I respectfully dissent.
I believe that Education Code section 44865 should be interpreted in its plain meaning. Thus, “in place of” any credential which authorizes the assignment of a teacher to teach at a continuation high school or any other of the enumerated assignments, the qualifications for assignment to continuation high schools are: (1) a valid teaching credential based on a bachelor’s degree; (2) student teaching; (3) specific fitness to perform; and (4) consent. Accordingly, I would hold that this code section requires a school district to obtain the consent of all teachers before transferring them to any of the enumerated assignments.
The majority states “If a law is clear the Legislative Counsel’s Digest must be disregarded.” I do not view the statute in question, Education Code section 44865, as clearly or as unambiguously written as my fellow justices. Thus, it *616becomes necessary to construe the statute. There can be no absolute test in the area of legislative intent. Analysis must be on a case-by-case basis because there are numerous potential sources of legislative intent available to the courts in California, including (1) organizations outside the Legislature (State Bar, Judicial Counsel, Attorney General, California Law Revision Commission, and numerous organizations and state agencies) which give opinions regarding legislative action, and (2) entities within the Legislature (Legislative committees, Legislative Counsel, and the Senate and Assembly Offices of Research). (See Comment, Legislative Intent (1981) 12 Pacific L.J. 189.)
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest has been used frequently by California courts to discern evidence of legislative intent. (See People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 520 [156 Cal.Rptr. 450, 596 P.2d 328]; People v. Superior Court (Douglass) (1979) 24 Cal.3d 428, 434 [155 Cal.Rptr. 704, 595 P.2d 139]; Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420,443 [134 Cal.Rptr. 650, 556 P.2d 1101]; Maben v. Superior Court (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 708, 713 [63 Cal.Rptr. 439].) Created in 1913, the Legislative Counsel is charged with the duties of preparing legislation in assisting law makers in the initial drafting phase of the legislative process. In addition, the Legislative Counsel is charged with rendering legal opinions on proposed legislation upon a legislator’s request. The Legislative Counsel also publishes a short synopsis or analysis of every bill as it is introduced or amended, called the Legislative Counsel’s Digest, which precedes the text of every bill. Moreover, the Legislative Counsel is charged with other duties, such as assisting the drafters of initiative measures to be submitted to the voters and advising the Legislature of legislation needed to maintain a particular code or to codify a certain public policy. (Gov. Code, § 10200 et seq.)
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest to the 1978 amendment to Education Code section 44865 provided in pertinent part that: “This bill would also prohibit the assignment of a teacher to the position of a home teacher or as a teacher in any of such special schools, classes, and the programs without the consent of the teacher.” (Leg. Counsel’s Dig. of Sen. Bill No. 433,4 Stats. 1978 (Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 248, italics added.) It is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute in question with the intent and meaning expressed in the Legislative Counsel’s Digest. Thus, I would uphold the trial court’s interpretation of Education Code section 44865—that is, the consent of any teacher, regardless of the nature of the credential held by that teacher, is necessary prior to being assigned to one of the enumerated positions listed in section 44865.
I am also persuaded by the fact that the majority’s interpretation of the statute in question treats teachers in the State of California unfairly depending upon *617what year they received their teaching credential. For example, if a junior high or high school teacher holding a single-subject credential under the Ryan Act is transferred to teach his or her authorized field at an elementary school or continuation school, he can only be transferred with his consent. (Ed. Code, § 44258.) Similarly, an elementary school teacher who holds a multi-subject credential under the Ryan Act can be transferred to teach his authorized field at the secondary level or at a continuation school, but only with his consent. (Ibid.)1 However, the majority would hold that a high school or junior high school teacher holding a general-secondary credential could be transferred to teach at a continuation school without his consent.2 I do not think the Legislature intended such disparate treatment.
The question of whether a teacher with a general-secondary credential could be assigned to teach at adult school has been considered by the Attorney General. In this case, a permanent high school teacher was assigned without his consent to teach at an adult school run by the school district at Soledad Correctional Institution. The Attorney General concluded that, although a general-secondary credential authorized teaching at adult school, adult school was an entirely different classification than teaching at regular high school; thus, the teacher could not be assigned to adult school without his consent unless tenure was acquired in the adult schools of the district. (41 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 175 (1963); cf. Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Education (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 189,202-203 [58 Cal.Rptr. 520] (dealing with a transfer to home teaching from classroom teaching).)
Education Code section 44865 deals with various special, and sometimes more difficult, teaching assignments. There is a perfectly rational basis for requiring a teacher’s consent to teach in those special situations.
For the foregoing reasons I would conclude that Education Code section 44865 prohibits school districts from assigning a teacher to teach at a continuation high school or any of the other enumerated assignments without his or her consent. As respondent Baird did not consent to be assigned to teach at Pershing Continuation High School, the trial court’s decision granting the writ of mandate was proper and should be upheld.
Respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 29, 1983, Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
Ryan Act credentials have been issued since February 1, 1973.
A general-secondary credential was no longer issued after 1976.