I dissent.
The court here confronts a case in which the molestation has been so consistent that the minor victim cannot recall distinct and identifiable acts within this course of conduct. Unfortunately, this is not unusual in the prosecution of a “resident child molester,” that is, a person who either resides in the same home with the minor or otherwise has virtually unchecked access to the minor and who sexually abuses the minor on repeated occasions over a prolonged period of time.
If a child has been molested on a regular basis and in a consistent manner, e.g., “every day when my mommy went to work,” “every weekend when I would stay with my dad,” or “two or three times a week when Johnny would come to visit,” the child may have no meaningful reference point of time or detail by which to distinguish one specific act from another. Obviously, the more frequent and repetitive the molestation and the younger the victim, the less likely it becomes that the prosecution can establish one or more specific acts via the testimony of the minor victim. Since many aberrant practices leave no permanent physical evidence and since children are usually molested outside the presence of witnesses, the testimony of the minor victim may be the only evidence on which the prosecution can base its case; rendering such testimony inadequate as a matter of law under circumstances like those here under discussion could effectively insulate the most egregious child molesters from prosecution.
*779Under these circumstances, the majority’s requirement that either the prosecutor elect the specific acts of molestation on which it relies or the trial court instruct the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 17.01 or 4.71.5 (or their equivalent) that they must unanimously agree on the specific acts the defendant committed does not bear close scrutiny. Neither People v. Williams (1901) 133 Cal. 165 [65 P. 323], which focuses on prosecutorial election, nor People v. Castro (1901) 133 Cal. 11 [65 P. 13], which emphasizes the constitutional requirement of jury unanimity, in logic or common sense compels the majority’s conclusion. I am not convinced that any of the fundamental concerns for a defendant’s ability to present a defense or to have a unanimous jury verdict as expressed in Castro and Williams are served by requiring election or instruction on jury unanimity in cases where neither is realistically possible at the time of trial and the defendant can suggest no conceivable prejudice in the absence of election or a unanimity instruction.
I believe the concerns expressed in 1901 by the Supreme Court in deciding Castro and Williams, and recognized by subsequent courts when considering the prosecution of multiple offenses as requiring either election or a unanimity instruction, were grounded upon due process considerations in light of criminal procedure as it then existed. The linchpin of the due process analysis that shapes and permeates those cases is the ability of a criminal defendant to meaningfully prepare and present a defense to the charges against him. (See People v. Dunnahoo (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 561, 571 [199 Cal.Rptr. 796].) It is simply not enough to state, in the abstract, that a criminal defendant has the right to be charged with and convicted of a particular act, nor that he has the right to a jury instruction on unanimity, nor that he has the right to compel the prosecutor to elect the act, upon evidence of which he intends to rest his case. All of these principles lead inexorably back to the defendant’s ability to defend. If that ability has been curtailed by the state’s failure to give the defendant adequate notice of the charges against him, or if the charges as made can be shown to lack specificity so that a defense cannot be mounted, the defendant should be entitled to dismissal of the charges against him or reversal of any resultant conviction. Existing procedures, including Penal Code section 1004 which permits a criminal defendant to demur to a complaint when the charging allegations considered in light of the transcript of the preliminary hearing do not provide sufficient certainty, ensure protection of the defendant’s rights in the appropriate forum in a timely fashion. (See People v. Jordan (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 362, 369-370 [97 Cal.Rptr. 570].)
So long as the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing supports the number of offenses charged against a defendant and covers the time frame or time frames charged in the information, a defendant has all the notice the *780Constitution requires. Should a defendant in such circumstances feel the lack of greater specificity hampers his ability to prepare a defense, he may demur; to the extent the success of the demurrer depends upon an offer of proof concerning his intended defense, making such offer in camera ensures the defendant would not be compelled to prematurely disclose his defense strategy to gain the constitutionally adequate notice of the charges against him to which he is entitled. (Cf. People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 393-394 [228 Cal.Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173].)
There is nothing in this record to suggest that defendant was surprised at trial. He elected to stand on his denial that he had ever molested Linda. Thus the jury’s task was to decide who was telling the truth, the victim or defendant. Necessarily there was jury unanimity on this issue. Nothing more was required in logic or in law. The absence of an election and the failure to instruct on jury unanimity that the majority deems reversible error were, in my opinion, irrelevant under the facts of this case.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 27, 1988.