dissenting.
I dissent from the majority's opinion that Wior has presented an oral contract outside the Statute of Frauds. It is true that the Statute of Frauds has no application to contracts which are capable of being performed within one year of the making thereof. However, the evidence most favorable to Wior does not support an inference that the parties entered an agreement that could be performed within one year. Although Wior characterized his claims as one for breach of a contract for permanent employment, permanent employment does not equate with lifetime employment under the alleged circumstances.
Wior presented his understanding of a permanent position with Anchor Industries as: "With a commitment to a sound future, a long-term employment-you were talking 20 plus us [sic] years-a good opportunity here to be a V.P. at Anchor, yes." Record at 164. He believed his period of employment was "until retirement." R. at 164. Thus, considering Wior's understanding of permanent employment, it does not equate with lifetime employment referred to in case law. The cases relied upon by the majority have found death to be a contingency to the agreements therein. However, death was not contemplated as the contingency here. To the contrary, retirement estimated to be twenty years, not death, was the contingency of the alleged agreement for permanent employment. The cases relied upon by the majority are not applicable. Even using new math principles, one cannot reasonably expect to work 20 years until retirement and simultaneously expect to perform the contract within a year. The contract as contemplated by Wior is within the seope of the Statute of Frauds. Since it was not written, Wior's claim must fail, and I would affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of Anchor Industries on this issue.
I also note my reluctance to concur with the decision affirming summary judgment for Anchor Industries on Wior's wrongful discharge claim. It cannot be denied that public policy is transgressed when a supervisor can be discharged without legal recourse for refusing to fire an employee who filed a worker's compensation claim against the company. Although Indiana law recognizes the employee's cause of action for wrongful discharge, it has yet to grant the supervisor the same remedy. I am resigned to concur on this issue only because our courts have shown judicial restraint and refused to tread into this area, even when public policy is clearly violated, unless a statute explicitly declares the existence of the public policy.
In conclusion, I dissent from the majority decision reversing summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. On the related claims for negligent misrepresentation and intentional misrepresentation, I would affirm the trial court's determination that Wior failed to show an enforceable contract between the parties; thus, his claims likewise fail. I concur with the affirmance of summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim.