The plaintiff-appellee Judith M. Clark filed a false arrest and malicious prosecution cause of action against the defendant-appellant Kroger Food Stores, Inc. After a bench trial, Clark was awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $88,525.80, and punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000. Kroger appeals from that judgment. We affirm.
Kroger argues three issues1:
1. whether the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as to lack of probable cause are erroneous as a matter of law;
2. whether the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the pri-ma facie presumption of probable cause afforded Kroger had been rebutted, are erroneous as a matter of law; and,
3. whether the record supports by clear and convincing evidence the trial court's conclusions that Kroger engaged in a "witch hunt", a "vendetta", a "single-minded attack", and "conspiracy" against Judy Clark so as to justify an award of $1,000,000 in punitive damages?
Clark, who was hired by Kroger in 1974 as a cashier, had worked at several Kroger stores during her fourteen-year tenure, the most recent being the Kroger store in Monticello. As an "old contract" employee, she received twice as much pay and substantially better benefits than cashiers hired at a later date. Clark had a history of medi-eal problems which required that she take leaves of absence from work, caused her to be disfigured, and ultimately led to a pronouncement by the Social Security Administration that she was disabled.
In late 1987, Kroger commenced one of its "K-card" promotions. Each week that a customer purchased $15 in groceries his or her card would be appropriately marked. If the customer had the card marked for seventeen or more weeks out of a twenty-week period the card could be redeemed for $25 worth of groceries. Although the Kroger company instructed its participating stores that K-card exchanges were to be recorded separately from the rest of a transaction as cash, these instructions were never passed on to the Monticello cashiers by head cashier, Andrea Dubes.
Clark, as well as other cashiers, frequently filled in the name and address seetion of the card for customers until a memorandum prepared by Dubes and circulated by store manager, Jim Slavens, prohibited that practice and required the customers to fill in the address portion of the card themselves. Slavens instituted the policy well into the promotion, after the redemption period had begun, about the same time that Dubes began to actively investigate her suspicions that Clark had been exchanging counterfeit K-cards for cash.
Dubes suspected Clark of theft because Clark had turned in K-cards which did not appear to Dubes, and Kroger management, to be worn," appeared to be folded in the same place, and bore a Kroger stamp which appeared to be fading over successive weeks. In early January, 1988, at the suggestion of risk management, Clark's cash drawer was isolated and Dubes required the cashiers to list each check, K-*1087card, and exchange of food stamps separately. Clark's drawer was never short and the number of K-cards she submitted matched her pick-up slip. Dubes examined the register-generated detail tape from Clark's register, which showed the amount of each transaction and whether the customer paid by cash or check (the only two options available). Dubes found several transactions which she could "safely" say involved K-card transactions but for a number of consecutive days, could not identify the appropriate number of transactions in which K-cards could be said to have been exchanged. Dubes concluded that the detail tapes supported her suspicion that Clark had been stealing.
Dubes was the only person on behalf of Kroger or the State to examine the entire detail tape. She related her findings to store management and the store's investigators, who had no independent understanding of the tape. Dubes examined only one other employee's detail tape. That employee rang in all of her K-card transactions as Kroger management had expected. White County Deputy Sheriff Ron Clark, a part-time security officer, watched Clark through binoculars from an upstairs office as did the store's managers. This occurred over a five or six week period, but none saw Clark remove money from the cash register. Dubes also checked the names and addresses listed on some of the K-cards and found several discrepancies.
Clark denied the alleged theft but was never given an opportunity to explain to any of her supervisors. She was tried of theft and acquitted.
When the trial judge enters extensive findings of fact in support of the judgment as was done here, this court applies a two-tiered standard of review which involves first determining whether evidence supports the findings and then determining whether the findings support the judgment. W & W Equipment Co. v. Mink (1991), Ind.App., 568 N.E.2d 564, 569, trans. denied. The findings and judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. In determining whether the findings and judgment are clearly erroneous, this court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. In making the determination of whether the findings and judgment are clearly erroneous we will only consider the evidence in the record which supports the' judgment along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. Finally, we will disturb the trial court's findings only if the record is devoid of facts or inferences to support the findings. Id.
I.
