(concurring specially).
I. The court majority assumes for the purposes of the opinion that Estabrook “has a property interest in the form of his right not to be discriminated against because of his age . . . .” I agree. Section 601A.6 of the Code makes age discrimination against an employee an unfair employment practice. When interests are thus *312“recognized and protected by state law,” they are “comprehended within the meaning of either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ as meant in the Due Process Clause.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 419 (1976).
But the majority concludes, incorrectly, in my view, that the Iowa Civil Rights Commission’s finding of no probable cause on Estabrook’s complaint against Goodyear did not “adjudicate” Estabrook’s charge of age discrimination. After the commission’s finding of no probable cause under the statute in effect at the time, the only means available to Estabrook for further pursuing his interests under the Iowa Civil Rights Act itself was judicial review pursuant to the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. § 601A.15(1), The Code 1977. (Enforcement actions in court under the act had to be brought by the commission. § 601A.15(2).) IAPA provides that on review the district court may modify final agency action if it is “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion.” § 17A.19(8)(g). Due to the deference which this standard of review accords agency action, the commission’s finding of no probable cause on Estabrook’s complaint materially reduced his chances of establishing that he was a victim of age discrimination in violation of section 601A.15. Thus in a real sense, the commission’s finding of no probable cause “adjudicated” Esta-brook’s right to be free from age discrimination; the finding had an actual, substantial, adverse impact on Estabrook’s complaint.
The majority offers two reasons for its conclusion that Estabrook’s right to be free from age discrimination was not adjudicated by the commission’s finding. First, the majority notes that Estabrook remains free to “file a civil action in either state or federal court to enforce his extensive rights under the federal enactment.” (Emphasis added.) Second, the majority states that Estabrook has a remedy of filing a civil action in court for damages.
The availability of a federal cause of action to remedy age discrimination does not appear relevant to the issue of whether the right to be free from age discrimination under.the Iowa statute was adversely affected. Section 601A.15 of the Code creates a right which is independent of the right created by federal civil rights legislation. This is evidenced by our decision that we do not consider ourselves bound by the United States Supreme Court’s construction of the federal civil rights law. Quaker Oats Co. v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission, 268 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Iowa 1978). Because section 601A.15 creates an independent right to be free from age discrimination, remedies available under federal law cannot be said to protect the same substantive rights as those under the Iowa Act. I do not subscribe to a principle that a state may create a right but withhold due process in achieving it because a parallel federal right exists.
If a civil damage action was permissible under the statute at the time notwithstanding a finding of no probable cause, that alternative would provide a somewhat stronger basis for concluding that a right to be free from age discrimination is not adjudicated by a commission finding of no probable cause. The United States Supreme Court has held that individuals have no property right, in a constitutional sense, in any particular form of remedy. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332, 54 S.Ct. 140, 142, 78 L.Ed.2d 342, 347 (1933). When one form of remedy is substituted for another, however, due process requires that the substitute remedy be an effective one. Id.
For a number of reasons a civil action for damages is not an effective substitute for the variety of remedies provided by the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Some of the reasons are considered by Professor Bonfield in State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 Iowa L.Rev. 1067, 1113 (1964). Private damage suits may involve protracted and costly litigation, beyond the resources of the ordinary working person, as well as the expense of engaging counsel whose fees are “unlikely to be recompensed by the relatively small amount of damages awarded, even if they are won.” Id. The most *313significant weakness of independent damage actions, however, is that they “may not operate as a deterrent to prosperous individuals who are strongly committed to a discriminatory course of conduct.” Id. Instead of accomplishing the primary purpose of eliminating age discrimination, substituting a civil damage remedy for the administrative specific-enforcement remedies may force aggrieved individuals “to accept a substitute for a right which they are entitled to share with other members of the public.” Id. See also Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 526, 526 (1961). In contrast the commission remedy affords several administrative tools, including authority to issue enforceable cease-and-desist orders. § 601A.14(2).
