dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I am concerned with the practical implications. of this decision, and I believe that the imposition of sanctions in this case will have a chilling effect on the practice of law. I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly imposed sanctions against Parrillo, Weiss because I believe that the third-party complaint was well grounded in both law and fact. I also disagree with the majority’s imposition of additional sanctions.
The majority states that the “crux of the trial court’s ruling was that the allegations contained in the third-party complaint were without legal basis.” 299 Ill. App. 3d at 701. While I may agree with the majority’s conclusion that there is not a duty to warn or keep a lookout for vehicles approaching from behind, I cannot agree that the remaining allegations in the third-party complaint lacked a sufficient legal basis. In addition to alleging that Pelini did not keep a proper lookout and that Pelini stopped without warning, the third-party complaint also alleged that Pelini failed to exercise reasonable care in operating her vehicle. It is well settled in Illinois that the driver of a motor vehicle does have a duty to exercise reasonable care in operating her vehicle to avoid a collision. Moran v. Gatz, 390 Ill. 478, 481 (1945). In light of this long-standing rule, I believe that the allegation that Pelini failed to exercise reasonable care in operating her vehicle serves as a sufficient legal basis.
I also believe that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there was an inadequate legal investigation of the facts. In drafting the third-party complaint, Fleming relied on a telephone conversation with Gaynor in which Gaynor told Fleming that Pelini stopped suddenly and that there was no traffic or other reason for the stop. Fleming also relied on the written statement that Gaynor submitted to his insurance company. In the written statement, Gaynor recounted that after Pelini started to make a right turn she suddenly stopped. Moreover, the diagram attached to the written statement depicted that Pelini’s car started to enter the intersection. According to Fleming, the police report included neither a description of the events precipitating the accident nor a list of witnesses. Also, plaintiff named Pelini as a defendant in the original complaint, and Fleming was not aware that Pelini had been dismissed as a defendant at the time that she filed the third-party complaint. In light of this evidence, I believe that Fleming had sufficiently investigated the facts prior to filing the third-party complaint and that her actions were reasonable under the circumstances. See Jurgensen v. Haslinger, 295 Ill. App. 3d 139, 143 (1998) (a party’s conduct must be reasonable at the time of filing).
Given that there was no evidence before the trial court to suggest that Parrillo, Weiss filed the third-party complaint for vexatious or harassing purposes and that the third-party complaint was both legally and factually sufficient, I would reverse the trial court’s imposition of sanctions. For the same reasons, I disagree with the majority’s decision to impose additional sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 375.