dissenting:
I agree that the trial court erred when it allowed the stun belt to be used without determining whether the circumstances demonstrated a “manifest need” for such a restraint. See Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266. A trial court abuses its discretion when it abdicates its decision-making authority regarding stun belt use to security personnel or law enforcement officials. People v. Mar, 28 Cal. 4th 1201, 52 P.3d 95, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161 (2002); State v. Flieger, 91 Wash. App. 236, 955 P.2d 872 (1998). As the Supreme Court of Kansas noted:
“It is the trial judge’s responsibility to insure that a defendant receives a fair trial. The sheriff is in control of the defendant outside the courtroom, but, within the courtroom, the obligation of courtroom security becomes a matter of shared concern. While deference should be given to law enforcement officers with security obligations, the trial judge must retain complete control over the courtroom and exercise his or her discretion in finally determining if restraints are to be utilized.” State v. Powell, 274 Kan. 618, 636, 56 P.3d 189, 201 (2002).
I believe, however, that the use of stun belts may be justified in appropriate cases. See D. Kendrick, United States v. Durham: Are the Criminal Defendant’s Rights at Trial Violated by Wearing a Stun Belt?, 26 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 711, 715-16 (2003) (collecting cases where use of stun belts has been upheld); but see Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind. 2001) (Indiana Supreme Court prospectively barred use of stun belts). More importantly, I do not believe that the erroneous use of a stun belt always requires reversal of a defendant’s conviction.
In People v. Peeples, 205 Ill. 2d 480, 793 N.E.2d 641 (2002), the defendant raised an issue in his postconviction petition regarding the fact that uniformed deputies sat behind him during his trial and a deputy sheriff escorted him to the witness stand and stood behind him while he testified. After finding that such security measures were not inherently prejudicial, our supreme court stated that “once the challenged security measures are found not to be inherently prejudicial, the defendant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating actual prejudice as a result of the in-court security.” Peeples, 205 Ill. 2d at 531, 793 N.E.2d at 672.
In this case I do not believe that the use of the stun belt was inherently prejudicial. There is no indication that the jury was aware of its existence or that it had any effect on the decision in this case. Despite the defendant’s assertion that he was “scared as heck” of the belt, defendant does not explain how the belt allegedly impeded him in the ability to assist in his defense. In my opinion, the defendant simply failed in meeting his burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. I therefore dissent.