dissenting.
In reviewing a decision rendered by the trial court, Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., mandates that “due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,” and that a trial court’s finding of fact “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous unless it has no support in the evidence or, although there may be some supporting evidence for it, this court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918 (N.D.1985). In this case, although there may be some evidence supporting an award of custody to Rhonda, I am left with the firm conviction that a mistake was made when the trial court did not award custody to Richard.
In Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., the North Dakota Legislature has set forth certain factors that the court is to consider when deciding which of the parents is to receive custody in a contested custody matter. This court has stressed the importance of those factors in many of its decisions. In Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D.1986) this court indicated that the guiding standard is “ ‘the best interests and welfare of the child,’ Section 14-09-06.1, N.D.C.C., which must be determined by the court’s consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the best “ ‘interests and welfare of the child’ as enumerated in Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C.” The trial court is vested with substantial discretion in matters of custody and in the determination of what is in the best interests of the child, but it must consider and evaluate all factors that affect those best interests and welfare as enumerated in Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., although it is not required to make separate findings on each relevant statutory factor. Wolf v. Wolf, 474 N.W.2d 257 (N.D.1991). The trial court is to weigh each factor as it deems fit and there is no requirement that it assign one factor priority or give one factor more weight than another. Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607 (N.D.1992).
In this case, the trial court made findings on all of the factors set forth in Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., except factor (i) which deals with the preference of a child. The trial court found that some of the factors were a draw and did not favor either of the parties however, it did find that some of the factors favored Rhonda. It is unclear if the trial court determined that any of the factors favored Richard.
In failing to do that I feel that some of the findings of fact made by the trial court were clearly erroneous. For example, under factor (f), which deals with moral fitness of the parents, the court stated the following:
“Richard attempted to portray the marital difficulties between the parties as resulting from Rhonda’s involvement with John Nugent.”
*494I don’t believe that this is a finding of fact and it is certainly unclear whether or not the court made a determination that Rhonda’s involvement with John Nugent led to the marital difficulties. If the trial court did not consider the moral fitness of Rhonda a factor that favored Richard it should have. The evidence seems to be clear that in the fall of 1989 Rhonda went to a seminar in Wisconsin where she met John Nu-gent, who was a married elementary principal from the State of Michigan. Shortly after Rhonda and Mr. Nugent returned to their respective homes, they announced to their spouses that they wanted divorces and as Rhonda obtained a divorce in North Dakota, John Nugent obtained a divorce in Michigan. Rhonda has since married John Nugent and moved to Michigan with the parties’ children.
The court’s findings of fact on factor (d) did not go far enough. As to factor (d), which relates to the length of time a child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity, the court found that the children have lived with Rhonda as the primary caretaker since the parties’ separation in December of 1989. It should be remembered that these children were with Rhonda as a result of an interim order entered by the trial court in December of 1989. The court should have given some consideration to the parties’ family home near Max, North Dakota, where the oldest child has resided most of his life and the youngest child has resided all of her life. Further, the trial court gave no consideration to the “extended family” of both Rhonda and Richard. Both Rhonda and Richard have family members, including their parents, living in or near the Max area. As the children have been growing up, these family members have had extensive contact with the children. With the children now moving to the State of Michigan to reside with Rhonda and her new husband, the contact between the extended family members and the children will be limited. This contact is important and it is something that the trial court should have considered. Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121 (N.D.1980). In Bashus v. Bashus, 393 N.W.2d 748 (N.D.1986), this court noted the following about contact with extended family members:
“We determined that the grandparents’ involvement was an appropriate factor in support of the trial court’s decision to award Trina’s parents joint custody. We concluded that children ‘need interaction and interrelationship with their parents, siblings, and other persons who may significantly affect the child’s best interests.’ ”
This court has made it clear that the trial court is to evaluate all factors that affect the best interests and welfare of a child. Wolf, supra. The trial court did not adequately evaluate factor (d) when it failed to consider the children’s home in Max or the “extended family.”
Under factor (k), the trial court is also to make some redetermination concerning the interaction of interrelationship of any person who resides in or frequents the household of a parent and who may significantly affect the child’s best interests. A determination under this factor is not limited to a person who has a history of causing physical injury. As has already been pointed out, the trial court made no determination concerning the interaction or interrelationship of the extended family with these children and it made no determination on what effect John Nugent, who is now married to Rhonda and living with her and the children, would have on the children. John Nugent’s ex wife, Linda Nugent, testified at this trial and her testimony about his relationship with the children from their marriage, a boy 19 and twin daughters 17, was hardly glowing. She testified that at the present time his relationship with his children is nonexistent and during the time that they were growing up he was never very close to his children nor did he have much time for them. John Nugent’s ex wife testified that he was not a violent person but when he became frustrated with the children he would take out his frustration on some object such as a wall or a window or a door. Her testimony very clearly indicated that he did not enjoy children. This appraisal was from a woman *495who had lived with John Nugent for 20 years and raised three children with him. The trial court should have made some determination as to how John Nugent’s relationship with the children was going to affect them.
Lastly, the trial court appears to have relied almost exclusively upon the recommendation of Dr. Podrygula in making its custody decision. Under factor (l), which allows the court to consider anything else that is relevant, the trial court set forth that it was Dr. Podrygula’s clear and unequivocal recommendation that Rhonda be awarded full custody. In its memorandum opinion, the court indicated that it had considered all of the factors set forth in Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., but added that one of the key factors in the court’s determination was the psychological evaluation by Dr. Podrygula.
In Justice VandeWalle’s concurrence, he indicated that judges cannot surrender to professional psychologists the judge’s responsibility to decide the issue of the best interest of the children. I am in agreement with that and based upon the record in this case that appears to have been what happened.
While the psychological evaluation may have been thorough and helpful, as indicated by the trial court, it appears to be an evaluation that was influenced by Rhonda’s education and Dr. Podrygula’s feeling that growing up in rural North Dakota does not offer much challenge or opportunity to children.
While Rhonda’s educational qualifications are certainly impressive, it should be remembered that the trial court found that both parents have the capacity and disposition to give the children love, affection and guidance and to continue their education. While Rhonda’s education worked to her advantage in this case, it should be remembered that there are a number of spouses who have not pursued their education but instead have stayed in the home raising the children or, while raising the children, worked at low paying jobs putting their spouses through school. Does this mean that they are less qualified to have custody? It makes one wonder if the roles would have been reversed in this case, would Richard have been allowed to take the children to Michigan to a new job and a new wife?
Also, Dr. Podrygula seemed to have a disdain for rural North Dakota. In his report he indicated as follows:
“Growing up in Max would offer a lot of stability, but probably not too much challenge or opportunity.”
Given the fact that North Dakota is a rural state that stresses its quality of life, this is particularly disturbing. I’m sure we would not have to look very far to find children that have come out of towns as small as Max or smaller who have been successful as adults. Also, heaven forbid, what if these children wanted to be farmers like their father?
For the reasons set forth above I respectfully dissent.