(concurring in part, concurring in result in part).
Although I generally concur in the majority writing, I only concur in the result of Issue One. It appears to me that the majority author’s treatment of said issue is too broad and misleading. The majority author says:
In a revocation proceeding, a constitutional attack on the underlying charge is without merit because the proceeding relates to whether or not the terms of probation have been violated.
That statement is not totally accurate or legally sound. Given a literal reading, one might presume that under the majority writing (based upon its careless reliance upon selected language in State v. Olson, 305 N.W.2d 852 (S.D.1981)), the constitutionality of a penal statute is totally immaterial in a probation revocation proceeding. That simply is not so!
It must be remembered that in Olson, the probationer (who had originally been convicted of first-degree burglary) while on probation was charged with misdemeanor trespass and unlawful entry. The charges principally flowed from conduct amounting to being a “peeping tom” in a fitness center at a local YWCA. In State v. Burkman, 281 N.W.2d 442, 443 (S.D.1979), this court reiterated the appropriate standard of proof in probation revocation proceedings: the trial court must be “reasonably satisfied] ... that the conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions [imposed].” The Olson court determined that such standard had been met, but never stated that the constitutionality of a statute which forms the basis of the probation revocation petition is immaterial! Certainly, sneaking into a YWCA to clandestinely glare at nude women is inappropriate conduct, irrespective of the constitutionality of the specific statute which prohibits such activities.
Similarly, in this case, Reif had been placed on probation for the felony offense of engaging in a contracting business and failing to file an excise tax return. While on probation, he engaged in generally the same conduct for which he was previously convicted; i.e,, he engaged in the contracting business without first obtaining an excise tax license. At his probation revocation hearing he objected to the absence of certain notice requirements in the excise tax statutes. His objections fail on their merits.
“All presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt.” Crowley v. State, 268 N.W.2d 616, 618 (S.D.1978). In my view, Reif's constitutional arguments and authority lack persuasion and merit. State v. Iron Thunder, 272 N.W.2d 299, 303 (S.D. 1978). Under the facts of this case, the trial court certainly was “reasonably satis*517fied” that Reif s activities warranted revocation. Olson, supra, at 853.
It must be emphasized, however, that despite the majority’s above-quoted language to the contrary, violation of an unconstitutional statute cannot be the sole basis for revoking probation. Cf. Wickham v. Dowd, 914 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.1989). A holding to the contrary would give a new meaning to the word “reasonable” in the standard we apply in these cases.
I am authorized to state that Justice HENDERSON joins in this concurrence in part and concurrence in result in part.