dissenting:
I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that under the statutory provisions applicable here a crime victim’s age may not both constitute an element of the offense and serve as the basis for imposing an extended-term sentence on the offender. Accordingly, I dissent.
Section 5 — 5—3.2(b)(3)(i) of the Unified Code of Corrections authorizes the court to impose an extended term of imprisonment on a defendant who has been convicted of a felony committed against “a person under 12 years of age at the time of the offense.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(b)(3)(i) (now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(b)(4)(i))-) The defendants in the three causes consolidated here were convicted of aggravated felonies having as one of their elements the involvement of a minor under the age of 13. In all three cases the victims were less than 12 years old at the time of the offenses, and the defendants were sentenced to extended terms of imprisonment pursuant to section 5 — 5—3.2(b)(3)(i). Reflecting a divergence of authority on the question whether an extended term of imprisonment is available in those circumstances, different districts of the appellate court affirmed the extended-term sentences in two of the cases but vacated the sentence in the third.
The legislature has broad authority to define offenses and prescribe penalties. (See People v. Coleman (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 87, 96; People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 500.) “The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, and that inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute. (Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 136, 139-40.)” (Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Washburn (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 486, 492.) “ ‘There is no rule of [statutory] construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports’ (Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350), and it is not a court’s function to ‘ “read into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which depart from its plain meaning” ’ (In re Estate of Swiecicki (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 111, 120, quoting Belfield v. Coop (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 293, 307).” (People v. Hare (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 441, 447.) Thus, in the absence of ambiguity or constitutional invalidity, we should enforce, as enacted, the sentencing provision at issue here, which authorizes imposition of an enhanced penalty on the basis of a circumstance also constituting an element of the defendant’s aggravated offense. See Fitzsimmons v. Norgle (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 369, 373-74.
Unlike the majority, I find no ambiguity in the enhancement clause of section 5 — 5—3.2(b)(3)(i) of the Unified Code of Corrections or in the statutes defining the defendants’ offenses. In those provisions the legislature has expressed plainly its intention that the youthfulness of a crime victim may constitute an element of the particular offenses and may also serve as the basis for imposing an extended term sentence on an offender. We therefore should enforce the legislature’s mandate. The clear statutory language authorizing imposition of extended-term sentences in these circumstances distinguishes the present cases from our previous decisions in which we have determined that a sentence was improperly based on an element inherent in the offense. See People v. White (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 61; People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400.
One additional indication of legislative intent in this regard is the legislature’s use of different ages as conditions of enhancement in the various provisions relevant here. The common aggravating element in the defendants’ offenses is the involvement of a victim under the age of 13. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 10 — 2(a)(2) (aggravated kidnapping), 12 — 14(b)(l) (aggravated criminal sexual assault), 12 — 16(c)(1) (aggravated criminal sexual abuse).) An extended-term sentence, however, may be imposed pursuant to section 5 — 5—3.2(b)(3)(i) of the Unified Code of Corrections if the victim was under the age of 12 at the time of the offense. Clearly, the legislature contemplated that an extended term of imprisonment would be available for some, but not all, persons guilty of the aggravated offenses at issue here. (See People v. Phillips (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 483, 492.) The majority’s contrary holding thwarts the legislative scheme.
The defendants point to no language in the relevant provisions suggesting that the legislature intended to preclude imposition of extended-term sentences in these circumstances, nor do the defendants make any claim that section 5 — 5—3.2(b)(3)(i) is unconstitutional on its face or in its application to them. Therefore, I would conclude that the three defendants were properly sentenced to extended terms of imprisonment, and I would dispose of the appeals accordingly.