(dissenting.) This action brought by the plaintiff to recover for personal injuries incurred while he was at a municipal garbage dump operated by the City of East Tawas raises two questions. First, pursuant to. Article 4, § 24 of the Michigan Constitution, restricting an act of the legislature to the scope of its title, should § 7 of the governmental immunity statute, which grants immunity to governmental agencies for all tort liability when engaged in governmental functions,1 be reduced to the scope of the act’s title which says the act grants immunity to governmental agencies for injuries to persons or property caused by negligence2 or should § 7 be held unconstitutional in toto ? *162Second, if § 7 is held to mean only torts caused by negligence, is a nuisance in the manner of the operation of a municipal dump within the scope of governmental immunity for such negligent torts or does the nuisance label take it outside the reach of immunity for injuries to persons caused by negligence?
I
Article 4, § 24 of the Michigan Constitution states: “No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.” There is no question that § 7 embraces an object not expressed in its title in violation of Article 4, § 24. The term “tort” contained in § 7 is clearly broader in scope than the term “negligence” embodied in the title of the act for, as the Court of Appeals and the trial judge noted, tort includes intentional torts and strict liability torts as well as those based on negligence.
The difficult problem is whether the term “tort” in § 7 should be construed narrowly to mean only torts caused by negligence so that it is no broader in scope than the title of the act.
It is important to note that we are not dealing with the common-law rule of immunity which is a judge-made rule. Here, we have a statute to construe and it is incumbent upon us as to sustain the statute’s constitutionality by construction of the language to preserve the intent the legislature manifested in enacting the statute if that can properly be done.
*163When this Court has been confronted on other occasions with the situation of a statutory provision exceeding the scope of its title, we have adopted a narrow construction of the statute to preserve the statute’s constitutionality. Scott v. Alsar Company (1953), 336 Mich 532 where the workmen’s compensation act was construed as not applying to independent contractors; Arnold v. Ogle Construction Company (1952), 333 Mich 652 where a certain provision of the workmen’s compensation act was construed to refer only to accidental injuries to conform to the scope of the title; State Mutual Rodded Fire Insurance Co. v. Foster (1934), 267 Mich 118 where the part of an act dealing with sureties was held unconstitutional since the title made no reference to sureties; and Booth v. Eddy (1878), 38 Mich 245 where the term “assignees” was construed narrowly to conform to the scope of the title. See also MacLean v. State Board of Control for Vocational Education (1940), 294 Mich 45; and People v. Smith (1929), 246 Mich 393.
What, in effect, these precedents say is that we must follow the rule of partial invalidity by construing an act’s provisions narrowly to conform to the title where such construction works to fulfill legislative intent. The language of Arnold v. Ogle Construction Company, supra, 663, 664 is particularly illuminating on this point:
“ * * * The application of such rule requires that the provisions of part 2 of the workmen’s compensation law, in question here, * * * shall be interpreted as within the scope of the title and not repugnant thereto, and consequently as permitting the payment of compensation for disability resulting from accidental injuries only. If the legislature in the enactment of said amendments had intended such drastic change in part 2, as is now claimed was *164made, I think that such purpose would have been expressed in clear and unequivocal terms by an affirmative statement to that effect. Likewise the reference to ‘accidental injury’ would have been deleted from the title. The omission of such action furnishes cogent proof that it was not the purpose of the legislature to strike from part 2 the requirement that disability of an employee should not be compensable thereunder unless caused by an accidental injury only * * * .”
It is appropriate to inquire here whether reading § 7 as giving immunity for negligent torts carries out the legislative intent. The background leading up to the enactment of the statute here in question clearly indicates that the legislature desired to restore immunity for municipalities in the performance of governmental functions.3 Torts arising out *165of negligence are certainly the most common type of tort. Whether the legislature wanted to give immunity for torts based on strict liability or intentional conduct is unclear, but what is clear is that they certainly wanted governmental immunity for that which is headnoted in the title, namely torts arising out of negligent conduct. To declare § 7 null and void in its entirety would judicially defeat this obvious legislative purpose. Therefore, we apply the rule of partial invalidity and hold that the term “tort” in § 7 shall be construed to refer to torts caused by negligent conduct.
In so doing we pay heed to the spirit of the statutory rule on severability which states:
“If any portion of an act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall be found to *166be invalid by a court, sucb invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid portion or application * * * .” (MCLA § 8.5 [Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 2.216].)
II.
The next question is whether the jury’s finding that the defendant maintained a nuisance in the manner of operation of its municipal dump places the City of East Tawas outside of the scope of immunity for negligent torts which occur during the performance of a governmental function.