Federal cases cited by the majority do not appear to support the conclusion that Esta-brook’s rights under the Iowa Civil Rights Act were not adjudicated by the commission’s finding of no probable cause. Those cases were brought under the federal statutes. The federal statutes, unlike chapter 601A as it stood at the time, provide alternative procedures: one before the commission and the other in court after notice to the commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (civil actions for discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (civil actions for discrimination based on age) (1976). Compare §§ 601A.16(1)(b), 601A.16(2), The Code 1979 (present Iowa statute). The federal alternative procedure in court involves de novo trial of the discrimination charges. The commission’s finding of no probable cause is not binding. See, e. g., Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F.Supp. 1321, 1338 (D.Del.1974), aff’d, 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975). Because probable cause findings under the federal act have no binding effect in the parties’ alternative court cases, and the parties have de novo trials, the federal courts cited by the majority were able to hold that the plaintiffs were not deprived of liberty or property interests by commission findings. See Georator, 592 F.2d at 768; Stewart v. EEOC, 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1633, 1638 (N.D.Ill.1978); EEOC v. Johnson Co., 421 F.Supp. 652, 657 (D.Minn.1975). Cf. Kelly v. EEOC, 468 F.Supp. 417, 418 (D.Md.1970) (did not reach the due process issue; instead denied the plaintiff any right to review under the federal administrative procedure law on the ground that probable cause determinations under the federal civil rights statute have no legal effect and hence are not “final” agency action subject to review). The same cannot be said of probable cause determinations under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, since the scope of review applied to those findings is circumscribed on administrative review, §§ 601A.15(1), 17A.19(8)(g), The Code 1977, since the commission itself is the party which must bring enforcement actions, § 601A.15(2), and since an ordinary damage lawsuit is not effective to achieve the ends of the civil rights legislation.
The state case cited by the majority does support the conclusion that Estabrook was not deprived of a liberty or property interest. In that case a California Court of Appeal dealt quite briefly with the petitioner’s due process argument. After recognizing two United States Supreme Court decisions holding that due process applies to termination of welfare benefits and eviction from public housing projects, the California court reasoned thus: “In the case at bar the state has not deprived petitioner of anything. It has merely refused to act affirmatively. The availability of judicial relief in a proper case seems adequate protection against arbitrary actions by the commission.” Marshall v. Fair Employment Practice Commission, 21 Cal.App.3d 680, 685, 98 Cal.Rptr. 698, 702 (1971).
I would not follow the reasoning in Marshall. Although the Marshall court found the petitioner was deprived of nothing, and hence could not claim the protection of due process, it went on to recognize that a petitioner who is arbitrarily subjected to action by the commission is entitled to judicial relief — in other words, due process. In effect, the California court concluded that *314due process only applies when individual rights are arbitrarily deprived. I do not believe that to be the law. Due process applies whenever state action “remove[s] or significantly alter[s]” an individual’s liberty or property interests. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 419 (1976).
II. Having concluded that due process applies to Iowa Civil Rights Commission procedure regarding probable cause, I next inquire how much protection due process demands. Strangely, before the employer can be found to have discriminated, quite elaborate administrative hearing proceedings must be taken, § 601A.14(5)-(13), The Code, but after a summary finding of no probable cause, the employee has judicial review with its deference for the administration finding. § 601A.15(1).
The relevant criteria for determining the procedural safeguards required in a given factual situation were set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). The analysis requires consideration of three distinct factors: “first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [state] interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id.
After considering each of these factors, I do not believe that due process requires an “evidentiary hearing” before the commission makes its probable cause determination. Yet under the first factor in the Mathews equation, I take it no one questions that an individual’s right to be free from age discrimination is an important one. See Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Iowa 1971). Moreover, a significant risk of error appears to exist in the commission’s procedure for determining probable cause. In the case before us, that procedure involved a personal interview with Estabrook’s employer and several telephone calls to Esta-brook, but no personal interview of him or information to him regarding the employer’s version of the facts. Estabrook necessarily had to proceed without knowledge of the claimed facts which Goodyear reported to the investigator and without information about the contents of the investigator’s file. A person in Estabrook’s position is proceeding blindly; he does not know what the employer’s contentions are which he must rebut.
By requiring an evidentiary hearing in which the complainant has an opportunity to present evidence and hear and respond to opposing evidence, we would probably reduce the risk of error inherent in the commission’s informal investigatory process. Such a requirement would, however, substantially reduce the speed and simplicity of the proceeding. In establishing the commission’s investigatory and enforcement powers, the legislature apparently intended to create a quick and efficient means of relief for victims of unlawful discrimination. To require the commission to hold an evidentiary hearing on every complaint would severely impair its ability to achieve the legislative objective. Although I consider the due process issue to be close at this point, the state’s strong interest in an expeditious means of processing discrimination complaints outweighs the possible benefits to be derived from a full-blown hearing on every complaint.
Estabrook insisted in district court and insists here that he is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing. Like the majority I conclude he is not. I do believe however that due process is implicated in probable cause determinations. Perhaps a simple disclosure by the investigator would be sufficient, in which he informs the employee and the employer of the other’s version of the facts and gives them an opportunity to respond in their conversations with the investigator. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348, 96 S.Ct. at 909, 47 L.Ed.2d at 41. See also Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas Best-Freight System Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 288, *31595 S.Ct. 438, 443, 42 L.Ed.2d 447, 457 n. 4 (1974): Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 302, 57 S.Ct. 724, 729, 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1100 (1937). But this case does not require delineation of the steps due process mandates.
I concur in the result reached by the majority.
McCORMICK, J., joins in this special concurrence.