I concur in parts I, II, III, and the general factual summary set forth in the majority opinion. However, I respectfully disagree with the analysis of the facts and law in part IV in the context of the doctrine of impossibility of performance and will dissent from that part of the opinion.
“The law never requires impossibilities.” (Civ. Code, § 3531.) Impossibility means not only strict impossibility but also impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss involved. (Oosten v. Hay Haulers etc. Union (1955) 45 Cal.2d 784, 788 [291 P.2d 17].) Consistent with this maxim, the law recognizes exceptions to statutory requirements for impossibility of performance. (People v. Lake County (1867) 33 Cal. 487, 492 [impossibility of performance renders mandatory statutory duty directory only]; County of San Diego v. Milotz (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d Supp. 871, 883-884 [260 P.2d 282]; see 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 15, p. 278 [“[W]here strict compliance with the terms of a statute is impossible, compliance as near as can be has been permitted on the principle that the law does not require impossibilities.”].) More to the point in this case, “it is very generally held that a public body will not be required to do an act when it is impossible through a want of funds and inability to raise them, . . .” (55 C.J.S., Mandamus, § 14, p. 39.)
Thus, in Sutro Heights Land Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist. (1931) 211 Cal. 670 [296 P. 1088], a landowner within the irrigation district’s boundaries sought to compel the district to perform its statutory duty to furnish drainage to *305the landowner’s property. The court held that, under the circumstances presented, equity would prevent the mandate from issuing. The court noted that if the plaintiff were entitled to a mandatory injunction requiring the district to drain its land, then all other landowners in the district would seek to enforce their rights as well. “The evidence shows that the district is in no position to meet the cost of such extensive additions to its present drainage system. ... To compel the district to immediately install the facilities and works necessary to drain all the land in the district requiring drainage would bring financial ruin upon the district and irreparable injury to the land owners in the district, including the plaintiffs. We do not believe that, under this state of facts, it was ever intended by those responsible for the enactment of the Drainage Act of 1907, that an irrigation district, situated as is the defendant in this action, should be compelled to work its own destruction by undertaking to provide drainage facilities for the district, the expense of which is beyond its financial ability to meet or pay for. In fact, before a writ of mandate will issue to compel a public corporation or agency to perform an act involving the expenditure of money, it must affirmatively appear that there are funds available for that purpose.” (Id., at pp. 703-704; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Ross (1964) 61 Cal.2d 199, 209 [37 Cal.Rptr. 425 [390 P.2d 193] [“mandate does not lie to compel a public officer to authorize expenditures when the proper funds are lacking”].)
Admittedly, this is not an action for writ of mandate seeking to compel Butte County (County) to perform its statutory duty to fund a portion of aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) grants in that county. Nonetheless, the principle stated is an equitable one (Sutro Heights, supra, 211 Cal. at pp. 704-705), and injunctive relief is an equitable remedy (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Provisional Remedies, § 240, p. 209). If, as a matter of equity, impossibility of performance would be a defense to a petition for writ of mandate by the state against the County, I see no reason the County may not make a preemptive strike by seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute in the first instance.
In similar fashion, there is no principled reason why the County should not be permitted to enjoin enforcement of the statutory funding scheme for AFDC in that County for financial inability to comply when financial inability would be a defense to an action against the County’s Board of Supervisors (Board) for contempt should it have refused to comply. Thus, in Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899 [141 Cal.Rptr. 133 [569 P.2d 727], the Board of Supervisors of Plumas County was found guilty of contempt for refusing to pay certain welfare benefits as ordered by the Department of Benefit Payments (now the Department of Social Services [Department]). The court affirmed the judgment, reasoning, in part, that the unchallenged evidence established beyond question that Plumas County *306had the financial ability to comply with the order. (Id., at p. 916.) Impossibility of performance is a defense to an action for contempt. (Nutter v. Superior Court (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 72, 75 [6 Cal.Rptr. 404].)
I recognize that an injunction may not be granted “[t]o prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, 2d subd. 4.) The rule is subject to exception, however. Thus enforcement of a public statute may be enjoined when it is unconstitutional on its face or unconstitutionally applied, when it does not cover the plaintiff’s activities, or when the public official’s action exceeds his power. (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Provisional Remedies, supra, § 272, pp. 234-235.) In light of the equitable nature of the remedy, I believe the exceptions to the rule stated should be extended to permit enjoining the execution of a public statute in a situation that factually would be contrary to established principles of equity.
I also acknowledge that, in the context of the state-mandated general assistance program (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 17000 et seq.), it has been consistently held that state law imposes upon local government “a mandatory duty to relieve and support its indigents, and the excuse that it cannot afford to do so is unavailing.” (City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 44, 47 [128 Cal.Rptr. 712]; Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 217 [211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695]; Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 680 [94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231]; Nelson v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 25, 32 [235 Cal.Rptr. 305]; Clay v. Tryk (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 119, 125 [222 Cal.Rptr. 729]; Boehm v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 494, 503 [223 Cal.Rptr. 716]; Boehm v. County of Merced (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 447, 451 [209 Cal.Rptr. 530]; Rogers v. Detrich (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 90, 103 [128 Cal.Rptr. 261].) The rule is premised, however, on the fact that “the county retains extensive authority to establish standards for General Assistance, both as to eligibility and as to amount of aid. In view of this discretion, the county can surely find many ways which do not violate state statute in which it can limit General Assistance payments to the financial resources available.” (Mooney v. Pickett, supra, at p. 680; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 17001.) In contrast, under the AFDC program, the counties have no discretion as to eligibility and as to amount of aid. In that respect, the cited cases are distinguishable, and I would conclude the rule would not be applicable here. Moreover, the cited cases have not considered the rule in the context of the maxim that the law never requires impossibilities.