Nuisance is a judge-made exception from the common-law rule of governmental immunity. The statute here in question does not alter the liability of governmental agencies for nuisance. This conclusion is based upon the following language of § 7:
“Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying * * * the immunity of the state * * * as it existed heretofore * * * .”
In Denny v. Garavaglia (1952), 333 Mich 317, 331, this Court classified nuisances resulting in personal injury into three classes. The first class consists of nuisances based on illegal conduct; the second class involves nuisances based on conduct intended to bring about conditions which are in fact a nuisance; and the third class comprises nuisances based on negligent conduct. Since the jury found that there was no intentional nuisance4 and since the City of East *167Tawas broke no laws in maintaining its dump, what we have here where the jury found a nuisance in the manner of operation is a nuisance arising out of negligent conduct.
Our Court has had the opportunity to illuminate the relationship between nuisance and negligence in a series of cases where we have held that contributory negligence is a good defense to nuisances based on negligent conduct but not for the other two classes of nuisances. Denny v. Garavaglia, supra; Dahl v. Glover (1956), 344 Mich 639; Young v. Groenendal (1969), 382 Mich 456; and Awad v. McColgan (1959), 357 Mich 386.
In our most recent opinion on the subject of the nuisance exception from governmental immunity, Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Company v. Michigan (1970), 383 Mich 630, 635, Justice Adams, writing for a unanimous Court, wrote:
“The Royston, Denny, Dahl and Young cases involved claims for personal injuries and are within that class of cases described as nuisance having its origin in negligence and as to which contributory negligence is a defense.”
Buckeye itself, however, did not involve a nuisance based on negligent conduct. Rather the nuisance was a “condition” (p 636), an old, open, dilapidated and unoccupied building which was a fire hazard, declared dangerous and ordered demolished by the city. Any negligence involved was strictly incidental and this Court denied immunity to the state, which had acquired the property by tax sale (p 638).
The distinction between Buckeye and Maki was clearly indicated by Justice Adams in speaking as follows of Buckeye:
*168“Negligence, which is antecedent to and responsible for the nuisance, is not our concern here even though the nuisance in this case may have been created by negligent acts.” (p 635.)
In Maki the jury specially and specifically found that the nuisance was in the “manner of operation,” or in other words nuisance based on negligent operation. Presumably this had reference to nuisance based on one or more of such things as no restrictions on dumping of live ammunition, lighting trash fires during dumping hours, or allowing people to wander about the entire dumping area. In other words, in Buckeye there was no way to get rid of the nuisance, which was a condition, except to abolish the building, whereas in Maki the jury verdict implied that the dump if properly “operated” would not be a nuisance.
When a nuisance based on negligent conduct is at issue, our Court has treated the action as a negligence action. In our latest opinion on the matter, Young v. Groenendal, supra, 461, 462, Justice Dethmers wrote:
“A problem of labels is involved. Can denominating defendants’ action or inaction a nuisance, rather than negligence, change the law as to availability of the defense of contributory negligence, or will the court peer through the label to the nature of the causes of the damage to determine the question? We think the latter is and should be the prevailing rule.”
If we failed to peer through the label and treated a nuisance based on negligent conduct as a separate cause of action for which there was no governmental immunity, we would make the statutory rule of immunity for negligent torts a nullity since plaintiffs would simply cast any negligence action in the *169form of a nuisance based on negligent conduct and thus avoid governmental immunity.
By finding that a nuisance based on negligent conduct does not escape the immunity provision of § 7, we do not terminate the nuisance exception from the immunity rule. Nuisances which are based on intentional conduct, illegal conduct or conduct, such as that characterized as ultrahazardous, for which strict liability in tort is imposed, constitute a class of nuisances for which there is no governmental tort immunity.
Arguably, the plaintiff could still hold the City of East Tawas liable on the theory that operating a municipal garbage dump is a proprietary function. The immunity statute defines a proprietary function narrowly as “any activity conducted primarily for profit.” Although the City of East Tawas charges non-residents a fee to use the dump, quite clearly the primary purpose for the dump is a health and safety one of providing residents a place to dispose of their garbage and trash. Moreover, a pre-governmental immunity statute case, Curry v. Highland Park (1928), 242 Mich 614, found that maintaining a garbage dump was a governmental function.
III.
On the facts of this case we find that the plaintiff, Leo Maki, is barred from suing the City of East Tawas by virtue of § 7’s immunity provision. In finding that a nuisance in the manner of operation of a municipal dump is a nuisance based on the absence of reasonable care which comes within the scope of § 7’s immunity for negligent torts occurring in the performance of a governmental function, let it not be inferred that this Court is biased either way on governmental tort immunity. This is a case *170where the legislature has spoken in an area where it properly has jurisdiction and the legislative intention should prevail.