In a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant instituted, or caused to be instituted, a prosecution against the plaintiff, 2) the defendant acted maliciously in doing so, 83) the prosecution was instituted without probable cause, and 4) the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff's favor. Johnson County REMC v. Burnell (1985), Ind.App., 484 N.E.2d 989; K Mart Corp. v. Brzezinski (1989), Ind.App., 540 N.E.2d 1276, trans. denied. Kroger challenges the trial court's conclusion that its conduct was malicious. It concedes that malice may be inferred from a total lack of probable cause, Board of Commissioners of Hendricks County v. King (1985), Ind.App., 481 N.E.2d 1327, 1329, but argues that the trial court's finding there was no probable cause to arrest and charge Clark is not supported by the evidence and is clearly erroneous as a matter of law.
The trial court's factual findings include two findings that Dubes and Kroger had no probable cause to believe that Clark had committed a criminal act. Another finding states that reasonable inquiry would not have induced any person to believe that Clark had committed the crime of theft. The trial court's finding Number 24, which Kroger specifically attacks states:
Andrea Dubes believed that [Clark's] detail tapes did not evidence the number of K-cards turned in (as redeemed) by [Clark] with her corresponding pick-up sheets. The basis for her belief was that K-cards redeemed were to be isolated on the detail tapes as independent cash *1088items. This belief is totally rebutted by the testimony of [Clark] and of [Kroger's] witnesses Sharon Quisenberry (who testified she rang up redeemed K-cards as straight cash), Andrea Dubes (who admitted there was no posted policy regarding how to ring up redeemed K-cards and that she never asked [Clark] or any other cashier how redeemed K-cards were being rung up), and Margaret (Meg) Harmon (who testified there was no posted policy).
The trial court also found in finding 26: Given that redeemed K-cards were rung up as straight cash items by cashiers, including [Clark], and that there was no posted policy prohibiting same, Andrea Dubes' suspicions regarding detail tape pick-up sheet "inconsistencies" do not rise to the level of probable cause. They do not rise to the level of reasonable belief. They rise only to the level of ignorance or vendetta.
These factual findings are plainly supported by the record. (R. 957, 959, 1098, 1141, 1148). Indeed, co-manager Meg Harmon testified that it was "probable" a straight cash transaction on Clark's detail tape was a K-card transaction.
Probable cause to commence criminal proceedings exists when a reasonable inquiry would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that the accused committed the crime charged. King, 481 N.E.2d at 1329; McQueen v. City of Indianapolis (1980), Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 138, 140. It exists when, from an apparent state of facts, a reasonably intelligent and prudent person would be induced to act as did the person who is charged with the burden of having probable cause to act. Satz v. Koplow (1979), Ind.App., 397 N.E.2d 1082, 1084-85.
Andrea Dubes conceded that she had never instructed the cashiers under her charge on how she expected them to record K-card transactions. She admitted that a K-card transaction could appear on the register tape in a variety of different ways and the only transactions she identified for investigators as K-card transactions were those she could "safely" say were indeed K-card transactions. Had Dubes inquired of her cashiers and in particular, Clark, she would have discovered that the cashiers were not using any single method of registering the transaction. Had any of Kroger's "risk management'" employees inquired of the other cashiers, independently reviewed Clark's detail tapes for an alternative explanation, or compared the detail tapes of the other registers, they too would have discovered that the register tapes did not evince a theft. To continue to maintain the belief that an employee had engaged in theft in the face of a simple and "probable" explanation which is readily discoverable and without some evidence that anything had ever been taken is simply not objectively reasonable. Cf. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Anderson (1984), Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 1249, trans. denied.
Kroger also takes issue with the trial court's conclusion that the efforts of their investigators added nothing, characterizing this finding as "absurd." In fact, the record establishes that other than interview Clark, check on some of the addresses written on the cards, and watch Clark for a period of time, Kroger's investigators did nothing other than retrace the steps taken by Dubes. Although Kroger's investigators examined the register tapes, pick-up slips, and cards, they relied entirely on Dubes' explanation of the register tapes without independently attempting to verify her reading of them. As a consequence, their "review" of the documentation did nothing to substantiate Dubes' suspicions. The admission obtained by investigators from Clark that she may have improperly rung up K-card transactions is at best an indication that she violated store policy, which it turns out had never been communicated to the cashiers by Dubes. Kroger concedes that its surveillance of Clark proved fruitless. Its efforts to match Clark's handwriting with the handwriting on some of the cards proved nothing because cashiers were permitted to write in names and addresses for their customers.
Kroger points to the cards themselves and the qualities which its employee *1089identified as indicative of fraud as a basis for concluding that its belief in Clark's guilt was reasonable. In particular, Kroger challenges the evidentiary support for the trial court's finding number 17, that "... Dubes looked at other cashier's K-cards and found some having the same features as Plaintiff's K-cards; however, she focused her suspicion/attention on only Plaintiff." The second portion of this compound finding is amply supported by Dubes' own testimony. However, in our review of the record, we have been unable to find testimony to the effect that Dubes found other cashier's cards with similar features. To the contrary, on two occa sions Dubes testified that she looked at other cashier's cards and did not find cards with similar features. (R. 774, 983-84).
