The majority opinion here apparently takes the'unique position that because the applicant stated that it desired to contract for its services with five banks rather than one and to solicit other bánks where it was' possible to" fürñish necessary services,'the operations "are somehow'converted "from'a'contract carrier type “of operation to a common carrier' type'.' of' operation.
Thei eVidence is almost undisputed that the needs *269of banks for transportation services for data processing materials are specialized within a rigid time and place framework. The record is abundantly clear that neither the rules of the railway commission nor any law or previous decision of this court limit the holder of a contract carrier permit to contracting for the authorized carriage with a single specific shipper or even a series of named shippers. Not even the protestant takes that position.
The majority here hás substituted its own definition of a “contract carrier” for that prescribed by statute, by previous opinions of this court, and by the regulatory body charged with the responsibility of carrying out legislative policy.
In the original Samardick case in 1968, this court said: “The term ‘consistent with the public interest’ is quite different in its meaning than the term ‘public convenience and necessity.’ The former means only that the proposed contract carrier service does not conflict with the legislative policy of the state in dealing with transportation by motor carriers, while the latter requires a consideration of the present service being rendered in the territory, the need of additional service, and the facilities which the applicant can provide. Consistent with the public interest simply means that it is- not contrary to the public policy of the state as expressed in the Motor Carrier Act.”
The evidence here is replete with testimony indicating the requirements of specialized service to meet the needs of the banking industry in connection with prompt and efficient data processing. We refer again to the original Samardick case in 1968. We also said there: “The evidence as to where the public interest lies in the present case is in conflict. The determination of the public interest in such a case is one that is peculiarly for the determination of the commission. If there is evidence to sustain the findings of the commission, this court cannot intervene. ' It is only where the findings of *270the commission are against all the evidence that this court may hold that the commission’s findings on the evidence are unreasonable and arbitrary. Where the evidence is in conflict, as here, the weight of the evidence is for the determination of the commission and not for this court.”
It is glaringly apparent that the majority opinion here is grounded upon the principle that a single, somewhat specialized, common carrier ought to be protected from all competition. In effect, the majority opinion says that the type of specialized service rendered by that common carrier, at least if it is offered to more than one contract shipper by any other carrier, can only be that of a common carrier and cannot be contract carriage. These are policy issues into which this court ought not to inquire. The entire statutory and regulatory pattern for motor carriers in this state clearly demonstrates that such policy decisions were specifically committed to the railway commission. Whatever expertise and experience it may have is and should be applied to making such policy determinations in the public interest. An attempt by this court to determine how much competition is in the public interest and where the competition ought to be or ought not to be is a clear usurpation of the authority and jurisdiction specifically committed to the railway commission.
The basic principles undergirding the regulation of motor carriers was stated very effectively in Black Hills Stage Lines, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 174 Neb. 425, 118 N. W. 2d 498: “The purpose of the Nebraska Motor Carrier Act was regulation for the public interest. Its purpose was not to stifle legitimate competition but to foster it. Its purpose was not to create monopolies in the transportation industry, but to eliminate discrimination, undue preferences or advantages, and unfair or destructive competitive practices. Legitimate competition is a normal attribute of our free enterprise system. *271It must be permitted to exist and the law contemplates that it shall.”
The extent and level of regulation of motor carriers is a matter of legislative policy. It has been committed to the jurisdiction of the railway commission. When the evidence on policy issues is in conflict, but there is evidence to sustain the findings and orders of tire commission, this court cannot and should not act in the role of ia superimposed regulatory body. See, Samardick of Grand Island-Hastings, Inc. v. B.D.C. Corp., supra; Neylon v. Petersen & Petersen, Inc., 181 Neb. 143, 147 N. W. 2d 488.
There was evidence here to sustain the findings and the order of the railway commission. It was within the jurisdiction of the commission to act and the action was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Its order should be affirmed.