T. E. Brennan, J., concurred with Williams, J.The governmental immunity statute, PA 1964, No 170, § 7 (MCLA § 691.1407; Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 3.996[107]) states:
“Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein said government agency is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is hereby affirmed.” (Emphasis added.)
The title of the governmental immunity statute, PA 1964, No 170 (MCLA § T-691.1401; Stat Ann 1968 Rev § T-3.996[101]) reads:
“An act to make uniform the liability of municipal corporations, political subdivisions, and the state, its agencies and departments, when engaged in a governmental function, for injuries to property and persons caused by negligence; to define and limit such liability; *162to define and limit the liability of the state when engaged in a proprietary function; to authorize the purchase of liability insurance to protect against loss arising out of such liability; to provide for defending certain claims made against public officers and paying damages sought or awarded against them; and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.” (Emphasis added.)
In Williams v. Detroit (1931), 364 Mich 231, this Court abolished the common-law rule of governmental immunity for “municipal corporations”. Prior to Williams the law provided almost complete immunity for all levels and agencies of state and local government while engaged in governmental functions. Judge-made exceptions from the immunity rule existed where a governmental body engaged in a proprietary function, maintained a nuisance or caused a direct trespasser act in connection with the construction or maintenance of public works. By legislation there were also exceptions for injuries resulting from defective maintenance of public roads and from negligent operation of autos and airplanes.
Baum, Governmental Immunity in Michigan, 44 Michigan State Bar Journal (May 1965) 37, 38, 39. The author, Judge Baum, is a Wayne County Circuit Judge and was the trial judge in Williams v. Detroit (1961), 364 Mich 231.
Williams was part of a general trend of decisions across the country abolishing common-law governmental immunity for tort. (Prosser, Torts [3d ed], § 125, pp 1012, 1013.) Due to the broad tenor of the no immunity language in Williams and, no doubt, because of the nationwide trend against governmental immunity in which some state courts terminated immunity for all levels and branches of state government, the question in the cases following Williams was whether the scope of the no immunity rule would be broadened. In McDowell v. State Highway Commissioner (1961), 365 Mich 268 this Court held a person injured because of the defective condition of a state highway could not sue the State Highway Department since the legislature in allowing suits against lower levels of government in such circumstances had manifested an intention to continue immunity for state government and its agents. In Sayers v. School District No. 1, Fractional (1962), 366 Mich 217, this Court held that school dis*165tricts were immune from tort liability. In Lewis v. Genesee County (1963), 370 Mich 110, this Court held that both Genesee County and the Genesee County Board of Social Welfare which operated a hospital were agents and instrumentalities of state government and thus immune from liability for the negligent acts of the hospital employees.
In contrast to this narrow reading of the term “municipal corporation,” this Court expanded the judge-made exception of proprietary function. In Munson v. County of Menominee (1963), 371 Mich 504, we held that in leasing space to the state, a county was engaged in a proprietary function, and, as such was liable for negligently maintaining the space. In Carlisi v. City of Marysville (1964), 373 Mich 198, a city was liable for the drowning of two children by negligently failing to post no swimming signs by its water filtration plant on the ground that a water filtration plant is a proprietary function.
Then in 1965 this Court shifted ground in Myers v. Genesee County Auditor (1965), 375 Mich 1 and expanded the Williams umbrella to include counties, townships and villages. It was at this time and against this background that the legislature stepped in and enacted the statute at issue in the case before us today in an attempt to make uniform the tort liability of state and local governmental agencies. The statute did three important things. It established immunity for all state and local governments engaged in governmental functions thus restoring immunity to municipal corporations; it created exceptions for three types of activities namely defective maintenance of roads, negligent operation of motor vehicles and defective maintenance of public buildings (which was the situation in Williams); and third it adopted the judge-made rule of no immunity when a government is engaged in a proprietary function but defined proprietary narrowly as “any activity conducted primarily for profit”.
At one time garbage disposal areas were held to be per se nuisances but these cases all involved “piggeries” inundating neighboring lands with offensive odors. A piggery is a method of disposing of garbage by feeding the garbage to pigs. Trowbridge v. City of Lansing (1927), 237 Mich 402; Albaugh v. Abbott (1931), 253 Mich 588; and see Kobs v. Zehnder (1949), 326 Mich 202. Garbage disposal areas other than piggeries are not per se nuisances but instead *167are nuisances only if they are unreasonable in the light of surrounding land use and manner of operation. Smith v. Ann Arbor (1942), 303 Mich 476.