Even so, the inaccuracy contained in this finding does not render the trial court's judgment clearly erroneous. The cards which aroused Dubes' suspicions were never introduced into evidence; they were all turned in by Clark before she was alleged to have stolen from Kroger. Indeed, Dubes testified at the criminal trial that the cards which initially aroused her suspi-clon were turned in by Clark during an earlier promotion, that she kept holding the cards "hoping something would come up," and suspected Clark "from the very beginning." Presumably, Kroger did not introduce the suspicious cards because it could not identify them or no longer had them. Be that as it may, having failed to produce the cards themselves, Dubes' own subjective interpretation of them is not objective evidence of Kroger's reasonable belief in Clark's guilt. The fact remains, as the trial court found, that Dubes singled out Clark. Kroger never developed probable cause. This finding is supported by the other evidence of record and the trial court's other findings.
Finally, in passing, we note that the element of malice may be inferred from a total lack of probable cause, from the failure to make a reasonable or suitable inquiry, and from a showing of personal animosity. F.W. Woolworth, 471 N.E.2d 1249, 1254. The facts, as found by the trial court and established at trial, show a course of conduct designed to implicate Clark in disregard of the objective cireum-stances which would have manifested themselves had a suitable investigation been undertaken. Despite Dubes' denials of animosity toward Clark there is also evidence in the record that Clark had reported Dubes to union officials and that Dubes resented Clark as a consequence.
IL.
Kroger maintains that the trial court's finding, that Clark had rebutted the prima facie presumption of probable cause in its favor, is clearly erroneous. While a judicial determination of probable cause in a criminal proceeding may constitute prima facie evidence of probable cause in a subsequent action for malicious prosecution, that evidence may be rebutted by other evidence showing that the finding of probable cause was induced by false testimony, fraud, or other improper means such as the withholding of material facts. Lazarus Dept. Store v. Sutherlin (1989), Ind.App., 544 N.E.2d 513, 520, trans. denied; Johnson County REMC, 484 N.E.2d at 992.3
*1090The record reflects that the probable cause determination was based solely upon the affidavit of part time Kroger investigator and White County Deputy Sheriff Ron Clark without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. In three paragraphs, the affiant swears that he was personally informed by Gene Tomey (another part time Kroger "risk management" employee and police officer) that Clark exerted unauthorized control over currency belonging to Kroger by "falsifying Kroger's Christmas Club Cards and redeeming them for U.S. currency;" that this information was credible because Tomey "spoke with personal knowledge and the investigation uncovered facts which support his statement;" and that Tomey was reliable and credible because Tomey "spoke with personal knowledge and the investigation uncovered facts which support his statement."
Apart from the fact that the affidavit on its face fails to specifically set forth the facts constituting the affiant's belief in his assertion of probable cause, the veracity of his informant and the basis of the informant's knowledge, or contain the corroborating circumstances gained from independent investigation which might provide an objective basis for evaluating the totality of the information contained in the application for the warrant, the affidavit contains the blatant misrepresentation that Gene Tomey had personal knowledge of the circumstances averred in the affidavit and that his investigation had uncovered facts which support the assertion made in the affidavit. At no time did Gene Tomey, or anyone else, ever observe Clark falsify K-cards or take cash. Tomey's knowledge of Clark's purported theft was gained solely from other Kroger employees, not from his own firsthand observations or from facts uncovered during his investigation. As we have already discussed above, neither Clark nor Tomey contributed any evidence of value from their "investigations." The trial court clearly did not err in its conclusion that Clark had successfully rebutted Kroger's prima facie case which relied upon judicial process.
III.
Kroger also argues that a reasonable trier of fact could not have found conduct supporting punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, Kroger challenges the trial court's findings that it had engaged in a "witch-hunt," a "single-minded attack," a "conspiracy" and had "a vendetta" against Clark. Kroger contends that the evidence showed only negligence or noniniquitous human failing.
We have already recited the evidence which supports the trial court's description of Kroger's actions. Kroger knew that K-card fraud was occurring but focused all of its attention on a single person, Clark. The individual entrusted with primary responsibility for investigating Clark was Dubes, another union employee, which the evidence discloses had reason to dislike Clark because Clark had reported Dubes, on more than one occasion, to union officials *1091for having violated union work rules. Dubes expressed her resentment of Clark to another employee, indicating that she would "pull [Clark's] hair out." Dubes testified at both the civil and criminal trials that she set out to prove that Clark had done something wrong when the promotion began.
