I concur in the result of the majority opinion insofar as it upholds overruling the demurrer of CSAA by the trial court. I respectfully dissent from the unnecessary suggestion that *1435the solution to the timing problem raised by CSAA is to try the declaratory relief complaint prior to trial of the cross-complaint.
As to the principal question, the majority opinion points to the heart of the matter: Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880 [153 Cal.Rptr. 842, 592 P.2d 329] is not controlling because the purpose of that holding is to serve the policy behind Evidence Code section 1155 and that policy is not implicated in this case. The fact of insurance cannot be suppressed in an action on a contract of insurance. Moreover, even if section 1155 were implicated, in a bilateral action this could not warrant a demurrer. The statutory basis for sustaining a demurrer in Royal Globe is misjoinder of parties, a ground for special demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (d); see 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 923.) Here there is no such ground. There can be no claim of misjoinder of parties; the claim is really misjoinder of issues. Such “misjoinder” is not demurrable. As the majority opinion notes, a defendant has an unrestricted right to cross-complain against the plaintiff under Code of Civil Procedure section 428.10, subdivision (a). (Also see 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, § 1090.) If there is a misjoinder of issues this furnishes no basis for a demurrer. The Legislative Committee comment to section 428.10, subdivision (a) says: “Any undesirable effects that might result from joinder of causes under Section 428.10 may be avoided by severance of causes or issues for trial under Section 1048 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
I part company from the majority at the point that they suggest the solution to CSAA’s claim of misjoinder of issues is to try the declaratory relief cause of action before the cross-complaint. CSAA complains that the cross-complaint is premature because CSAA must first be afforded the opportunity to arbitrate issues entailed in the cross-claim, namely, liability of and damages owed by the uninsured motorist. Of course, what is really premature here is the inchoate claim of arbitration rights since no one seems to have properly invoked arbitration. Setting that aside, CSAA’s argument goes nowhere on the priority issue. The Sousas’ answer to the declaratory relief complaint tenders the same matter as the cross-complaint. The answer includes an affirmative defense alleging CSAA failed to negotiate in good faith with the Sousas and asserting that this bars CSAA from invoking the exclusion clause for third party settlements without written consent. The argument shoots itself in the foot. If this matter must wait on arbitration when tendered in the cross-complaint the same result should obtain regarding the main action when it is tendered in the answer. CSAA’s declaratory relief claim should not be granted priority based on this argument.
*1436Moreover, since the declaratory relief action appears to entail the same issues as the Sousas’ cross-complaint, it may be appropriate to deny declaratory relief in any event. The office of declaratory relief is to set prospective controversies at rest in a cost effective manner. (See 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 817, p. 259.) “Hence, where there is an accrued cause of action for an actual breach of contract or other wrongful act [encompassing the same matters as a declaratory relief action], declaratory relief may be denied.” (Ibid; also cf. Annot., Application of Declaratory Judgment Acts to Questions in Respect of Insurance Policies (1943) 142 A.L.R. 8, 40-50; see generally Note, The Role of Declaratory Relief and Collateral Estoppel in Determining the Insurer’s Duty to Defend and Indemnify (1969) 21 Hastings L.J. 191, 195-204.) This tendency should gain force where, as here, declaratory relief may preempt issues subject to jury trial by forcing litigation in an equity proceeding.
I would defer any attempt to fully resolve the premature timing problems raised by CSAA and simply return the proceeding to the trial court for appropriate resolution when, and if, necessary.
Petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 11, 1986. Panelli, J., was of the opinion that the application should be granted.