I concur out of deference to the dicta contained in the Supreme Court decisions cited in the principal opinion.1 Were it not for that dicta I would agree with Blackwell that the proper standard for determining his right to release under Penal Code section 1026.2 is whether he is dangerous to the health and safety of others. Should he be dangerous to himself, he would be subject to involuntary civil commitment under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq., § 5150), which contains substantially different (and less restrictive) provisions relating to location, nature and length of commitment and procedures for release. The Legislature seems quite capable of distinguishing between the two standards (cf. Pen. Code, §§ 1602, subd. (a), 1603, subd. (a), 1609, and 1611, subd. (a) with Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6500, 5150), and the distinction finds support in reason. It strikes me as anomalous that a person presently dangerous only to himself should be treated in a more restrictive manner than another person with the same tendencies simply because he was committed for a different reason. To do so is “to allow the remedy to exceed the cause of special treatment.” (Hamann, The Confinement and Release of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity (1966-1967) 4 Harv.J.Legis. 55, 83; Szasz, Law, Liberty and Psychiatry (1963) p. 229.)
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 24, 1981.
Neither In re Franklin (1972) 7 Cal.3d 126 [101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465], nor In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457 [149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097], involved the issue presented here, nor is that issue discussed in those opinions.