We reiterate that the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a punitive damage award does not differ from any other sufficiency of the evidence question. We will affirm a judgment of punitive damages if, considering only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting it, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could find such damages proven by clear and convincing evidence. Bud Wolf Chevrolet, Inc. v. Robertson (1988), Ind., 519 N.E.2d 135, 137. If it can be said that either of two conclusions can be reasonably drawn from the evidence, it is immaterial, upon appeal, that one of such conclusions appears to be more likely than the other. We are bound by the finding of the trier of fact. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1019, 1022. Hence, it matters not whether we would have also concluded that Kroger's managerial employees engaged in a conspiracy with Dubes. A reasonable person could conclude from the evidence of Kroger management's frustration with Clark's frequent absences and the financial efficacy of replacing Clark, that Kroger employees conspired to prove Clark guilty of theft.
We have also already found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of malice. However, punitive damages may also be awarded upon evidence that Kroger consciously and intentionally engaged in misconduct which, under the existing conditions, it knew would probably result in injury to Clark. Id. at 1023; Bud Wolf Chevrolet, 519 N.E.2d at 187. Kroger employee Dubes knew of Clark's health problems, disfigurement, and the damage termination and prosecution for theft would do to Clark's reputation as a trustworthy employee and cashier. She also knew Kroger could replace Clark at substantially less cost to the company. Nevertheless, Dubes set out to prove Clark had done something wrong. While some of Kroger's employees may have only acted negligently in relying upon Dubes' interpretation of the evidence, Dubes' actions were not merely negligent. The trial court did not err in awarding punitive damages on this evidence.
Judgment affirmed.
BAKER, J., concurs. SULLIVAN, J., dissents with separate opinion.. Kroger states a fourth issue, namely, whether the rebuttable presumption that Kroger's actions even if tortious were not wicked precludes an award of punitive damages; however, Kroger does not argue this issue independently of its third issue which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the award. Accordingly, we will not undertake a separate discussion of the fourth issue either.
. The dissent makes the assertion, on page six infra, that "[aln examination of the evidence ... clearly shows that the finding of probable cause for the criminal prosecution was not based upon bare allegations by Kroger employees which were ultimately proven to be contrived or untruthful ..." The author also "assumes" that the judge who made the probable cause finding was a reasonably intelligent and prudent person.
We obviously have no quarrel with the proposition that the judge who made the probable cause determination is a reasonably intelligent and prudent person; the problem lies in making an assumption rather than reviewing the determination which was made. Ultimately, the question for the trial judge in this civil action was the weight to be assessed the earlier determination of probable cause, and in resolving that question, the trial court must have inquired whether, under the circumstances of this case, a determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable. Applying the appropriate standard of review, the evidence most favorable to the judgment (indeed, the only evidence of record concerning the evidence before the judge who made the probable cause determination), is that none of the evidence recited by the dissent as a basis for a determination of probable cause was before the judge who made the probable cause *1090determination. Court reporter, Kathy Sue Clear, testified that evidentiary hearings are not routinely held in the White Superior Court when a warrant on a misdemeanor is sought, (R. 289, 300) and that, to the best of her knowledge, there was never a probable cause hearing in Clark's case. (R. 297). "The prosecutor brings up the probable cause affidavit and the charging information." (R. 300). There having been no evidentiary hearing, the only "evidence" offered to the judge in support of the determination was the barebones affidavit, the content of which is recited infra on page 11. In a criminal context, the author of the dissent would be the first to recognize that not only is this affidavit deficient but that it is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. See, generally, Everroad v. State (1991), Ind.App., 570 N.E.2d 38 (Sullivan, J. dissenting), superseded in part, (1992), 590 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Affidavit relied upon hearsay without the requisite information establishing credibility, factual basis and corroboration).
In short, the dissent's entire analysis overlooks the critical fact that, whatever the evidence in Kroger's possession, that evidence was not offered to the judge in support of the affidavit. And, we reiterate, as we state above, that the few representations of fact which were made in the affidavit have now been shown to be patently false. Clark's burden was not to establish that "the physical evidence" in Kroger's possession was falsified but to refute the presumption of validity accorded the earlier determination of probable cause. By showing an absence of truthful, factual support for the determination, Clark plainly has met that burden.