dissenting. Because the complaint filed by Wilmans seeks affirmative relief and a ruling that her daughter, Lisa Moreno, was not authorized to use her credit card, I agree with the trial court that Moreno is a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, I must respectfully dissent.
The following excerpts from Wilmans’s complaint reflect the broad relief requested:
• Sears attempts to charge to the Plaintiff charges' made by Lisa Moreno, ... and there is no basis for charging the disputed bills to the Plaintiff.
• Sears continues to seek to collect from the Plaintiff for charges that have been made by Lisa Moreno without the knowledge of the Plaintiff and without the authorization of the Plaintiff and, therefore, these charges should not be billed to the Plaintiff under the circumstances.
• [T]he Plaintiff will experience irreparable harm from the effort of Sears to collect these unauthorized and unjustified charges.
• Plaintiff asks for declaratory judgment against the Defendant that she does not owe any amount of this alleged charge or indebtedness except on any charge slip on which she signed her name.
• [T]he Plaintiff never authorized her daughter to make any charges at all on the Sears account.
• Each and every charge that Lisa Moreno made on the account was unauthorized.
Similarly, in her response to the motion to dismiss filed by Sears, Wilmans reiterates her request for broad relief:
The Plaintiff is seeking to have the charges that she did not make on her credit card taken off. Sears cannot provide authorization slips for these charges. The Plaintiff is simply seeking a declaratory judgment which would state that she is not liable for these charges. . . . The Plaintiff is seeking to have her account cleared of the charges that she did not make. . . . The Plaintiff simply did not make these charges nor did she authorize anyone to charge these items.
(Emphasis added.) This is not, as the majority states, “a simple declaration of whether under the credit agreement with Sears, Wilmans owes on charges for which she signed no charge slip.” Wilmans’s complaint squarely presents the question of Moreno’s authorization, and, thus, who is liable for the charges. Accordingly, “in [Moreno’s] absence[,] complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1) (2003).
Wilmans seeks to have the circuit court decide whether Moreno was authorized to make the disputed charges on the Sear’s card without naming Moreno as a party to the suit. Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude that the circuit court erred in dismissing the action under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7) (2003).
Glaze, J., joins.