concurring.
I concur with the majority. However, I believe that the majority's great reliance on the law of other states' is unnecessary. Precedent in Indiana law supports the majority's opinion.
In recent years, our supreme court has increasingly limited governmental immunity from tort liability. For example, in Quakenbush v. Lackey the court held that law enforcement officers are liable for the breach of private duties owed to individuals, but are immune from liability for the breach of public duties owed to the public at large. (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 1284, 1291.
Additionally, as briefly mentioned by the majority, in Greathouse v. Armstrong, the court similarly held that the duty breached must be private in order for a county sheriffs office to be liable. (1993), Ind., 616 N.E.2d 364, 368. In Greathouse, the court reiterated the three elements of actionable negligence from Webb v. Jarvis (1991), Ind., 575 N.E.2d 992. These elements are: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to conform its conduct to a standard of care necessitated by its relationship with the decedent; (2) a breach of that duty; and, (8) an injury proximately caused by the breach. Greathouse 616 N.E.2d at 368 (citing Webb ).
After considering the facts of this case and applying existing Indiana case law, I concur.