I concur but with a few observations:
First, McClure v. McClure (1935) 4 Cal.2d 356 [49 P.2d 584, 100 A.L.R. 1257] stood only for the point that attorneys fees were not recoverable by a wife seeking to reinstate alimony long after it had terminated. (In re Marriage of Coleman (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 56 [102 Cal.Rptr. 629]; Cochran v. Cochran (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 339, 351 [91 Cal.Rptr. 630].) That holding may have been undermined by the expansion of the statutory basis for awards of fees of section 4370 of the Civil Code; but we have no need to discuss the question in this appeal, since spousal support is not even an issue here.1
Second, if the majority really intends to pronounce McClure, a Supreme Court holding, moribund and to “discredit” the theory that attorneys fees and costs continue to have any relationship to spousal support after the Family Law Act, it may surprise many in the bench and bar; for most recognized authorities disagree. (See, e.g., Adams & Sevitch, Cal. Family Law Act Practice (4th ed. 1983) § A.29, p. A-9: “Since an award of attorneys’ fees is considered a personal award to the recipient and is founded on the same principle as an award of spousal support, there can be no post-judgment award of attorneys’ fees for post-judgment proceedings regarding the issue of spousal support if that right had been waived ... or terminated . . . .”; and 1 Cal. Marital Dissolution Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1981) Financial Considerations, § 6.3, p. 146: “Civil Code § 4357, which provides that either spouse can be ordered to pay any amount necessary for the other’s support pending dissolution, and ... § 4370, which provides that either can be ordered to pay the other’s reasonable litigation costs and attorney’s fees, are declarations of former law. Therefore, cases interpreting former law are persuasive. . . . [Marriage of Jafeman (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 244, 263 (105 Cal.Rptr. 483)].”)
*923Finally, I would hold Cochran and Coleman provide sufficient authority to resolve this case without assessing the viability of McClure after passage of the Family Law Act. Wife did not pursue spousal support in this proceeding and has, in fact, remarried. McClure is thus no bar to an award of fees to her. Whether a needy spouse is now entitled to attorneys fees to pursue a meritless (but reasonable and good faith) claim for spousal support may present an open question in domestic relations law, but it is not before us.
In re Marriage of Mulhern (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 988 [106 Cal.Rptr. 78] is even less on point. It holds only that a request for attorneys fees in a post dissolution proceeding to modify spousal support after the community property has been divided and the dissolution has long since become final requires a showing of changed circumstances to demonstrate need. Here the community property division itself was part of the first appeal and the trial court made the requisite finding of need.