Finally, I acknowledge that, even in the context of AFDC, it has been held that counties, as agents of the state, are bound to comply with state statute and that relief from state mandates must come from the Legislature *307and not from the courts. (See Ross v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 908-909 & fn. 6; see also Jensen v. McCullough (1928) 94 Cal.App. 382, 394 [271 P. 568] [“In the absence of some limitation on the power of the legislature, there is no sound reason why the entire burden of the care and maintenance of [the indigent, the orphans and half-orphans, the blind, the insane, the feeble-minded, the juvenile delinquents, the criminal and other dependent persons] could not be placed upon the political subdivisions of the state. (Sacramento v. Chambers [1917] 33 Cal. App. 142, 145 [164 Pac. 613].) If, therefore, in the wisdom of the legislature a portion of this burden is ordered to be borne by the political subdivisions and a portion by the state as a whole, the legislature is acting within its power, and the question of the wisdom of the action is, of course, not one for the courts to determine.”].) However, the duty of a county to support the indigent presupposes the county’s power and authority to raise the funds with which to do so. (See San Francisco v. Collins (1932) 216 Cal. 187, 190-191 [13 P.2d 912]; cf. May v. Board of Directors (1949) 34 Cal.2d 125, 131 [208 P.2d 661] [the power to tax is “the very essence” of municipal bond obligations].) Therein lies the problem I see. By article XIII A of the California Constitution (Prop. 13), the state has significantly limited the power of local government to raise revenues, creating over a period of time an impossible situation—local government has been rendered incapable of keeping pace with increasingly rising costs for state-mandated programs. I see no reason why, in the wake of Proposition 13, the duty of local government to comply with state mandates must remain so hard and inflexible. “When the reason for a rule ceases, so should the rule itself.” (Civ. Code, § 3510.) Accordingly, when it can be shown that a local government’s compliance with a state mandate is financially impossible of performance, a court of equity may intervene to provide relief.
With this in mind, I examine the County’s likelihood of success on the merits at trial. The uncontroverted evidence adduced at the hearing below disclosed that Butte County is on the verge of bankruptcy because of state-mandated programs, in particular the AFDC program. County has the lowest tax base in the state, with the consequence that per capita general purpose revenues in the county are $139, compared to the statewide average of $268. State-mandated expenses are rising considerably faster than the County’s revenues, with the result that essential local services must be curtailed. Butte County has “the worst level of [police] protection in any county in California.” And by 1993, it is estimated that state-mandated expenses will consume the entire county budget. On these facts, I do not perceive an abuse of discretion in ruling that the County will likely succeed on the merits at trial.
For the same reason I believe the County is likely to succeed on the merits, the County would suffer more harm should the injunction not issue *308than would the state should it issue. Indeed, the state made no showing in this respect. The only apparent consequence of issuance of the injunction is that the state will have to opt out of the AFDC program (a politically unlikely possibility) or that the state will have to pick up the County’s 5.4 percent share of AFDC funding. The Department made no showing that this would be any hardship; its only argument against the injunction was that the Board had no legal theory on which it could issue.
I conclude that the issuance of the preliminary injunction in this case is supported by equitable principles established by decisional authority. The relief if granted, however, must be limited to enjoining the Department from requiring the County to contribute 5.4 percent increase of the cost for AFDC grants in the County. To extend the injunction to mandate the state to supply that 5.4 percent share would pose a severe separation of powers problem. The courts may not mandate the Legislature to appropriate money for specific purposes. (See City of Sacramento v. California State Legislature (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 393 [231 Cal.Rptr. 686].)
Additionally, and I believe more importantly, I would affirm the issuance of the preliminary injunction against a requirement that County fund any increases in the AFDC program required after November 6, 1979, as a violation of the provisions of article XIII B, section 6. Article XIII B, section 6, was enacted on that date and provides, “Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any local government, the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of such program or increased level of service, except that the Legislature may, but need not, provide such subvention of funds for the following mandates: [¶] (a) Legislative mandates requested by the local agency affected; [¶] (b) Legislation defining a new crime or changing an existing definition of a crime; or [¶] (c) Legislative mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or executive orders or regulations initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January 1, 1975.”
It appears obvious to me that the state requirement that the County fund the increase in AFDC mandated by the state is a program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6; under the constitutional restraints the state may not shift the burden of such program funding to the County.
The term “program” in the constitutional context has a dual meaning. One encompasses programs that carry out the government function of providing services to the public, in this instance AFDC. The second are laws that implement state-mandated policy and impose unique requirements on local governments and do not apply generally to all residents in the state. Either finding will trigger the reimbursement requirement. In this case, the *309increase in funding of the AFDC program mandated by the state after 1979 met both requirements.
The application of article XIII B, section 6, does not relate to when the program was established but when the increased funding of the program was made an obligation of the County. I would conclude the obligation to fund any increases in AFDC programs after 1979 is one of the state rather than the County.
I would reverse the preliminary injunction to the extent it would require the state to fund Butte County’s share of the County’s AFDC program, but would affirm it to the extent it preliminarily forbids the state from requiring Butte County to increase its contribution to the AFDC program in that county and remand the matter for further appropriate proceedings in the trial court.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 30, 1990, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Evans, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The petition of respondent Board of Supervisors of Butte County for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 27, 1990.