I respectfully dissent. The policy of the law is to favor a hearing on the merits, particularly where it appears a defense could be *1039made. (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 854 [48 Cal.Rptr. 620, 409 P.2d 700]; Baske v. Burke (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 38, 43 [177 Cal.Rptr. 794].) “Rigid rule following is not always consistent with a court’s function to see that justice is done.” (Kapitanski v. Von’s Grocery Co. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 29, 32 [193 Cal.Rptr. 839].) There is no dispute that Mr. Bellia’s attorney acted promptly when notified his client had been served. While Mr. Bellia obviously did not act as promptly as he should have, his declaration shows that his father was dying of cancer at the time and this contributed to his neglect. It is true that he was also under the press of business, but he contends that his father’s illness (his father subsequently died) coming shortly after his mother’s death, was also a factor contributing to his failure to contact his attorney earlier. He was an only child, and his parents were dependent on him for support. His declaration shows he has a legitimate defense to offer. It appears the trial court emphasized the press of business at the expense of Mr. Bellia’s family problems.
Another factor in this case is equally disturbing. Plaintiff’s attorney knew Mr. Bellia had legal counsel in connection with another case in which plaintiff’s attorney was also suing Mr. Bellia on behalf of another client. Yet, plaintiff’s attorney never contacted nor notified Mr. Bellia’s attorney, and never advised the court that Mr. Bellia might be represented by counsel. An attorney is an officer of the court, and in presenting matters to the court may employ only such means as are consistent with the truth, and may not mislead the court in any fashion. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subds. (b) and (d); rule 7-105 (1), Rules Prof. Conduct.) This obligation requires the attorney to render a complete and candid disclosure—not merely relate only those facts which the attorney deems to be helpful to the cause for which he or she is retained. (See Mosesian v. State Bar (1972) 8 Cal.3d 60 [103 Cal.Rptr. 915, 500 P.2d 1115].)
Rule 7-103 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an attorney from any communication, direct or indirect, with a party known to be represented by counsel. In Abeles v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 603 [108 Cal.Rptr. 359, 510 P.2d 719] and Mitton v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 525 [78 Cal.Rptr. 649, 455 P.2d 753], our Supreme Court has made it clear that the purpose of the rule is to protect the client. While we are not dealing here with a communication, we are dealing with a situation where a default judgment was taken against a party by an attorney who knew the defaulting defendant had legal representation. The obligation of an attorney to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and the legal profession (Hamilton v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 868, 879 [153 Cal.Rptr. 602, 591 P.2d 1254]) is ill served by such conduct. “Counsel should not forget that they are officers of the court, and while it is their duty to protect and defend the interests of their clients, the obligation is equally imperative to aid the court *1040in avoiding error and in determining the cause in accordance with justice and the established rules of practice.” (Furlong v. White (1921) 51 Cal.App. 265, 271 [196 P. 903].)
I believe the action of the trial court was an abuse of its discretion and would reverse.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 8, 1984. Haning, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 14, 1984.